9911796707
TMI Blog2024 (10) TMI 905X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this Appeal, being aggrieved as against the Impugned Order of 31.01.2020, as it has been passed in IA/69/2020, rendered in CP(IB)/499/7/HDB/2018. 3. As a consequence of the Impugned Order, the revised final Resolution Plan dated 04.01.2020, as it stood submitted by M/s. SVSS Commercial Pvt. Ltd., was approved by the Members of the Committee of Creditors, having 100% voting Shares, as per the provisions contained under Section 31 (1) of the Code. It is this Order of Approval of Resolution Plan, which has been subject to challenge, in this Appeal. 4. When initially the Company Appeal was preferred by filing the same, before the Registry of this Tribunal on 28.05.2021, it was not accompanied with any Condone Delay Application, despite being an Appeal under Section 61 of I & B Code, 2016 and since the challenge was to the Impugned Order of 31.01.2020, it was apparently much beyond the period prescribed under Sec. 61 to be read with Sub Section 2, and even its proviso. 5. When later on, the Appeal was taken up to be argued on merits, after the exchange of pleadings and furnishing of Notes of Submissions, it is then only, at that stage that, the Appellant had preferred a Condone Dela ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ngs in Miscellaneous Application No. 21 / 2022 in MA No. 665 / 2021 in Suo Motu Writ Petition No. 3 / 2020, owing to the Covid-19 situation, he pleads that he would be entitled for the extension of the period of limitation contemplated under the proviso to Sub Section 2 of Section 61, for the purposes of the determination of the period of limitation as the same would have to be construed on the basis of the ratio propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court and accordingly, the date of filing the Appeal would be falling within the upper time limit provided by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid Judgment of Suo Motu Writ (C) No. 3 / 2020, as it has been provided under Para 5 for the relaxation of the limitation period, due to unforeseen circumstances because of Covid-19 situation. 10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 5 of the said Judgment has provided that the period of limitation of all the proceedings either under the general law or under special laws, would stand extended with effect from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022. 11. The relevant observation, as it has been made in Para 3 of the Judgment in Suo Motu Writ (C) No. 3 / 2020 is extracted hereunder:- "3. The period from 15.03.2020 til ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ounsel for the Appellant had submitted that, since though the Impugned Order was passed on 31.01.2020, and the Appeal was preferred on 28.05.2021, but still, it would be falling well within the cut off period of limitation prescribed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, as per Para 5 of the Judgment extracted above, which started running from 15.03.2020, because, since in the instant Appeal, the 45 days period would be expiring on 16.03.2020 which falls within the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022, as per Para 3 of the Judgment cited above and hence, he would be entitled to get the benefit of the Hon'ble Apex Court Judgment. 14. In elaboration of his argument, he has submitted that, the issue with regards to further extension of the extended period, as it stood provided under the proviso to Sub Section 2 of Section 61, on account of Covid-19 pandemic, an issue which has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matters of `Sagufa Ahmed'. He has contended that in the said Judgment of Sagufa Ahmed & Ors. Vs. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., as decided on 18.09.2020, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the extended period of limitation under the Statute, if it was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her than the period of limitation. Any period beyond the prescribed period, during which the court or tribunal has the discretion to allow a person to institute the proceedings, cannot be taken to be "prescribed period". 22. In Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd. [Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831] , this Court dealt with the meaning of the words "prescribed period" in paras 13 and 14 as follows : (SCC pp. 627-28) "13. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963 Act are "prescribed period". What is the meaning of these words? 14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines: "2. (j) "period of limitation" which means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and "prescribed period" means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act." Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application for setting aside arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of limitation prescribed under the general law or special laws whether compoundable or not with effect from 15.03.2020 till further orders. The order dated 15.03.2020 was extended from time to time. Though, we have not seen the end of the pandemic, there is considerable improvement. The lockdown has been lifted and the country is returning to normalcy. Almost all the Courts and Tribunals are functioning either physically or by virtual mode. We are of the opinion that the order dated 15.03.2020 has served its purpose and in view of the changing scenario relating to the pandemic, the extension of limitation should come to an end. 2. We have considered the suggestions of the learned Attorney General for India regarding the future course of action. We deem it appropriate to issue the following directions: - 2.1 In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall stand excluded. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 15.03.2020, if any, shall become available with effect from 15.03.2021. 