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TMI Blog1974 (10) TMI 27X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uted a joint Hindu family as stated above. It is common ground that Subhadra has not claimed partition of the joint family properties before her death nor there was any partition effected amongst the said members. On her demise, the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Ahmedabad, called upon the applicant herein who was the elder son and also the karta of the joint Hindu family to file return under the Estate Duty Act in respect of the property of the deceased, Subhadra. The return was made on September 3, 1960. One of the contentions on behalf of the accountable person before the Assistant Controller was that the individual property of the deceased, Subhadra, was liable to estate duty and her share in the joint Hindu family properties did not pass on her death since it merged with the interests of the other members of the said family. The Assistant Controller rejected this contention urged on behalf of the accountable person as in his opinion the undivided interest of Jayantilal Shah in the joint family properties which devolved on Bai Subhadra, under section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, became her absolute estate and of full ownership under section 14 o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or for that matter under section 6 or 7 of the Estate Duty Act. None of these contentions found favour with the Tribunal, which held that the interest of the deceased, Subhadra, in the joint family property became her absolute property under section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which devolved in terms of section 15 of the said Act. It, therefore, concluded that the property in question passed on under section 5 of the Estate Duty Act. The Tribunal did not uphold the opinion of the Appellate Controller that the provision of section 7 would also be attracted in the facts of the present case. In that view of the matter, the Tribunal held that the interest of the deceased, Subhadra, in the joint family properties was liable to be included in the property which should be subjected to duty under section 5 or section 6 of the Estate Duty Act. The Tribunal, therefore, dismissed the appeal of the accountable person. At his instance, therefore, the following questions have been referred to us for our opinion : " (1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the interest which the deceased, Subhadra, widow of Jayantilal Sha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... no property passing on the death either under section 5 or section 6 of the Estate Duty Act. 3. In any case since the extent of the interest in the joint family properties of the deceased, Bai Subhadra, could not be ascertained, as it was of a fluctuating nature, there was no property in specie, the principal value of which can be ascertained under the Estate Duty Act. All the three contentions stated above deserve to be rejected for the reasons stated hereunder : It should be recalled that Jayantilal Shah, the father of the accountable person, died in jointness in 1944. Under section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to property Act, 1937, the widow of a member of the joint family is put in place of her husband and the husband's interest in the joint family property, though indefinite, would vest immediately upon his death in the widow. It would not pass by survivorship to other coparceners. It is no doubt true that acquisition by a widow of her husband's interest in the joint family property would not per se amount to severance in the status and disrupt the family. It is also true, as has been observed in Hindu Law by Mulla, 14th edition, at page 95, that though her positio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l occupation of the property by the female, but may be possession in law ; and that it may either be actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law. To urge, therefore, that till partition is effected the limited estate of a widow under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, would not ripen into an absolute ownership, is, in our opinion, misconceived. In Mangal Singh v. Smt. Rattno , the Supreme Court again pointed out that section 14 covers all cases of property owned by a female Hindu although she may not be in actual, constructive or physical possession of that property, provided of course that she has not parted with her rights and is capable of obtaining possession of the property. In Munnalal v. Rajkumar it has been held that where, at the time of her death, the widow was in possession of the share of her property to which she became entitled under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, that share or that property would devolve upon her heirs and the latter would be entitled to prosecute a suit for partition filed by the widow. In Bhadri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi it has been held that the same principle would be applicable where a widow has acqui ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er at the date of the commencement of the Act, as a limited owner into an absolute estate notwithstanding any rule of Hindu law to the contrary. Section 14 extinguishes the estate called the 'limited estate' or 'widow's estate' and the incidents attached to it, and makes a woman, who under the old law would have been by any rule of law only a limited owner, a full owner with all powers of disposition which any other owner would enjoy and make the estate heritable by her own heirs and not revertable to the heirs of the last owner. " The second contention urged on behalf of the accountable person proceeds on the assumption that the first contention which we have rejected is the correct proposition of law. As held by us above, the first contention is not at all well-founded and it should be rejected. The result is that the second contention also must, therefore, fail. If Bai Subhadra who acquired the interest of her deceased husband under section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and who was possessed of the said interest on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, she became absolute owner of the estate by operation of law under section 14 of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the sense that it would increase by the death in the family and would decrease by birth in the same, it, none the less, on the ripening into full ownership under section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, would crystallise on her demise which under section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act being her interest in the joint family properties as on her death, would pass as property to her heirs. The expression " property " in section 15 includes all properties which were held and possessed by her on the date of commencement of the Act and were declared to be of her full ownership by section 14 of the Act. In that view of the matter, therefore, the third contention urged on behalf of the accountable person must also be rejected. The result is that the interest of Bai Subhadra in the joint family properties on her demise would be property passing on her death and liable to estate duty under section 5 of the Estate Duty Act. In any case Bai Subhadra being the full and absolute owner of the right which she had acquired on the demise of her husband and of which she was possessed on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, would be property which she would be competent to dispose of, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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