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TMI Blog2024 (7) TMI 811X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or such liberty , the review petitioners would not have even thought of applying for review since the law on the point was no longer res integra. It is, therefore, an admission on their part that the judgments and orders under review, as on the dates they were delivered/made, were neither erroneous (which is a possible ground for appeal, if an appeal were allowed by law) nor suffering from any error apparent on the face of the record (a possible ground for review). Therefore, merely based on Shailendra [3-Judge], a subsequent event, the review jurisdiction of this Court which is a limited jurisdiction could not have been invoked. In paragraph 365 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] itself, it has been held by the Constitution Bench that Shailendra [3-Judge] did not have the occasion to consider certain aspects for which that decision cannot prevail. Learned senior counsel for the respondents, based on such statement, contended that Shailendra [3-Judge] stands overruled. This submission has been disputed by learned senior counsel for the review petitioners. According to them, Shailendra [3-Judge] has not been expressly overruled; only because of aspects referred to in paragraph 365 and t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 400/2023 in C.A. No. 8899/2016, R.P.(C) No. 401/2023 in C.A. No. 8527/2016, R.P.(C) No. 402/2023 in C.A. No. 8547/2016, R.P.(C) No. 403/2023 in C.A. No. 8952/2016, R.P.(C) No. 405/2023 in C.A. No. 8935/2016, R.P.(C) No. 406/2023 in C.A. No. 8954/2016, R.P.(C) No. 407/2023 in C.A. No. 9049/2016, R.P.(C) No. 408/2023 in C.A. No. 8559/2016, R.P.(C) No. 411/2023 in C.A. No. 9214/2016, R.P.(C) No. 413/2023 in C.A. No. 9595/2016, R.P.(C) No. 397/2023 in C.A. No. 8909/2016, R.P.(C) No. 417/2023 in C.A. No. 8921/2016, R.P.(C) No. 420/2023 in C.A. No. 8904/2016, R.P.(C) No. 421/2023 in C.A. No. 9719/2016, R.P.(C) No. 423/2023 in C.A. No. 8957/2016, R.P.(C) No. 424/2023 in C.A. No. 8922/2016, R.P.(C) No. 426/2023 in SLP(C) No. 17316/2016, R.P.(C) No. 430/2023 in C.A. No. 11854/2016, C.A. No. 1522/2023 Diary No(s). 14831/2023 Diary No(s). 15893/2023, R.P.(C) No. 422/2023 in C.A. No. 12046/2016, R.P.(C) No. 404/2023 in C.A. No. 12111/2016, R.P.(C) No. 415/2023 in C.A. No. 11853/2016 Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta And Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. For the Petitioner : Mr. Ravi Bharuka, AOR, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, AOR, Ms. Poornima Singh, Adv., Ms. BLN Shivani, Adv., Ms. Manisha Ch ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Kumar Singh, Adv., Ms. Rajshree Singh, Adv., Ms. Diksha Rai, AOR, Mr. Arijit Dey, Adv., Ms. Atiga Singh, Adv., Ms. Apurva Sachdev, Adv., Ms. Akriti Chaubey, AOR, Mr. Mayank Kshirsagar, AOR, Ms. Smita Maan, AOR, Mr. Vishal Maan, Adv., Mr. Aditya Singh, Adv., Mr. Kartik Dabas, Adv., Mr. Jayant Singh, Adv., Mr. Sameer Jain, Adv., Mr. Abhinav Shrivastava, AOR, Mr. Shivang Rawat, Adv., Ms. Amrita Kumari, Adv., Mr. Atul Kumar, AOR, Ms. Sweety Singh, Adv., Ms. Archana Kumari, Adv., Mr. Rahul Pandey, Adv., Mr. Avs Kadyan, Adv., Mr. Arvind Kumar Sharma, AOR, Ms. Malvika Kapila, AOR, Mr. Ishaan Sharma, Adv., Ms. Tanwangi Shukla, Adv., Mr. Ashwani Kumar, AOR, Mr. Ashutosh Kaushik, Adv., Ms. Manika Tripathy, AOR, Mr. Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Mr. Dinesh Kumar Garg, AOR, Mr. Abhishek Garg, Adv., Mr. Dhananjay Garg, Adv., Ms. Anshula L. Bakhru, Adv., Mr. Ishaan Tiwari, Adv., Mr. Chanakya Gupta, Adv., Mr. R.P Bansal, Adv., Mr. Nitin Mishra, AOR, Mr. Ishaan Sharma, Adv., Ms. Mitali Gupta, Adv., Ms. Shambhavi Sharma, Adv., Ms. Sunieta Ojha, AOR, Mr. Nishit Agrawal, AOR, Ms. Kanishka Mittal, Adv., Mr. Shrey Kapoor, Adv., Ms. Upasna Agrawal, Adv., Ms. Vanya Agrawal, Adv., M/s. Saharya Co., AOR, Mr. V. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... said Division Bench has to be held incorrect unless, of course, harmonization of the two opinions, in any manner, is possible. In the process of considering the rival claims, the exercise of declaring one view as correct and the other incorrect or to harmonize the two views, have necessarily taken us back to the basics of the substantive and procedural laws regulating review jurisdiction of this Court. The effort, we have no hesitation to say, has been really educative as well as rewarding because the erudite arguments advanced from the Bar opened up a new vista of thinking to appreciate points of debate that emerged not only from the facts of the petitions before us but also points arising from certain connected matters, decided by this Court. We record our sincere appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by the members of the Bar who had the occasion to address this larger Bench. 2. THE REFERENCE 2. The two Hon ble Judges comprising the said Division Bench were considering a clutch of review petitions ( RPs , hereafter), presented either by the Delhi Development Authority or the Government of NCT, Delhi, or the Land and Building Department, etc. ( review petitioners , h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... paid in the same sub-section was also explained. Perhaps, since no argument was advanced, the Bench did not have the occasion to consider whether the conjunction or between the expressions compensation has not been paid and possession has not been taken in subsection (2) should be read as or as it is, or read as and . 