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TMI Blog1988 (9) TMI 48X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... permissible in law. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the High Court are set aside and the proceedings pending in the court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Esplanade, Bombay, in Criminal Case against the appellant for having committed alleged offences punishable under sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, on a complaint filed by the Secretary to the Commission, are quashed. - Criminal Appeal No. 114 of 1988 - - - Dated:- 12-9-1988 - Judge(s) : A. P. SEN., L. M. SHARMA JJ. A.S. Bobde, Advocate-General for the State of Maharashtra (A.M. Khanwilkar and Bhasme, Advocates, with him), for the respondents. Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Senior Advocate (Shambhu Prasad Singh, Mrs. Jayshree Wad, Mrs. Aruna Mathur, Manoj Wad and Vijay Tulpule, Advocates, with him), for the appellant. JUDGMENT The judgment of the court was delivered by SEN J. -This appeal by special leave directed against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dated August 11, 1987, raises a question of far-reaching importance. The question is whether a Commission of Inquiry constituted under s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l 1, 1974. Dr. Chitale's contention is that unless there was a similar change brought about in the Commissions of Inquiry Act, the Commission cannot be deemed to be a court for the purposes of section 195(1)(b) of the Code. We find great difficulty in dealing with the question involved in this appeal because, many diverse problems will have to be considered. In order to appreciate the point involved, it is necessary to state few facts. The State Government of Maharashtra, by a notification dated February 21, 1985, issued under section 3 read with section 5(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, appointed Shri Justice B. Lentin, Judge of the High Court of Bombay, as an one-man Commission of Inquiry to probe into the deaths of 14 patients in the Government-run Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoi Hospital, Bombay, between January 22, 1986, and February 7, 1986, after they were administered contaminated glycerol. The aforesaid notification of the State Government was to the effect: MEDICAL EDUCATION AND DRUGS DEPARTMENT, Mantralaya, Bombay 400 032, dated 21st February, 1986. COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY ACT, 1952 No. JJH. 2088/712/MED-4,-Whereas certain deaths of patients alleged ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on the other. In the course of its investigation, it discovered that there were as many as 582 grossly defaulting drug companies whose products, including crucial life-saving drugs, were sub-standard. The Commission's report was an indictment of the State's public health system and constant ministerial interference. It was particularly severe on the machinations of Bhai Sawant, the then Health Minister, who, the Commission observed, had a hairbreadth escape from being served with a notice to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for perjury under sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The court issued show cause notices on four persons including the appellant, Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray, for giving false evidence in an attempt to cover up the charges of rampant corruption brought against them. The State Government placed the report of the Lentin Commission before the State Legislature on March 30, 1988, and accepted its recommendations. One of the recommendations was that a separate enquiry be held by a retired High Court judge into the charges of corruption against the appellant, Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray, and Bhai Sawant, two former health Ministers and i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... necessarily to be false. The relevant excerpts of sections 191 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code, section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and sections 4(a), 5(5) and 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act were set out in Schedule 11. In response to the notice, the appellant appeared through counsel and showed cause. Amongst other grounds, the appellant contended, firstly, that, in law, the appellant's evidence would not technically constitute perjury and even if it were so, this was not a fit case where, in the interests of justice, it was expedient that an inquiry should be made against the appellant into the alleged offence under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which appeared to have been committed in or in relation to the proceedings before it. Secondly, the Commission of Inquiry was not a court for the purposes of section 195(1)(b) and section 340 of the Code. It was stated that while perjury before the Commission was no doubt punishable, it was not for the Commission to give a finding in terms of section 340, or to file a complaint, but for the Government or a public spiri ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Bench of the High Court, by its judgment dated August 11, 1987, repelled the contentions advanced by the appellant and accordingly dismissed the writ petition. We may first reproduce the statutory provisions bearing on the controversy. The relevant provision of section 191 of the Indian Penal Code, in so far as material, reads : 191. Giving false evidence. -Whoever being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence. Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 195(1) No court shall take cognizance - . . . (b)(i) of any offence . . . or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, or ... (iii) ... except on the complaint in writing of that court, or of some other court to which that court is subordinate. Sub-section (3) of section 195 of the Code provides that in clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term court means a civil, revenue or criminal court, and includes a Tribunal constituted by or under a C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (5 of 1898), forward the case to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same and the Magistrate to whom any such case is forwarded shall proceed to hear the complaint against the accused as if the case had been forwarded to him under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. (5) Any proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). Section 6 provides : 6. Statements made by persons to the Commission.