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TMI Blog2017 (7) TMI 1466X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . After the marriage, the couple shifted to the U.K. in early 2007 and stayed in Watford. The mother did get an employment in London in 2008, but had to come to her parents' house in Delhi in June 2009, where she gave birth to Nethra. Thus, Nethra is an Indian citizen by birth. She has not given up her Indian citizenship. Indeed, the mother, along with Nethra, returned to the U.K. in March 2010. But from August 2010 till December 2011, because of matrimonial issues between the Appellant and Respondent No. 2, the Appellant and her daughter remained in India. Since Nethra had acquired British citizenship, the U.K. Court could exercise jurisdiction in respect of her custody issues. Significantly, till Nethra returned to India along with her mother on 2nd July, 2015, no proceeding of any nature came to be filed in the U.K. Court, either in relation to the matrimonial dispute between the Appellant and Respondent No. 2 or for the custody of Nethra. Further, Nethra is staying in India along with the Appellant, her grandparents and other family members and relatives unlike in the UK she lived in a nuclear family of the three with no extended family. She has been schooling here for the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ffering from cardiac disorder and needs periodical medical reviews and proper care and attention. That can be given only by her mother. The Respondent No. 2 (father) is employed and may not be in a position to give complete attention to his daughter. There is force in the stand taken by the Appellant that if Nethra returns to the U.K., she may not be able to get meaningful access to provide proper care and attention. Further, she has no intention to visit the U.K. Thus, it would be in the best interests of the minor (Nethra) to remain in custody of her mother (Appellant) else she would be exposed to harm if separated from the mother. We have, therefore, no hesitation in overturning the conclusion reached by the High Court. Further, we find that the High Court was unjustly impressed by the principle of comity of courts and the obligation of the Indian Courts to comply with a pre-existing order of the foreign Court for return of the child and including the first strike principle referred to in Surya Vadanan's case [ 2015 (2) TMI 1408 - SUPREME COURT] . Welfare of the Child - The summary jurisdiction to return the child be exercised in cases where the child had been removed from i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n person and for which she is required to visit the UK, Respondent No. 2-Anand Raghavan will bear the air fares or purchase the tickets for the travel of Appellant and Nethra to the UK and including for their return journey to India as may be required. In addition, Respondent No. 2-Anand Raghavan will make all arrangements for the comfortable stay of the Appellant and her companions at an independent place of her choice at reasonable costs. In the event, the Appellant is required to appear in the proceedings before the High Court of Justice in the UK, the Respondent No. 2 shall not initiate any coercive process against her which may result in penal consequences for the Appellant and if any such proceeding is already pending, he must take steps to first withdraw the same and/or undertake before the concerned Court not to pursue it any further. That will be condition precedent to pave way for the Appellant to appear before the concerned Court in the UK. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed in the above terms. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition (Criminal) is set aside. Resultantly, the writ petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tended family and friends. Thus, it is the Indian Courts which have the intimate contact with the minor and including the jurisdiction to decide the matter in issue. Furthermore, the Respondent No. 2 did not initiate any action for initial six months even after knowing that the Appellant was unwilling to return along with her daughter and until he was slapped with a notice regarding complaint filed by the Appellant before the Women Cell at Delhi in December 2015, relating to violence inflicted by him. As a counter blast to that notice the Respondent No. 2 rushed to the UK Court and then filed writ petition in the Delhi High Court to pressurize the Appellant to withdraw the allegations regarding violence inflicted by him. 5. To be able to fully appreciate and analyse the issues raised before this Court, it would be expedient to first set out the factual milieu from which the present case arises: a. The Appellant has a Masters' degree in communication and had worked in India prior to her marriage. Respondent No. 2 had gone to the United Kingdom as a student in 2003 and was working there since 2005. Admittedly, both Appellant and Respondent No. 2 were Indian citizens when they con ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the UK (and studied there till July 2015). Respondent No. 2 was paying the annual fees for the school amounting to approximately 10,000 GBP per annum. l. Subsequently, in