5. However, Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was doubted by a two-Judge Bench (cor. Hon ble Arun Mishra and Hon ble Amitava Roy, JJ.) in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra [2-Judge] [(2018) 1 SCC 733] wherein it was of the opinion that the issue should be considered by a larger Bench. 6. Consequently, a Bench of three-Judges (cor. Hon ble Arun Mishra, Hon ble A.K. Goel and Hon ble M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.) was constituted. The majority speaking through Hon ble Arun Mishra, J. in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra [3-Judge] [(2018) 3 SCC 412] held Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) per incuriam but deemed it not necessary to refer to a larger Bench. Relevant excerpts from such decision are set out hereunder: 216. With respect to the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal Corpn. we have given deep thinking whether to refer it to further larger Bench bu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 8 SCC 129], the controversy was finally put to rest. The conclusions in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) are recorded in paragraphs 365 and 366. However, paragraph 365 being relevant for a decision here, is quoted hereunder: 365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corpn. is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corpn. has been followed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. cannot be said to be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions following the same are also overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra [3-judge] , the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether or has to be read as nor or as and was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present judgment. 12. Ironically, during the hearing, a controversy was raised by the respondents therein regarding the composition of the Bench in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). A preliminary objection for recusal of the presiding Judge of the said Constitution Bench was sought on the ground that His Lordship was a part of the three-Judge ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1894 Act stood lapsed. These RPs arise out of writ proceedings on the file of the High Court, which have since attained finality by reason of the judgments and orders under review. 16. The facts are noticed from the Review Petition arising out of the Writ Petition [W.P. (C) No. 9200/2014] instituted by the first respondent, K.L. Rathi Steels Limited, which is the lead matter. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and similar line of decisions, the High Court vide its judgment and order dated 7th July, 2015, allowed the writ petition taking a view that the necessary ingredients of section 24(2), as interpreted by this Court, having been met, the acquisition proceedings under challenge therein are deemed to have lapsed. Aggrieved, the first respondent carried such judgment and order in a Civil Appeal [Civil Appeal No. 11857/2016] praying for it to be set aside. This Court, vide a common judgment and order dated 29th November, 2016 concerning various civil appeals, dismissed the appeals and granted a period of one year to the appellants (review petitioners herein) to exercise liberty granted under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act for initiation of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arlier, was itself doubted in the subsequent decision in the case of and that the matter was referred to the Constitution Bench and thereafter the Constitution Bench has declared the law as above, more particularly paragraphs 365 and 366 of the judgment in the case of . 21. Lastly, it was noted that in most of the cases that were sought to be reviewed, the lands had already been utilised by the beneficiaries of acquisition and in view of the orders passed declaring the deemed lapse of acquisition, (T)he resultant effect would be to return the possession of the land/s which might have been used by the beneficiary authorities . It was, therefore held that the RPs should be allowed in the larger public interest and the authorities should be given an opportunity to put forward their case afresh, which shall be in the larger public interest . 22. In contrast, the Hon ble companion Judge while dissenting with the Hon ble presiding Judge proceeded to examine the RPs on the basis of their very maintainability, in the light of the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC. Multiple decisions of this Court, on the parameters on which a review petition could be entertained by this Court, were ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of NCT, Delhi), with all the passion at her command, argued that the RPs are maintainable and advanced, in support of maintainability, the following submissions: a) The specific and categoric overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was followed, leads to the conclusion, in absolute terms, that land acquisition proceedings cannot be deemed to have lapsed under section 24(2) unless the conditions enumerated in paragraph 366 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) are satisfied. b) Vide order dated 16th July, 2020 in Pune Municipal Corporation [Recall Order] (supra), the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has been recalled and the position of law, as expounded therein, stands erased, leading the findings operating inter se the parties to cease. c) To dismiss the review/recall petitions at the threshold as not being maintainable will lead to a great injustice and undermine the public interest, particularly in the light of the