-No statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission shall subject him to, or be used against him in, any civil or criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement : Provided that the statement (a) is made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer, or (b) is relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry. By section 8, the Commission is empowered to regulate its own procedure including the time and place of its sittings, etc. In support of the appeal, Dr. Y. S. Chitale, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the Commission of Inquiry ap ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f Courts Act. He also relied upon the later decision of a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Puhupram v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1968] MPLJ 629 and on a judgment of a learned single judge of the Kerala High Court in Balakrishnan v. ITO [1982] 134 ITR 573 ; [1976] KLT 561. Dr. Chitale submits that sub-section (3) of section 195 of the present Code has brought about a change in the law. He traced the legislative history behind the enactment of subsection (3) of section 195 and pointed out that in Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1963] 2 SCR 850, this court held that a Sales Tax Officer, acting under the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948, was merely an instrumentality of the State for the purposes of assessment and collection of tax and even if he was required to perform certain quasi-judicial functions, he was not a court for the purposes of section 195(1)(b) of the Code. Nor could he be treated to be revenue court within the meaning of section 195(2) of the Code. He then referred to the decision in Lalji Haridas v. State of Maharashtra [1964] 52 ITR 423 where, a Constitution Bench, by a majority of 3 : 2, took a view to the contrary and held that pro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... whether an authority created by an Act is a court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial Tribunal, what has to be decided is whether, having regard to the provisions of the Act, it possesses all the attributes of a court. In support of his submissions, Dr. Chitale relied upon the 41st Report of the Law Commission, paragraphs 15.93 to 15.101 and, in particular, referred to the following passage in para 15.99, where it was observed that in any concrete case, this question is bound to create problems of interpretation and, accordingly, suggested a change in law for the purposes of section 195(1)(b) : We consider that for the purpose of clauses (b) and (c), 'court' should mean a civil court or a revenue court or a criminal court, properly so called, but where a Tribunal created by an Act has all or practically all the attributes of a court, it might be regarded as a court only if it is declared by that Act to be a court for the purposes of this section. Learned counsel contends that Parliament, accordingly, enacted subsection (3) of section 195 to put an end to the controversy. In view of the change in the law brought about by section 195(3), it is urged that a Tr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... serted and shall be deemed to have been inserted at the end with effect from the 1 St day of April, 1974. The reason for the change is given in the Notes on Clauses in the Finance Bill, 1985, and it reads Clause 28 seeks to amend section 136 of the Income-tax Act relating to the proceedings before income-tax authorities to be judicial proceedings. This amendment seeks to secure retrospectively that an income-tax authority shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, from the date of its commencement, that is, 1 St April, 1974. This is also evident from paragraph 119 of the memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance Bill, 1985, and it reads : 119. Under the existing provisions, proceedings before income-tax authorities are deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code. It is proposed to provide that an income-tax authority shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This amendment is intended to secure th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n 4 of the Act, a Commission of Inquiry has the power of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the matters enumerated therein, the Legislature has not rested at that. Parliament has made an express provision, by the use of legal fiction in sub-section (4) of section 5 of the Act, that a Commission of Inquiry shall be deemed to be a civil court and has further, by the use of another legal fiction in sub-section (5) thereof, enjoined that any proceedings before a Commission of Inquiry shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings. On a combined reading of sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 5, the learned Advocate General contends that the conclusion is irresistible that a Commission of Inquiry is a court for the purposes of section 195 (1) (b) as laid down in Lalji Haridas' case [1964] 52 ITR 423 (SC). In other words, the submission is that while section 4 invests a Commission of Inquiry with the powers of a civil court, following the familiar pattern of statutes constituting special Tribunals, the Legislature has gone further and put the matter beyond doubt by enacting sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 5. The contentions advance ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es, the definition of term contains the words means and includes which may inevitably raise a doubt as to interpretation. According to the learned Advocate-General, the inclusive part of the definition of court in section 195(3) of the Code was ex abundanti cautela and was merely declaratory of the law. It is submitted that the first part of sub-section (4) of section 5 of the Act fulfils the requirements of the inclusive part of the definition of court in section 195(3) of the Code. Therefore, the Act was in line with sub-section (3) of section 195 of the Code and there was no occasion for Parliament to effect an amendment of the Act, particularly having regard to the majority decision in Lalji Haridas' case [1964] 52 ITR 423 (SC). The learned Advocate-General, with much learning and resource, submits that there are different types of legislative practices. One such instance is that of sub-section (4) of section 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, inserted in the Act in 1956, which provides that any proceeding before an The Income-tax Officer shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding, like in subsection (5) of section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act here. Our ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vide for a higher sentence in regard to the offence under section 193, Indian Penal Code, if it was committed in proceedings before the Income-tax Officer. It is plain that if the argument of the Additional Solicitor-General is accepted, the result would be that a complaint like the present one can be made by any person and if the offence alleged is proved, the accused would be