July 2014, the Appellant returned to India owing to certain purported health problems, and also brought her daughter along with her. Both the Appellant and her daughter went back to the UK around a month later i.e. on 6th September, 2014, purportedly at the insistence of Respondent No. 2. m. From late 2014 till early 2015, the daughter took ill and was eventually diagnosed with a cardiac disorder for which she had to undergo periodical medical reviews. According to the Appellant, she was taking care of her daughter during this period while Respondent No. 2 did not even bother about the daughter's condition, a claim vehemently contested by Respondent No. 2. n. On 2nd July, 2015, the Appellant came back to India along with her daughter because of the alleged violent behavior of Respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2 asserts that soon after the Appellant left for India with their daughter, she sent an email to the school in which the daughter was enrolled, giving the reason for her departure as 'family medical re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng her minority or until further orders and that the mother would have to return the child to England by 22nd January, 2016. The High Court opined that in light of the order by the UK Court, the mother would not face any financial hardship and further, the order of the UK Court had attained finality due to lapse of time. The High Court then examined the law as propounded in several judgments, including Arathi Bandi v. Bandi Jagadrakshaka Rao and Ors. (2013) 15 SCC 790, Surya Vadanan v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2015) 5 SCC 450, Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu and Anr. (1984) 3 SCC 698, Mrs. Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw and Anr. (1987) 1 SCC 42, Marggarate Maria Pulparampil Nee Feldman v. Chacko Pulparampil and Anr. (1970) AIR (Ker) 1, Kuldeep Sidhu v. Chanan Singh and Ors. (1989) AIR (Punjab and Haryana) 103, In Re: H. (Infants) (1965) H. No. 2428 : (1966) 1 All ER 886 and Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo (2011) AIR SC 1952. The High Court held that since the mother had not sought custody of the child by approaching any competent Indian Court prior to the passing of the order by the UK Court, therefore, the first, effective order/direction had been passed by t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... held that there was no special or compelling reason to ignore the interim order passed by the UK Court and that the child was accustomed to and well adapted to the culture in the UK. Further, the High Court opined that there was no force in the mother's allegation that she was a victim of domestic abuse since she had not made a single complaint to the authorities while she was staying with the Respondent No. 2 in the UK. In addition, there was no documentary evidence to support such a claim either. Finally, the High Court rejected the contention, that the child ought to be medically treated only in Delhi for her heart condition and not in the UK, as baseless. 8. Advocate Malavika Rajkotia, learned Counsel for the Appellant, first submits that the High Court has given undue emphasis to the principle of comity of courts in complete disregard to the paramount interests and welfare of the child. She submits that the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration and that such consideration ought to over-ride the need to enforce the principle of comity of courts. There is an obvious need to protect the interests of the child and the mother, especially in light of the fact that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d after an order of the foreign court, this Court has protected the welfare of the child. In the present case, the Appellant left the UK prior to any proceedings being initiated against her, let alone any judicial order being passed. Ms. Rajkotia has relied upon the following judgments to buttress her argument: Smt. Surinder Kaur Sandhu (supra), Mrs. Elizabeth Dinshaw (supra), Sarita Sharma v. Sushil Sharma (2000) 3 SCC 14 and Dr. V. Ravi Chandran v. Union of India and Ors. (2010) 1 SCC 174. 11. Ms. Rajkotia further submits that in two cases, viz. Shilpa Aggarwal v. Aviral Mittal and Anr. (2010) 1 SCC 591 and most recently in Surya Vadanan (supra), this Court has deviated from the established principle of putting the welfare of the child above all other considerations. In both these cases, the Court ordered that the child and mother return to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, despite the fact that the two had left the foreign jurisdiction before the court had passed any order. She has taken exception to the reasoning given in these two judgments on the ground that the decisions overlook the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Court as also misinterpreted the concept of 'int ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hould have been loath to countenance such stratagem adopted by Respondent No. 2, which is bordering on abuse of the process of Court. 