liberty granted by this Court in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). The RPs deserve to be decided on merits on a case-to-case basis on various parameters including the stage of lit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r. Giri, Mr. Chib and Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel and by Ms. Swaraj, learned counsel, supported the opinion expressed by the Hon ble companion Judge on the said Division Bench and urged this Bench to take the same recourse. The following submissions were advanced by them: a) The decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) does not come to the rescue of the review petitioners, it must operate prospectively and cannot reopen claims which have attained finality. b) BSNL v. Union of India [(2006) 3 SCC 1] and Neelima Srivastava v. State of U.P. [2021 SCC OnLine SC 610] were relied upon to support the contention that overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) merely takes away the precedential value; it, however, does not affect the binding nature of a decision that has attained finality inter se the parties. c) This Court has limited jurisdiction available in review and in terms of the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC, overruling of earlier judgments would not constitute a ground for review. d) Further, the decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) did not, in any manner whatsoever, endorse the purported liberty granted by Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) in p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... upreme Court. In view thereof and particularly in the light of the authorities considered in the split verdict and those which have been cited in course of the debate that unfolded before us, calls for a relook at the relevant provisions and the precedents bearing in mind the respective approaches of the Hon ble Judges in the split verdict: one of them has given public interest paramount importance, no matter what the law ordains; while the other has stuck to the law, no matter what public interest demands. 34. Power of the Supreme Court to review its own judgment and/or order has its genesis in Articles 137 and 145 of the Constitution read with Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 ( 2013 Rules , hereafter). Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the 2013 Rules, in no uncertain terms, lays down that no application for review in a civil proceeding will be entertained by this Court except on the ground mentioned in Rule 1 Order XLVII, CPC. Review in civil proceedings is governed by section 114 of the CPC read with Order XLVII thereof. It would, therefore, not be inapt to read section 114 and Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC once again: 114. Review. Subject as aforesaid, any person considering hi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aspect. 37. A peep into the legislative history would reveal that Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC, which is part of the First Schedule appended thereto, bears very close resemblance to its predecessor statutes, i.e., Section 623 of the Codes of Civil Procedure of 1877 and 1882. The solitary legislative change brought about in 1976 in Order XLVII, CPC resulted in insertion of an Explanation at the foot of Rule 1, which is at the heart of the controversy here. 38. The first and foremost condition that is required to be satisfied by a party to invoke the review jurisdiction of the court, whose order or decree, as the case may be, is sought to be reviewed, is that the said party must be someone who is aggrieved by the order/decree. The words person aggrieved are found in several statutes; however, the meaning thereof has to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and provisions of the statute. In one sense, the said words could correspond to the requirement of locus standi in relation to judicial remedies. The need to ascertain the locus standi of a review petitioner could arise, if he is not a party to the proceedings but claims the order or decree to have adversely affected his inte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er to the traditional view in Chhajju Ram (supra), a decision of a Bench of seven Law Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It was held there that the words any other sufficient reason means a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously , meaning thereby (i) and (ii) (supra). Notably, Chhajju Ram (supra) has been consistently followed by this Court in a number of decisions starting with Moran Mar Basselios Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526]. 43. There are recent decisions of this Court which have viewed mistake as an independent ground to seek a review. Whether or not such decisions express the correct view need not detain us since the review here is basically prayed in view of the subsequent event. 44. As noted above, the Explanation in Rule 1 Order XLVII was inserted in 1976. It reads: Explanation. The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. 45. The above insertion was preceded by a recommendati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e same view. The High Court at Calcutta way back on 15th February, 1927 in Sudananda Moral v. Rakhal Sana [XXXI CWN 822 = AIR 1927 Cal 920], considering the decision of the Privy Council in Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Raja Vellanki Venkatrama Rao [LR (1899-1900) 27 IA 197] , opined that reversal of a relied-on decision subsequent to the decree in the suit was not a ground for review of the judgment. Also, the High Court of Madras in Ravella Krishnamurthy v. Yarlagadda [AIR 1933 Madras 485] observed that for review on the ground of discovery of new and important matter, such matter must be in existence at the date of the decree. The exposition of law on the point, therefore, dates back to almost a quarter and a century back. I. PRECEDENTS CONSIDERING THE EXPLANATION 48. There are a few decisions of this Court where the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC has since been considered. 