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TMI Blog2024 (9) TMI 414X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... en adjudicated and the petitioner's registration has been suspended for a period of one year from the date of the order. 3. Bereft of unnecessary details, it may be stated that the petitioner came to be appointed as an Insolvency Professional - IP by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India - IBBI. On the basis of an investigation report submitted by the Investigating Authority, the IBBI through its Deputy General Manager issued a show cause notice to the petitioner under Section 219 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - the Code - calling upon the petitioner to show cause why action as indicated in paragraph 5 of the show cause notice, which included an action of cancellation of the petitioner's registration, may not be taken. The petitioner responded to the aforesaid show cause notice and it is on that basis that the Disciplinary Committee comprising of a single whole-time member adjudicated the same on 3rd July 2023. 4. Mr. Pratik Sarkar, the learned counsel for the petitioner inter alia submitted that since the show cause notice was adjudicated by a single member of the Disciplinary Committee in a manner contrary to the proviso to Section 220 of the Code, the orde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nical Education and Ors. 2001 INSC 454. Since the impugned order was passed by a single member of the Disciplinary Committee in a manner contrary to the Code, this Court ought to exercise jurisdiction as the impugned order had been passed in a manner not provided by the Code. This being a jurisdictional issue, the Court could examine the petitioner's challenge. It was thus submitted that the order dated 3rd July 2023 be quashed as it was passed by a single whole-time member of the Disciplinary Committee. 5. Mr. Pankaj Vijayan, learned counsel for the respondent-IBBI opposed the aforesaid submissions. He submitted that under proviso to Section 220 (1) of the Code, it was permissible for the IBBI to constitute a Disciplinary Committee consisting of even a single whole-time member. The use of the expression "members" and "whole-time members" in the proviso to Section 220 (1) of the Code implied that the said plural expression would also include a singular member. He referred to the provisions of Section 13 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 - Act of 1897 to submit that use of an expression which may be singular in a particular provision would include the plural and vice versa. He refer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iplinary Committee for considering an investigation report submitted by the Investigating Authority. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 220 stipulates that the members of the Disciplinary Committee can only be whole-time members of the IBBI. 7. Clause 2 (1) (c) of the Regulations of 2017 defines the expression "Disciplinary Committee". The said provision reads as under:- "Disciplinary Committee" means a committee of wholetime member(s) constituted by the Board under subsection (1) of section 220 of the Code : Provided that the whole-time member(s) in the Disciplinary Committee shall not be associated with the investigation or inspection;" The aforesaid clause indicates that the Disciplinary Committee would consist of whole-time member(s) as constituted by the IBBI provided that such whole-time member(s) is not associated with the investigation or inspection undertaken. 8. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, since the expression "members of the Disciplinary Committee" appearing in the proviso to Section 220 (1) of the Code makes reference to more than one member, the Disciplinary Committee cannot consist of only a single member. On a plain reading of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tter. If the subject or context indicates otherwise, it would not be permissible to interpret a singular word to include the plural and vice-a-versa. Reference in this regard can be made to the decisions in The Newspapers Ltd. Vs. The State Industrial Tribunal 1957 INSC 25 and Dhandhania Kedia & Co. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax 1958 INSC 87 wherein it has been held that the principle underlying Section 13 of the Act of 1897 does not have universal application and that the said principle can apply only when no contrary intention is deducible from the scheme or the language used in the statute. 10. In our view, the proviso to Section 220 (1) of the Code uses the plural expression "members" while referring to the eligibility of being part of the Disciplinary Committee. The object of the proviso is not to specify the number of members the Disciplinary Committee should comprise of. It only stipulates that the Disciplinary Committee shall consist of whole-time members of the IBBI. Clause 2 (1) (c) of the Regulations of 2017 in clear terms indicates that the Disciplinary Committee constituted by the IBBI ought to consist of whole-time member(s). This would indicate that the Discipl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... It cannot be so exercised as to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of such Act. This position has been reiterated in Kerala State Electricity Board and Ors. (supra) and it has been further observed that while considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, the Court would have to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling Act as well as the area over which power has been delegated under such Act and thereafter decide whether the subordinate legislation confirms to the parent statute. Rules or Regulations cannot be made to supplant the provisions of the enabling Act but to supplement it. There can be no quarrel with the aforesaid legal position. We however find that in the present case, Clause 2 (1) (c) of the Regulations of 2017 seeks to indicate the manner in which a Disciplinary Committee can be constituted. It could comprise of either a whole-time member or wholetime members. It therefore cannot be said that this clause travels beyond what has been provided by Section 220 (1) since the latter provision merely requires the members of the Disciplinary Committee to be wholetime members of th ..... 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