14. Ms. Rajkotia finally submits that the High Court has failed to consider certain factual circumstances and has committed manifest error in that regard. In that, Respondent No. 2 was offering the Appellant a paltry monthly maintenance of just 1000 GBP whereas he himself was earning 10,000 GBP per month. Even after making such offer, Respondent No. 2 has not paid for the welfare or education of the child in India. Further, the High Court has not considered the serious health issues being faced by the child while ordering her to go back to the UK. Ms. Rajkotia submits that in India, the child has access to private, specialist healthcare whereas in the UK, the child would be constrained by the National Health Service (NHS) which is the publicly funded national healthcare system for England. Further, the High Court has relied on incorrect facts while passing the Impugned Judgment. 15. In addition to the aforementioned cases, Ms. Rajkotia has also submitted a compendium of judgments titled 'List of judgments filed on behalf of Appellant'. The ju ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... No. 2 even had the resources to approach private hospitals. 18. Mr. Jauhar then submits that the Respondent No. 2's bonafides can be gleaned from the fact that the High Court directed Respondent No. 2 to honour his commitment of paying for accommodation near the child's school as well as boarding and travelling expenses of the Appellant and the child. Respondent No. 2 made statements before the UK court that he would vacate his family home for use of the Appellant's family, pay for the child's school expenses and pay 1000 GBP per month for incidental expenses. In fact, Respondent No. 2 even made a statement before the High Court that he would not pursue any criminal proceedings against the Appellant for kidnapping the child and only wished the family to be reunited in the UK so that the child could continue with her education. In addition to the aforesaid payments, Respondent No. 2 was even ready to provide a monthly payment of 1000 GBP to the Appellant and is now willing to fund the cost of litigation borne by the Appellant for custody of the child in the UK. 19. Mr. Jauhar then submits that only the UK Court would have jurisdiction with regard to the alleged acts ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... wanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde (1998) 1 SCC 112. In Paragraphs 28 to 30, 32 and 33 of the reported decision, the Court observed thus: 28. The leading case in this behalf is the one rendered by the Privy Council in 1951, in McKee v. McKee. In that case, the parties, who were American citizens, were married in USA in 1933 and lived there till December 1946. But they had separated in December 1940. On 17-12-1941, a decree of divorce was passed in USA and custody of the child was given to the father and later varied in favour of the mother. At that stage, the father took away the child to Canada. In habeas corpus proceedings by the mother, though initially the decisions of lower courts went against her, the Supreme Court of Canada gave her custody but the said Court held that the father could not have the question of custody retried in Canada once the question was adjudicated in favour of the mother in the USA earlier. On appeal to the Privy Council, Lord Simonds held that in proceedings relating to custody before the Canadian Court, the welfare and happiness of the infant was of paramount consideration and the order of a foreign court in USA as to his custody can be given due weight in th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and contacts to which he has been accustomed, or if its education in his native land is interrupted and the child is being subjected to a foreign system of education,-for these are all acts which could psychologically disturb the child. Again the summary jurisdiction is exercised only if the court to which the child has been removed is moved promptly and quickly, for in that event, the Judge may well be persuaded that it would be better for the child that those merits should be investigated in a court in his native country on the expectation that an early decision in the native country could be in the interests of the child before the child could develop roots in the country to which he had been removed. Alternatively, the said court might think of conducting an elaborate inquiry on merits and have regard to the other facts of the case and the time that has lapsed after the removal of the child and consider if it would be in the interests of the child not to have it returned to the country from which it had been removed. In that event, the unauthorised removal of the child from the native country would not come in the way of the court in the country to which the child has been rem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... has lapsed from the date of removal to the date of commencement of the proceedings before the court, the child would still be returned unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment. Article 12 is subject to Article 13 and a return could be refused if it would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable position or if the child is quite mature and objects to its return. In England, these aspects are covered by the Child Abduction and Custody Act, 1985. 