49. The earliest decision is Shanti Devi v. State of Haryana [(1999) 5 SCC 703] where the Court rejected the review petition by holding that the contention that the judgment sought to be reviewed was overruled in another case subsequently is no ground for reviewing the said decision. Expla ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. After considering a host of decisions with a finetooth comb, the Court went on to cull out the principles of review in paragraph 35 of the decision which is extracted hereunder: 35. The principles which can be culled out from the abovenoted judgments are: (i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a civil court under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. (ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f). (v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. (vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s and some that have emerged on our research on the subject and considered relevant, are discussed/referred to here. 56. Two of these decisions, viz. A.C. Estates v. Serajuddin [(1966) 1 SCR 235] and Raja Shatrunji v. Mohd. Azmat Azim Khan [(1971) 2 SCC 200] were rendered prior to introduction of the Explanation in Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC. Significantly, even without the Explanation, substantially the same view was expressed. 57. In A.C. Estates (supra), a bench of three Hon ble Judges of this Court, while dismissing the civil appeal and upholding the order of the High Court at Calcutta, held as follows: Our attention in this connection is drawn to Section 29(5) of the Act which gives power to the Controller to review his orders and the conditions laid down under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But this cannot be a case of review on the ground of discovery of new and important matter, for such matter has to be something which exist at the date of the order and there can be no review of an order which was right when made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event (see Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Raja Vellanki Venkatrama Rao[LR (1899-1900) 27 IA 19 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words sufficient reason in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit . In the next paragraph, Their Lordships quoted a portion of paragraph 32 from the Larger Bench decision in Moran Mar Basselios Catholics (supra) but held that the said rule is not universal . 60. Netaji Cricket Club (supra) was followed in Jagmohan Singh v. State of Punjab [(2008) 7 SCC 38] . It was held there that Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC does not preclude the High Court or a court to take into consideration any subsequent event and that if imparting of justice in a given situation is the goal of the judiciary, the court may take into consideration (of course on rare occasions) the subsequent events. 61. This Court, in paragraph 20 of the decision in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati [(2013) 8 SCC 320], after surveying previous authorities and following Chhajju Ram (supra) and Moran Mar Basselios Catholics (supra) summarized the principles ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... berty of the nature claimed by the review petitioners. 68. This Court sitting in a combination of five-Hon ble Judges in Vikramjit Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1992 Supp (3) SCC 62] had the occasion to consider an appeal where the facts were quite alike. A learned Judge (Varma, J.) of the Madhya Pradesh High Court had granted bail to the appellant. While the appellant was enjoying the concession of bail and such order had not been challenged, a co-accused moved for bail. Noticing the earlier order granting bail in favour of the appellant, another learned Judge (Gupta, J.) in his order observed that the appellant did not deserve to be enlarged on bail, and that it was a fit case where the State should apply for cancellation of bail of all the accused persons . In view of this observation, the State filed a petition for cancellation of the bail order passed by Varma, J. In this application, neither any additional fact was stated nor any allegation was made against the appellant which could be relevant for cancellation of the earlier bail order. The prayer for cancellation was founded only on the observations in the order of Gupta, J., which was verbatim quoted in the application ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a collective melody, akin to a choir of justice. It cannot be forgotten that no matter the strength, all these voices bear the symbol of the Supreme Court of India. While we may have our specific functions and jurisdictions, the collective objective is to find our bearings towards धर्म (duty) and न्याय (justice). In this sense, it can be said that each Bench speaks for the Court as a whole, contributing to the intricate symphony of justice that defines the Supreme Court of India. 