2.2 In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.202 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... visions contained under Rule 22. In Para 29 of the said Judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the parties cannot be automatically dispensed with from their obligation to apply for and obtain a Certified Copy of the Judgment for the purposes of filing an Appeal and the ultimate conclusion which has been arrived at is that as contained in Para Nos. 29 & 31 of the said Judgment as under: "29. On the question of a certified copy for filing an appeal against an order passed by NCLT under IBC, Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules mandates that an appeal has to be filed with a certified copy of the "impugned order". "22. Presentation of appeal.-(1) Every appeal shall be presented in Form NCLAT-1 in triplicate by the appellant or petitioner or applicant or respondent, as the case may be, in person or by his duly authorised representative duly appointed in this behalf in the prescribed form with stipulated fee at the filing counter and non-compliance of this may constitute a valid ground to refuse to entertain the same. (2) Every appeal shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the impugned order." (emphasis supplied) Therefore, it cannot be said that the parties can autom ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a timely fashion. In a similar factual scenario, Nclat had dismissed an appeal [Prowess International (P) Ltd. v. Action Ispat & Power (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine NCLAT 644] as time-barred under Section 61(2) IBC since the appellant therein was present in court, and yet chose to file for a certified copy after five months of the pronouncement of the order." 19. To answer the argument raised in Para 29 of the Judgment of V. Nagarajan (Supra), the learned Counsel for the Respondent who had filed his objection to the Condonation Delay Application on 08.11.2022, has submitted therein that the ratio of Sagufa Ahmed or that of the Suo Motu Writ Petition decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court, extending the period of Limitation from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, would not be attracted in the instant Appeal as it has been sought for, because the Appellant has filed the Appeal, only on 28.05.2021, though well before the cut off period i.e. 28.02.2022 as per the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court, because reasons as below. 20. The Respondent in his Reply has raised threefold objections: (i) That the Appellant would not be entitled for the benefit of the ratio laid down in the matters of Sagufa Ahm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... wn that the benefit of extended period of limitation under the proviso to Sub Section 2 of Section 61, would only be made available to the party who is diligent to the proceedings, subject to the condition that the Application for obtaining the Certified Copy was made well before expiry of the period of 30 days from the date of the Judgment, which in the instant case would be on 01.03.2020. Thus, he contends that as the copy was not applied for, between the period from 30.01.2020 to 01.03.2020, since, being the period falling much prior to the cut off period i.e. 15.03.2020, as per the Suo Motu Judgment, the benefit of extended period of limitation will not be made available to the Appellant. (iii) He further submits that the Appellant would not be entitled for taking the benefit under the plea that, he was not a party to the proceedings, because of the fact and also as it was not denied, that the Appellant was a member of the Committee of Creditors (CoC), he was having knowledge of the proceedings right from the date of Constitution of CoC and hence, he cannot take a plea that, he was not a party to the proceedings and therefore, he did not have the knowledge and accordingly, wo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ht under the Act, or the Reserve Bank of India Act 1934 (2 of 1934) to make suggestions or submissions or objections or reply;" 24. If the said definition of the word "party" under the NCLT Rules, 2016, is taken into consideration, it is quite wide and it does not stipulate that a person for the purposes of being treated as to be a `party', has to be actually the party to the proceedings. Rather, the term party as defined under Sub Rule (16) of Rule 2 of the NCLT Rules of 2016, is wide enough to include within itself a person who prefers an Appeal. Particularly, when the definition itself uses the word "Person who prefers the Appeal", it will also logically include the Appellant himself, because the Appellant has preferred an Appeal on 28.05.2021 under Section 61 of the I & B Code, 2016, and hence, the attempt made, to carve out an exception on the basis of the use of word "Party" in Para 29 of the Judgment of V. Nagarajan, for the purpose to exclude himself on the grounds that he was not covered by the aforesaid principles to apply for a Certified Copy of the Judgment within the period of limitation prescribed under the Statute would not be sustainable, for the reason being that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... retation given to the proviso to Sub Section 2 of Section 61, as given and dealt in Para 29 of V. Nagarajan's Judgment (Supra), would be applicable in the instant case and the Appellant for the purposes of the Appeal would treated as to be a "Person Aggrieved", even though he might not have been a party to the proceedings. Thus, the necessity to apply for the Certified Copy within 30 days of Limitation will bind the Appellant too, as law carves out no exception as such for the words "Person Aggrieved", which is a provision which has to be read as a whole. 29. Much argument had been extended by the learned Counsel for the Appellant as to how the word "party", as mentioned in Para 29 of the Judgment of V. Nagarajan, has to be read in the context of the Appellate provision contained under Sec. 61 of the I & B Code, 2016. 