33. So far as non-Convention countries are concerned, or where the removal related to a period before adopting the Convention, the law is that the court in the country to which the child is removed will consider the question on merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of the foreign court as only a factor to be taken into consideration as stated in McKee v. McKee unless the Court thinks it fit to exercise summary jurisdiction in the interests of the child and its prompt return is for its welfare, as explained in L. As recently as 1996-1997, it has been held in P (A minor) (Child Abduction: Non-Convent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r has been brought must ordinarily consider the question on merits, bearing in mind the welfare of the child as of paramount importance whilst reckoning the pre-existing order of the foreign Court if any as only one of the factors and not get fixated therewith. In either situation-be it a summary inquiry or an elaborate inquiry-the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration. Thus, while examining the issue the Courts in India are free to decline the relief of return of the child brought within its jurisdiction, if it is satisfied that the child is now settled in its new environment or if it would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable position or if the child is quite mature and objects to its return. We are in respectful agreement with the aforementioned exposition. 25. Notably, the aforementioned exposition has been quoted with approval by a three-judge bench of this Court in Dr. V. Ravi Chandran (supra) as can be discerned from paragraph 27 of the reported decision. In that, after extracting paragraphs 28 to 30 of the decision in Dhanwanti Joshi's case, the three-judge bench observed thus: 27. ...However, in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... court in one jurisdiction to make an order directing that a child be returned to a foreign jurisdiction without investigating the merits of the dispute relating to the care of the child on the ground that such an order is in the best interests of the child has been explained in L (Minors), In re and the said view has been approved by this Court in Dhanwanti Joshi. Similar view taken by the Court of Appeal in H. (Infants), in re has been approved by this Court in Elizabeth Dinshaw. 26. The consistent view of this Court is that if the child has been brought within India, the Courts in India may conduct (a) summary inquiry or (b) an elaborate inquiry on the question of custody. In the case of a summary inquiry, the Court may deem it fit to order return of the child to the country from where he/she was removed unless such return is shown to be harmful to the child. In other words, even in the matter of a summary inquiry, it is open to the Court to decline the relief of return of the child to the country from where he/she was removed irrespective of a pre-existing order of return of the child by a foreign Court. In an elaborate inquiry, the Court is obliged to examine the merits as to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ould be changed and the child be handed over to the care and custody of any other person. While doing so, the paramount consideration must be about the welfare of the child. In the case of Mrs. Elizabeth (supra), it is held that in such cases the matter must be decided not by reference to the legal rights of the parties but on the sole and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interests and welfare of the minor. The role of the High Court in examining the cases of custody of a minor is on the touchstone of principle of parens patriae jurisdiction, as the minor is within the jurisdiction of the Court (see Paul Mohinder Gahun v. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors. 113 (2004) Delhi Law Time 823 relied upon by the Appellant). It is not necessary to multiply the authorities on this proposition. 29. The High Court while dealing with the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus concerning a minor child, in a given case, may direct return of the child or decline to change the custody of the child keeping in mind all the attending facts and circumstances including the settled legal position referred to above. Once again, we may hasten to add that the decision of the Court, i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... SENIOR COURTS ACT 1981 The Child is Nethra Anand (a girl, born 7/8/09) AFTER HEARING Counsel paul Hepher, on behalf of the applicant father AFTER consideration of the documents lodged by the applicant IMPORTANT WARNING TO NITHYA ANAND RAGHAVAN If you NITHYA ANAND RAGHAVAN disobey this order you may be held to be in contempt of court and may be imprisoned, fined or have your assets seized. If any other person who knows of this order and does anything which helps or permits you NITHYA ANAND RAGHAVAN to breach the terms of this order they may be held to be in contempt of court and may be imprisoned, fined or have their assets seized. You have the following legal rights: a) to seek legal advice. This right does not entitle you to disobey any part to this order until you have sought legal advice; b) to require the applicant's solicitors, namely Dawson Cornwell, 15 Red Lion Square, London WC1R 4QT, tel 020 7242 2556 to provide you with a copy of any application form(s), statement(s), note of the hearing; c) to apply, whether by counsel or solicitor or in person, to Judge of the Family Court assigned to hearing urgent applications at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, if pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... les of the Ward NETHRA AN AND (a girl born on 7/8/09) IT IS ORDERED THAT: 8. NETHRA AN AND (a girl horn on 7/8/09) is and shall remain a Ward of this Court during the minority or until further order. 