70. It is here that the need arises for a Bench to be careful, cautious, and circumspect while being critical of a precedent of a previous Bench. Every Bench is supposed to bear in mind two overriding considerations. The first is that of deference to the views expressed by a Bench in a primary decision and the other is maintaining judicial discipline and propriety if, upon threadbare consideration, it is found difficult to assent to the justification for such primary decision. In such an eventuality, dignity and decency would demand disagreement voiced by the subsequent Bench and reference of the matter to the Hon ble the Chief Justice for constitution ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of the Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. *** (emphasis supplied) 73. Although the larger Bench in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) appears to have considered in excess of 250 decisions, the above opinions of the Constitution Benches do not seem to have been presented before it. It is, thus, clear as crystal from the majority opinion delivered by Hon ble Arun Mishra and Hon ble A.K. Goel, JJ. that recourse was taken to declare Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) per incuriam without having the benefit of the caution sounded by this Court in Vikramjit Singh (supra) and Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra). 74. Having regard to the opinions expressed by Constitution Bench decisions of this Court, there is absolutely no scope for a Bench of three-Hon ble Judges to declare a prev ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he consequential observation would nevertheless survive. Significantly, in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), one does not find any observation of like nature as in paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). 78. That apart, being members of a larger Bench of coequal strength as in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), we are not precluded by any law from interpreting the last sentence of paragraph 217 of the said decision and to say what the Court exactly intended even if it is assumed notwithstanding what has been said in paragraph 365 of Manoharlal [5- Judge, lapse] (supra) that the observation in paragraph 217 survives. In our humble understanding, what the majority in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) intended to say is that if review petitions were pending on the date of the decision, i.e., 8th February, 2018, seeking review of decisions which had been rendered relying on the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), such review petitions could be entertained and considered on the basis of the discussion in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) declaring Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) per incuriam and the decisions reviewed; nothing more, nothing less. We do not think that the major ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the party on the losing side to pursue or to grant liberty to him to pursue an otherwise available remedy - which by passage of time might have been lost - behind the back of a party who would obviously be seriously affected if he were compelled to contest the proceedings once again. Such an act of court would be without the authority of law, and this is precisely what Vikramjit Singh (supra) has held. 82. Moreover, as on the dates the RPs were filed, the decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) had not seen the light of the day. A review petition, under the law, cannot be filed in anticipation of a favourable judgment in the future. 83. For the reasons discussed above, we cannot be persuaded to accept that the phrase open to be reviewed in appropriate cases occurring in paragraph 217 of the decision in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) could have been perceived by the review petitioners as opening up an avenue for them to apply for review. Assuming arguendo that the contention touching liberty granted by Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) is correct, the plinth thereof crumbles by reason of paragraph 365 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) and, therefore, is rendered non-existent. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f some subsequent event (emphasis supplied). 90. With the introduction of the Explanation, there seems to be little room for any serious debate on the point under consideration. Parliament, in its wisdom, has accepted what the Law Commission recommended. Resultantly, what the statute prohibits, cannot be permitted by the Court. If permitted, the Court would be acting contrary to law. What the Parliament has done, the Court cannot undo unless the law enacted by the Parliament is declared ultra vires. The vires of the Explanation not being under challenge during more than four decades of its existence, it is not for the Court to ignore the Explanation. 