30. We have no hesitation to hold that owing to reasons given above, word "parties" as referred to in the V. Nagarajan Judgment (Supra) the provision under Section 61 of the Code, is not limited to the extent of the parties who are in contest to the proceedings, because, the Appellate provision, where it includes the word "person aggrieved", it would be wide enough ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o the application. A further point was raised under order II, rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure which obviously has no substance. The case has been extremely well argued on both sides before us and a great number of authorities have been cited on this vexed question. It is not desirable to add more than one is obliged to the tangle which appears to exist with regard to the method of reconciling proceedings under section 144 with other provisions of the law. It so happens that in the case before us the point whittles itself down to a comparatively narrow compass. We agree with the decision of this Court in the case of Jiwa Ram v. Nand Ram [ (1922) Supra p. 407. ] that proceedings under section 144 of the Code are not execution proceedings, although they are, of course, in the nature of proceedings in execution to enforce either directly or indirectly the final decree. We do not agree with the lower appellate court that it is necessary that a party to an application under section 144 should have been a party to the decree. Section 144 is very wide in its terms. It includes matters which an execution court or an appellate court could not ordinarily deal with, and the word "party" ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cision / judgment which affects / has the potential to affect his personal rights. 33. The expression "person aggrieved" will have to be interpreted with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the Statute. One interpretation is that a "person" will be held to be aggrieved by a decision, if that decision is materially adverse to him or materially effects his or her rights. The said interpretation of the "person aggrieved" was dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Judgment reported in 1975 (2) SCC 702 Bar Council of Maharashtra Vs. M.V. Dabholkar and the aforesaid expression has been dealt in Paras 27 & 28 of the said Judgment, which is extracted hereunder:- "27. The words "person aggrieved" are found in several statutes. The meaning of the words "person aggrieved" will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute. Sometimes, it is said that the words "person aggrieved" correspond to the requirement of locus standi which arises in relation to judicial remedies. 28. Where a right of appeal to courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ituted as per Section 129 of the Act. Sub-section (1) thereof lays down that "the Central Government shall constitute an Appellate Tribunal to be called the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal consisting of as many judicial and technical members as it thinks fit to exercise the powers and discharge the functions conferred on the Appellate Tribunal by this Act". It is, therefore, obvious that the Appellate Tribunal CEGAT is a creature of statute and derives its jurisdiction and powers only from the statute creating it and not outside the same. Then follows Section 129-A dealing with "Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal". The relevant provisions thereof read as under: "129-A. Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal.-(1) Any person aggrieved by any of the following orders may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such order- (a) a decision or order passed by the Collector of Customs as an adjudicating authority; (b) to (d)***" Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 129-A are relevant for our present purpose. They read as under: "129-A. (2) The Collector of Customs may, if he is of opinion that an order passed by (a) the Appellate Collector of Customs under Sec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vernment to entertain revision petitions against certain orders of the Collector (Appeals). It provides as under: "129-DD. Revision by Central Government.-(1) The Central Government may, on the application of a person aggrieved by any order passed under Section 128-A, where the order is of the nature referred to in the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 129-A, annul or modify such order. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, 'order passed under Section 128-A' includes an order passed under that section before the commencement of Section 40 of the Finance Act, 1984, against which an appeal had not been preferred before such commencement and could have been, if the said section had not come into force, preferred after such commencement to the Appellate Tribunal." The aforesaid provisions of the Act leave no room for doubt that they represent a complete scheme or code for challenging the orders passed by the Collector (Customs) in exercise of his statutory powers. It is axiomatic that the importer against whom the Collector has passed the impugned order of adjudication and who is called upon to pay the customs duty which, according to him, is not payable ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... icating authority-Collector of Customs could prefer such an appeal to the CEGAT and the adjudicating authority under Section 122 can prefer such an appeal only when directed by the Board under Section 129-D(1) and not otherwise. It is easy to visualise that even a third party may get legitimately aggrieved by the order of the Collector of Customs being the adjudicating authority if it is contended by such a third party that the goods imported really belonged to it and not to the purported importer or that he had financed the same and, therefore, in substance he was interested in the goods and consequently the release order in favour of the purported importer was prone to create a legal injury to such a third party which is not actually arraigned as a party before the adjudicating authority and was not heard by it. Under such circumstances such a third party might perhaps be treated to be legally aggrieved by the order of the Collector of Customs as an adjudicating authority and may legitimately prefer an appeal to the CEGAT as a "person aggrieved". That is the reason why the legislature in its wisdom has used the phrase "any person aggrieved" by the order of the Collector of Custom ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... wherein he is given a right to appear and make his submissions, he should without more have a right of appeal from an order rejecting his contentions or submissions. An appeal is a creature of statute and if a statute expressly gives a person a right to appeal, the matter rests there. Innumerable statutes both in England and in India give the right of appeal to 'a person aggrieved' by an order made and the provisions of such statutes have to be construed in each case to find out whether the person preferring an appeal falls within that expression. As was observed in Robinson v. Currey [(1881) 7 QBD 465 : (1881-85) All ER Rep Ext 1770] the words 'person aggrieved' are 'ordinary English words which are to have the ordinary meaning put upon them'. According to Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition, Vol. 25), page 293, footnote 'h': '... the expression is nowhere defined and must be construed by reference to the context of the enactment in which it appears and all the circumstances.' Attempts have however from time to time been made to define the expression in various cases. In Sidebotham, Re, ex p Sidebotham [(1880) 14 Ch D 458 : (1874-80) All ER Rep 588] (Ch D at p. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in order to demonstrate the offence of defamation, such a collection of persons must be an identifiable body so that it is possible to say with precision that a group of particular persons, as distinguished from the rest of the community stood defamed. In case the identity of the collection of persons is not established so as to be relatable to the defamatory words or imputations, the complaint is not maintainable. In case a class is mentioned, if such a class is indefinite, the complaint cannot be entertained. Furthermore, if it is not possible to ascertain the composition of such a class, the criminal prosecution cannot proceed." 36. From the above context, the distinction which has been carved out by the Appellant's Counsel to contend that since, he was a "person aggrieved" and "not a party" to the proceedings and did not have the knowledge of the case, and since he was a "person aggrieved", the aspect and implications of limitation has to be construed in the context of the Para 3 of the Judgment of Suo Motu Writ Petition, Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, because of Covid-19 situation. 37. In order to further qualify the said argument, the learned Counsel for the Appellant ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ered to be an operational creditor to the extent of the operational debt owed by the corporate debtor to such creditor. (5) Where an operational creditor has assigned or legally transferred any operational debt to a financial creditor, the assignee or transferee shall be considered as an operational creditor to the extent of such assignment or legal transfer. (6) Where the terms of the financial debt extended as part of a consortium arrangement or syndicated facility provide for a single trustee or agent to act for all financial creditors, each financial creditor may- (a) authorise the trustee or agent to act on his behalf in the committee of creditors to the extent of his voting share; (b) represent himself in the committee of creditors to the extent of his voting share; (c) appoint an insolvency professional (other than the resolution professional) at his own cost to represent himself in the committee of creditors to the extent of his voting share; or (d) exercise his right to vote to the extent of his voting share with one or more financial creditors jointly or severally. [(6-A) Where a financial debt- (a) is in the form of securities or deposits and the t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mmittee of creditors under sub-section (9) within a period of seven days of such requisition." He submits that since the Appellant, not being a Financial Creditor would not be forming part of the Committee of Creditors, as provided under Sub Section 2 of Section 21, he cannot be attributed with the knowledge of the proceedings and further, he cannot be treated as to be a "party" to the proceedings though, he may be a "person aggrieved". By this argument at least the Appellant, admits its status in Committee of Creditors, and having knowledge of the proceedings too, which would be sufficient for Section 61 of the I & B Code, 2016. 38. He further submits that the status of the Appellant has also to be seen from the perspective of, as to what would be the implication even if it is to be accepted as per the argument as extended by the learned Counsel for the Respondent that the Appellant had participated in the proceedings by being a member of the Committee of Creditors and had held the meetings. He states that even for the time being if it is presumed that, the Appellant had participated in the meeting of Committee of Creditors, then too, he should not be treated as to be a party t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which was necessitated for enabling to prefer an Appeal as per provisions under Sec. 61 of the Code. 40. The aspect of alleged lack of knowledge, which is being pleaded to derive the benefit of limitation, was an aspect considered by the Judgment of the Principal Bench of NCLAT, where the Principal Bench has observed that the knowledge of Judgment is an immaterial factor, because if that distorted interpretation is given to the date of knowledge, it would be leading to an absolute chaos in determining the period of limitation, contrary to the object of the Act, and that, date of knowledge of the Judgment, cannot be permitted to be used by the Appellant to circumvent the pre-condition of applying for the Certified Copy, within the period of limitation for getting the benefit of Para 29 of V. Nagarajan's Judgment. In the case on hand, though apparently, it seems that the Appellant is not a party to the proceedings, but, since he has knowledge of the proceedings, he will be falling well within the purview of the term "Person Aggrieved" as prescribed under Section 61 (1) and for the aforesaid purpose and particularly, for the purposes of extension of the benefit of the proviso to