9. The Respondent mother shall return or cause the return of NETHRA AN AND (a girl horn on 7/8/09) forthwith to England and Wales, and in any event no later than 23.59 on 22 January 2016. 10. Every person within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court who is in a position to do so shall co-operate in assisting and securing the immediate return to England and Wales of NETHRA ANAND (a girl born on 7/8/09) a ward of this Court. 11. The applicant's solicitor shall fax copies of this order to the Office of the Head of International, Family Justice at the Royal Courts of Justice, the Strand, London WC2A 2LL (DX4550 Strand RCJ: fax 02079476408); and (if appropriate) to the Head of the Consular Division, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Spring Gardens London SW1A 2PA, Tel: 02070080212, Fax 02070080152. 12. The matter shall be listed for directions at 10:30 am on 29 January 2016 at the Royal Courts of Justice, the Strand, London Wc2A 2LL, with a time estimate of 30 minutes, when the court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... resumed to be lawful. 33. The High Court in such a situation may then examine whether the return of the minor to his/her native state would be in the interests of the minor or would be harmful. While doing so, the High Court would be well within its jurisdiction if satisfied, that having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances, it would be in the interests and welfare of the minor child to decline return of the child to the country from where he/she had been removed; then such an order must be passed without being fixated with the factum of an order of the foreign Court directing return of the child within the stipulated time, since the order of the foreign Court must yield to the welfare of the child. For answering this issue, there can be no strait jacket formulae or mathematical exactitude. Nor can the fact that the other parent had already approached the foreign court or was successful in getting an order from the foreign court for production of the child, be a decisive factor. Similarly, the parent having custody of the minor has not resorted to any substantive proceeding for custody of the child, cannot whittle down the overarching principle of the best interest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... extended family. She has been schooling here for the past over one year and has spent equal time in both the countries out of the first six years. She would be more comfortable and feel secured to live with her mother here, who can provide her love, understanding, care and guidance for her complete development of character, personality and talents. Being a girl child, the guardianship of the mother is of utmost significance. Ordinarily, the custody of a girl child who is around seven years of age, must ideally be with her mother unless there are circumstances to indicate that it would be harmful to the girl child to remain in custody of her mother [see Sarita Sharma (supra) para 6]. No such material or evidence is forthcoming in the present case except the fact that the Appellant (mother) has violated the order of the U.K. Court directing her to return the child to the U.K. before the stipulated date. Admittedly, when Nethra was in the U.K., no restraint order was issued by any court or authority in the U.K. in that behalf. She had travelled along with her mother from the U.K. to India on official documents. It is a different matter that Respondent No. 2 alleges that he was not in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... writ of habeas corpus and not to decide the issue of grant or non-grant of custody of the minor as such. In a substantive proceeding for custody of the minor before the Court of competent jurisdiction including in India if permissible, all aspects will have to be considered on their own merit without being influenced by any observations in this judgment. 