91. It is worthwhile to also note at this stage the decision dated 3rd November, 2020 in Shri Ram Sahu and others v. Vinod Kumar Rawat [(2021) 13 SCC 1]. Upon consideration of the decisions in Moran Mar Basselios Catholics (supra), Haridas Das (supra), Kamal Sengupta (supra), etc., this Court speaking through the Hon ble presiding Judge of the said Division Bench was of the opinion that the court of review has a limited jurisdiction, it cannot overstep such jurisdiction and has to strictly adhere to the grounds mentioned in Rule 1 of O ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Constitutional limitations or in derogation of principles of natural justice can always be remedied by the court ex debito justitiae. It can do so in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in any proceeding pending before it without insisting on the formalities of a review application. After all, to err is human is the oft-quoted saying and courts including the apex court are no exception. To own up the mistake when judicial satisfaction is reached does not militate against its status or authority; perhaps, it would enhance both. On the other hand, when it involves invocation of the power of review and such power is traceable in a statute, which also has provisions regulating the exercise of the review power, it has to be held that the power of review is not an inherent power. That power of review is not an inherent power has been held in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji [(1971) 3 SCC 844] . If a power of review is statutorily conferred, it would be inappropriate, nay incompetent, for the court exercising review power to travel beyond the contours of the provision conferring the very power. A statutorily conferred power to review is not to be confused with the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... emedy available in accordance with the existing provisions of law. Such inherent power cannot override statutory prohibitions or create remedies which are not contemplated under the Code. Section 151 cannot be invoked as an alternative to filing fresh suits, appeals, revisions, or reviews. A party cannot find solace in Section 151 to allege and rectify historic wrongs and bypass procedural safeguards inbuilt in the CPC. (emphasis supplied) 99. An alternative remedy, carved out by Rule 1 of Order XLVII, already exists which the review petitioners have pursued. Recourse to section 151, CPC, therefore, would not be available, the object of which is to supplement and not replace the remedies provided under the CPC. 100. Moving on further, we find that the attempt of the review petitioners has been to draw inspiration from the ground any other sufficient reason appearing in Rule 1. There have been decisions of this Court which have construed the words any other sufficient reason expansively, like Netaji Cricket Club (supra) and Jagmohan Singh (supra), whereas there are decisions, including Moran Mar Basselios Catholics (supra), Raja Shatrunji (supra), Kamlesh Verma (supra) and S. Madhus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Jagmohan Singh (supra), therefore, must have been intended and necessitated by this Court because the justice of the cases so demanded but the same would have no application in a case of this nature. 102. Having regard to the aforesaid distinction in the exercise of review power and the power that inheres in every court, we are unable to be ad idem with the decision in Netaji Cricket Club (supra) as well as the decision in Jagmohan Singh (supra), which followed the former decision. The said two decisions are by benches of two Hon ble Judges, with a common author. With the deepest of respect and reverence we have for His Lordship, we find limiting the application of the principles regarding exercise of the power of review, as expounded in Moran Mar Basselios Catholics (supra) (a decision rendered by a Bench of three Hon ble Judges, which has stood the test of time), to be against established principles flowing from Article 141 of the Constitution by which the Supreme Court is also bound. Also, laying down as a matter of principle that subsequent events could be considered while hearing a review petition, is unprecedented. The Court in Netaji Cricket Club (supra) and Jagmohan Singh ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he review petitioners, since they were parties to the proceedings from which the RPs have arisen. However, in the context of a review, a distinction can yet be drawn between a person who, not being a party to the original proceedings, has the locus standi to invoke the review jurisdiction and a person who, despite being a party to the proceedings, can be considered as not aggrieved by the judgment/order of which he seeks a review. This question would obviously require a deep scrutiny, having regard to the materials on record and the objection to the maintainability of the RPs specifically raised by the respondent landowners. In the eyes of an unsuspecting person, obviously the review petitioners are persons aggrieved because of declaration of land acquisition proceedings initiated by them as deemed to have lapsed. But, as is evident from the factual narrative, the dates on which the High Court had disposed of the writ petitions by declaring that the land acquisition proceedings were deemed to have lapsed, it is the law laid down by a binding authority, i.e., Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) that was holding the field at the relevant time and which the High Court applied in reachi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gments/orders under review do not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record. 111. Thus, we have no hesitation to reject Mr. Sen s contention and answer question (e) against the review petitioners. 112. As we approach the end, we need to address question (f) regarding the maintainability of several miscellaneous applications in the present batch that seek recall of certain orders of this Court, whereby some of the land acquisition proceedings were declared to have lapsed. 