Sub ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Rules, 2016, stipulates for preferring an Appeal along with the Certified Copy of the Judgment and though powers have been given to the Tribunal to extend the time or waive the compliance of any Rule, framed under NCLAT Rules including grant of exemption from filing the Certified Copy of the Order, but still, filing of an application for a Certified Copy of the Order / Judgment is not just a technical requirement for computation of limitation, but, it is an indication of diligence of the "Aggrieved Party", in pursuing the Appeal. The relevant Para Nos. 27 & 29, are extracted hereunder: "27. It was further held that act of filing an application for a certified copy is not just a technical requirement for computation of limitation but also an indication of the diligence of the aggrieved party in pursuing the litigation in a timely fashion. Now the question to be answered is as to whether without applying a certified copy of the order, whether an Appeal can be filed under Section 61 or not? Rule 22, sub-rule (2) as extracted above clearly contemplate that every Appeal shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the order, whether the said requirement is 'mandatory' or can be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ellant, because the mandatory period of 30 days for applying for the Certified Copy of the Impugned Order of 31.01.2020 expired much before the short date of the extended period of limitation laid down by the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Suo Motu proceedings, due to Covid-19 situation, which was made effective with effect from 15.03.2020. 43. The aforesaid view is being taken by us for the reason being that, when the Appellant himself has failed to comply with the first part of the intention of legislature of procuring the Certified Copy of the Judgment in order to enable him to file an Appeal as an "Aggrieved Person" in the light of the provisions contained under Rule 22 and if the cut off period of procuring of the Certified Copy, which was a condition precedent, has expired much prior to the benefit of limitation extended by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the Appellant cannot contend that, he would be entitled for the benefit of limitation for the purposes of condonation of delay of about 451 days and that too, when according to his own records, the Appellant has for the first time applied for the Certified Copy of the Judgment only on 30.04.2021, though, he had knowledge ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rtified Copy and thus, the entire action of the Appellant would be barred by an `Estoppel by Conduct'. Section 114 of the Evidence Act is extracted hereunder:- "Section 114- Court may presume existence of certain facts. The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case." On a simpliciter reading of the language contained under Sec. 114, there would be a presumption of existence of a fact which would mean the knowledge to the Appellant for the purposes of satisfying the parameters prescribed pertaining to the knowledge of procuring the Certified Copy, as it has been propounded by the Judgments of the NCLAT in the matters of Sumit Singh Basisth and Innovators Cleantech Private Limited (Supra) that knowledge for the purposes of procuring of the Certified Copy of the Order is not material because, the necessity of procurement of the Certified Copy of the Order is a precaution taken by the legislation and it cannot be permitted to be utilised as a tool for the person who is not diligent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... prescribed under Section 61 of the Code, which has been mandated by the various ratios of the Principal Bench, as referred to above, as regards the principle that it is necessary for a "person aggrieved", in order to seek exclusion from the period of limitation, to apply for the Certified Copy for taking the benefit of limitation, ought to have procured the Certified Copy, within the period of limitation prescribed under Sec. 61 of the Code. (c) The Appellant has not denied the stand taken by the Respondent's Counsel, that since, all the email communications have generated from his email id, show that the knowledge of the proceedings was well within the knowledge of the Appellant, he was bound to have applied for the Certified Copy of the Judgment within the period of limitation to make his Appeal sustainable. (d) As regards the question that whether the Appellant would be falling within the ambit of Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 / 2020, we are of the view that even though the period of limitation of 45 days as prescribed under the Statute (including the condonable period of 15 days as per the proviso to Sub Section 2 of Section 61), ends within and not earlier to the comme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... well within the period of Limitation which was expiring, prior to the commencement of the extended period of limitation imposed by the Suo Motu Writ Petition i.e. 15.03.2020, he will not be entitled for the benefit of the said extended period of limitation.
(d) Since, the Appellant being conscious of the fact that he had applied the Certified Copy, only on 30.04.2021 and was preferring the Appeal, only on 20.05.2021, and having not filed the Application for condonation of delay earlier, and subsequently filing it as an afterthought, will not enable the Appellant to overcome the legal embargo to avail the benefit of the second proviso to Sub Section 2 of Section 61, for the purposes of deriving the benefit of extended 15 days of limitation since apparently, having not applied for the Certified Copy within the prescribed period of limitation.
48. Owing to the above, the Application in IA No. 361 / 2021 being the Application for condonation of delay, lacks merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. As a consequence thereto, the Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (INS) No. 177 / 2021, would too stand dismissed. The connected pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand closed. X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