35. As aforesaid, the Respondent No. 2 has heavily relied on four decisions of this Court. The case of V. Ravi Chandran (supra) also arose from a writ of habeas corpus for production of minor son and not from the substantive proceedings for custody of the minor by the father. The minor was in custody of his mother. It was a case of custody of a male child born in the US and an American citizen by birth, who was around 8 years of age when he was removed by the mother from the United States of America (USA) in spite of a consent order governing the issue of custody and guardianship of the minor passed by the competent Court namely, the New York State Supreme Court. The minor was given in joint custody to the parents and a restraint order was operating against the mother when the child was removed from the USA surreptitiously and brou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Arathi Bandi (supra) also, the male child was born in the USA and had acquired citizenship by birth there. The child was removed from the USA by the mother in spite of a restraint order and a red corner notice operating against her issued by the Court of competent jurisdiction in the USA. The Court, therefore, held that the matter on hand was squarely covered by facts as in V. Ravi Chandran (supra). More importantly, as noted in paragraph 42 of the reported decision the mother (the wife of the writ Petitioner) had expressed her intention to return to the USA and live with the husband. However, the husband was not prepared to cohabit with her. In the present case, the situation is distinguishable as alluded to earlier. 38. In the case of Surya Vadanan (supra), the minor girls were again British citizens by birth. The elder daughter was 10 years of age and the younger daughter was around 6 years of age. They lived in the UK throughout their lives. In a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the Court directed return of the girls to the UK also because of the order passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction in the UK to produce the girls before that Court. The husband ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... om the exposition in Dhanwanti Joshi's case (supra), which has been quoted with approval by a three-judge bench of this Court in V. Ravi Chandran (supra). In that, the nature of inquiry suggested therein inevitably recognises giving primacy to the order of the foreign Court on the issue of custody of the minor. That has been explicitly negated in Dhawanti Joshi's case. For, whether it is a case of a summary inquiry or an elaborate inquiry, the paramount consideration is the interests and welfare of the child. Further, a pre-existing order of a foreign Court can be reckoned only as one of the factor to be taken into consideration. We have elaborated on this aspect in the earlier part of this judgment. 40. As regards the fourth factor noted in Clause (d), we respectfully disagree with the same. The first part gives weightage to the first strike principle. As noted earlier, it is not relevant as to which party first approached the Court or so to say first strike referred to in paragraph 52 of the judgment. Even the analogy given in paragraph 54 regarding extrapolating that principle to the Courts in India, if an order is passed by the Indian Court is inapposite. For, the India ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... child. That is only one of the factors to be taken into consideration. The interests and welfare of the child are of paramount consideration. The principle of comity of courts as observed in Dhanwanti Joshi's case (supra), in relation to non-convention countries is that the Court in the country to which the child is removed will consider the question on merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of the foreign Court as only a factor to be taken into consideration. While considering that aspect, the Court may reckon the fact that the child was abducted from his or her country of habitual residence but the Court's overriding consideration must be the child's welfare. 42. The facts in all the four cases primarily relied upon by the Respondent No. 2, in our opinion, necessitated the Court to issue direction to return the child to the native state. That does not mean that in deserving cases the Courts in India are denuded from declining the relief to return the child to the native state merely because of a pre-existing order of the foreign Court of competent jurisdiction. That, however, will have to be considered on case to cas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rity, she should remain in the custody of her mother unless the Court of competent jurisdiction trying the issue of custody of the child orders to the contrary. However. the father must be given visitation rights, whenever he visits India. He can do so by giving notice of at least two weeks in advance intimating in writing to the Appellant and if such request is received, the Appellant must positively respond in writing to grant visitation rights to the Respondent No. 2-Mr. Anand Raghavan (father) for two hours per day twice a week at the mentioned venue in Delhi or as may be agreed by the Appellant, where the Appellant or her representatives are necessarily present at or near the venue. The Respondent No. 2 shall not be entitled to, nor make any attempt to take the child (Nethra) out from the said venue. The Appellant shall take all such steps to comply with the visitation rights of Respondent No. 2, in its letter and spirit. Besides, the Appellant will permit the Respondent No. 2-Mr. Anand Raghavan to interact with Nethra on telephone/mobile or video conferencing, on school holidays between 5 PM to 7:30 PM IST. 46. As mentioned earlier, the Appellant cannot disregard the proceedi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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