113. Notably, while these have been filed in the form of miscellaneous applications, they are in essence akin to the RPs as they also seek reconsideration of this Court s orders. Since these miscellaneous applications also rely on Manoharlal [5- Judge, lapse] (supra) as a ground for review/reconsideration of the previous orders, they are squarely covered by the foregoing analysis in this judgment. If we were to hold otherwise, we would be permitting the review petitioners to do something indirectly i.e., seeking review through miscellaneous applications, which they could not have done directly i.e., seeking review through RPs. This would open the law to being misused and lead to by-passing the legisl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ment has been pronounced. Such a practice has no legal foundation and must be firmly discouraged. It reduces litigation to a gambit. Miscellaneous applications are becoming a preferred course to those with resources to pursue strategies to avoid compliance with judicial decisions. A judicial pronouncement cannot be subject to modification once the judgment has been pronounced, by filing a miscellaneous application. Filing of a miscellaneous application seeking modification/clarification of a judgment is not envisaged in law. Further, it is a settled legal principle that one cannot do indirectly what one cannot do directly ( Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum ) . 116. We must clarify that our statement does not imply an absolute prohibition against filing of miscellaneous applications seeking 'clarification,' 'modification,' or 'recall' following the initial disposal of a matter. We are only emphasizing the need for the Court to exercise prudence and ascertain whether such an application is, in substance, in the nature of a RP. In case such an application is found to be nothing but a disguised version of a RP, it ought to be trea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ections: a) The time limit for initiation of fresh acquisition proceedings in terms of the provisions contained in section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is extended by a year starting from 01st August, 2024 whereupon compensation to the affected landowners may be paid in accordance with law, failing which consequences, also as per law, shall follow; b) The parties shall maintain status quo regarding possession, change of land use and creation of thirdparty rights till fresh acquisition proceedings, as directed above, are completed; c) Since the landowners are not primarily dependent upon the subject lands as their source of sustenance and most of these lands were/are under use for other than agricultural purposes, we deem it appropriate to invoke our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and dispense with the compliance of Chapters II and III of the 2013 Act whereunder it is essential to prepare a Social Impact Assessment Study Report and/or to develop alternative multicrop irrigated agricultural land. We do so to ensure that the timeline of one year extended at (a) above to complete the acquisition process can be adhered to by the appellants and the GNCTD, which would also likely b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the compliance of Chapter (V) pertaining to Rehabilitation and Resettlement Award is hereby dispensed with; and k) The expropriated landowners shall be entitled to seek reference for enhancement of compensation in accordance with Chapter-VIII of the 2013 Act. 122. Before we part, we must address a minor task that remains unfinished. Specifically, we are currently handling two sets of RPs. The first set pertains to landowners who continue to maintain their status as landowners from the date of Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act. The second set includes landowners who, subsequent to the aforementioned Notification under section 4(1), have transferred their properties the subject of acquisition to purchasers ( subsequent purchasers , hereafter) through methods such as executing sale deeds, deeds of assignment, or even via power of attorney. In addition to the allegations regarding fraud by landowners by suppressing subsequent sale transactions, the second set may also involve ownership title disputes, etc. 123. The cases falling under the second set are listed below: a) DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. TARUN KAPAHI [R.P.(C) No. 425/2023]; b) GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. NAREND ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that were erroneously included in the present batch. These cases shall be listed separately in the week commencing 22nd July, 2024. The details of the cases are as follows: a) In these two cases outlined below, no notice has been issued by this Court for condonation of delay and/or otherwise; hence, they need to be de-tagged and listed separately: i. GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI v. M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS LTD. [M.A. No. 414/2023 in C.A. No. 11857/2016]; and ii. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. HARI PRAKASH [R.P. (C) No. 432/2023 in C.A. No. 11841/2016]. b) The following are three cases where neither a RP nor a miscellaneous application has been filed. These cases are Special Leave Petitions filed before this Court and thus necessitate separate hearing: i. GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI v. M/S BEADS PROPERTIES PVT. LTD. [C.A. No. 1522/2023]; ii. LAND AND BUILDING DEPARTMENT v. RAM SINGH [Diary No. 14831/2023]; and iii. LAND AND BUILDING DEPARTMENT v. SUMIT BANSAL [Diary No. 15893/2023]. c) The following two cases, although RPs, were filed before the change in law, i.e., prior to the decision in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). Consequently, they need to be de-tagged to be assessed based on thei ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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