liable to receive higher penalty awardable under the first paragraph of section 193, Indian Penal Code, without the safeguard correspondingly provided by section 195(1)(b), Criminal Procedure Code. Could it have been the intention of the Legislature in making the offence committed during the course of a proceeding before an Income-tax Officer more serious without affording a corresponding safeguard in respect of the complaints which can be made in that behalf ? We are inclined to hold that the answer to this question must be in the negative. The learned Chief Justice then concluded (at page 431 of 52 ITR) ....after careful consideration, we have come to the conclusion that the view taken by the Bombay High Court should be upheld though for different reasons. Section 37(4) of the Act makes the proceeding ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ority, while holding an inquiry or hearing an appeal or revision under this Act, shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of sections 345 and 346 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and any proceeding before him or it to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. XLV of 1860). In Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh [1982] 1 SCC 466, a three-judge Bench, speaking through Desai J., held that in view of the specific provision made in sub-section (2) of section 34 of the U. P. Rent Act, District Magistrate must be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as for the purposes of section 195(1)(b) and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We were referred to the following passage in that judgment (at page 1241 of AIR 1982 SC) : Now, sub-section (2) of section 34 extracted hereinbefore would show that the expression 'District Magistrate' which would include any officer authorised by him to exercise, perform and discharge his powers, functions and duties, shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing under the Income-tax Act before an income-tax authority shall be deemed to be judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code, viz., every income-tax authority shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of section 195 but not for the purposes of Chapter XXVI of the Code. According to him, the amendment brought about in section 136 of the Income-tax Act was nothing but legislative exposition of the law , as declared in Lalji Haridas' case [1964] 52 ITR 423 (SC). To substantiate his submission that the Legislature adopted different methods to achieve the same end, he drew our attention to section 23 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, and section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, where, like section 136 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as now amended by section 28 of the Finance Act, 1985, the analogous provision which, he says, is a combination of two provisions like sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, into one, enacts that the Commissioner appointed under the Workmen's Compensation Act shall be deemed to be a civil court for all purposes o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ings) Act, 1984, section 19(6) of the Bird and Company Ltd. (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings and other Properties) Act, 1980, section 12(3)(d) of the Cine Workers and Cinema Theatre Workers (Regulation of Employments) Act, 1981, section 37(2) of the Emigration Act, 1983, section 13(5) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, section 14 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, section 19 of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, and section 95 of the Coast Guard Act, 1978, deeming the Commissioner or the Tribunal appointed under the respective Acts for investigation of claims to be a civil court for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Of these eleven enactments, five relate to acquisition of certain industrial undertakings and there is provision made for investigation of claims for the purposes of payment of compensation. The sixth relates to regulation of the conditions of employment of a class of workmen. The remaining five enactments provide for creation of a Tribunal for investigation of claims or entrusted with certain adjudicatory functions. It would, therefore, appear that Pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or the purposes of clauses (b) and (c) should mean a civil, revenue or a criminal court, properly so called, but where a Tribunal created by an Act has all or practically all the attributes of a court, it might be regarded as a court, only if declared by the Act to be a court for the purposes of section 195. Indubitably, the introduction of the inclusive clause in the definition of court in sub-section (3) of section 195 has brought about a change in the law. No rule is more firmly established than the principles enunciated in Heydon's case [1584] 3 Co. Rep. 7a, which have been continually cited with approval not only by the English courts but also by the Privy Council as well as this court. The principles laid down in Heydon's case [1584] 3 Co. Rep. 7a have been enunciated in Crates on Statute Law, 6th Edn., at page 96, as follows : That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered : (1) What was the common law before the making of the Act, (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide, (3) What r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t depend on any substantial degree of skill. A further example is furnished in the construction of section 16(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which provides : In computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included-(a) so much of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly. The question before the court was whether the word individual occurring in section 16(3) meant only a male or also included a female. After finding that the said word in the setting was ambiguous, Bhagwati J., speaking for himself and J. L. Kapur J., in CIT v. Sodra Devi [1957] 32 ITR 615,626 (SC) observed: In order to resolve this ambiguity, therefore, we must of necessity have resort to the state of the law before the enactment of the provisions, the mischief and the defect for which the law did not provide, the remedy which the Legislature resolved and appointed to cure the defect and the true reason of the remedy . . . After taking into account these factors, the learned judge went on to say (at p. 629) : It is clear that the evil which was sought to be remedied was the one resulting from the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stuteness, says that although he cannot fall back on the inclusive part of the definition of court in sub-section (3) of section 195 of the Code, laid particular emphasis on the main part of the definition and contended that the mere absence of an express provision in the Commissions of Inquiry Act deeming the Commission to be a court for the purposes of section 195 of the Code, would not necessarily imply that the Commission is not court for the purposes of section 195 particularly when sub-section (4) of section 5 in express terms provides that the Commission shall be deemed to be a civil court and sub-section (5) expressly provides that any proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Advocate-General contends that the use of the words deemed to be indicates that the proceedings before a Commission of Inquiry are not judicial proceedings, but, by the legal fiction, they have to be regarded as judicial proceedings for the purposes of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. It is contended that the word deemed is, however, sometimes used by the Legislature ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ll be deemed to be a civil court and it stops there. We are quite clear that the first part cannot be read in isolation but must take its colour from the context in which it appears. It would not be correct to contend that the fiction created by the first part by the words shall be deemed to be a civil court is full and complete in itself. The purpose and object of the legal fiction created by the first part of sub-section (4) is reflected in the second. A Commission of Inquiry is, therefore, fictionally, a Civil court for the limited purpose of proceedings under section 482 of the old Code or under section 346 of the present Code. fortiori, the legal fiction contained in sub-section (5) of section 5 which relates to proceedings before the Commission is necessarily confined to offences that are punishable under sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and does not extend beyond that. In Lalji Haridas' case [1964] 52 ITR 423 (SC), the majority of this court held that the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer under section 37(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, were judicial proceedings under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and that such proceedings must be t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fficer is normally designated as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Under section 20 of the Act, the powers of eviction are exercisable by the regular civil courts. In cases not falling under section 20 but under section 21, the powers are exercisable by the prescribed authority. A landlord may apply for release of the accommodation on the ground of bona fide requirement under section 21(1)(a) before the prescribed authority. The expression Prescribed authority as defined in section 3(e) means a Civil Judicial Officer or Judicial Magistrate authorised by the District Magistrate to exercise, perform and discharge all or any of the powers, functions and duties of the prescribed authority under the Act. The hierarchy of courts is clearly established because, section 18 of the Act contemplates an appeal from an order of the District Magistrate to the District Judge. Although, therefore, Desai J., in delivering the judgment of the court, has not referred to the definition of a District Magistrate in section 3(c) and that of the prescribed authority under section 3(e) or the provision for an appeal under section 18 of the Act, he has referred to the authority as the Rent Control Of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question, therefore, arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a court as distinguished from a quasijudicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether, having regard to the provisions of the Act, it possesses all the attributes of a court. It is a familiar feature of modern legislation to set up bodies and Tribunals, and entrust them with work of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative character, but they are not courts in the accepted sense of that term, though they may possess, as observed by Lord Sankey L. C. in Shell Co. of Australia's case [1931] AC 275, some of the trappings of a court. Venkatarama Ayyar J., in Virindar Kumar Satyawadi [1955] 2 SCR 1013, has referred to several decisions of the courts in England and Australia as to what are the essential characteristics of a court as distinguished from Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. About a decade later in Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1963] ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat the legal fiction created by the first part of sub-section (4) is for the limited purpose specified in the second and that the purpose for which the fiction is created is, therefore, to be gathered from what follows after the words which create the fiction. In dealing with the fiction, Bhutt J., observes (at page 75 of AIR 1954 Nag) : Applying this test to the instant case, it would appear that the purpose for which the fiction is created in sub-section (4) of section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, is to be inferred from the words that follow the expression 'the Commission shall be deemed to be a civil court'. It would not be correct to contend that the above expression is full and complete in itself and what follows it only denotes the limitation on the full-fledged status and powers of a civil court that the Commission would otherwise have possessed. If that was the intention of the Legislature, the sentence would have been completed after the words 'civil court' and what follows it would have been the subject of a separate sub-section or sentence. It is, therefore, clear that under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, the Commission is fictio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lies to His Majesty in Council. The learned judge rightly observed that the ratio decidendi in that case was that the Commissioners were not a court and held that the observations made by the Judicial Committee apply mutatis mutandis to a Commission of Inquiry constituted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, and observed (at page 76 of AIR 1954 Nag) : The Commission in question was obviously appointed by the State Government 'for the information of its own mind', in order that it should not act, in exercise of its executive power, otherwise than in accordance with the dictates of justice and equity in ordering a departmental enquiry against its officers. It was, therefore, a fact-finding body meant only to instruct the mind of the Government without producing any document of judicial nature. The two cases are parallel, and the decision must be, as in In re Maharajah Madhava Singh [1905] 31 IA 239, that the Commission was not a court. The term 'court' has not been defined in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Its definition in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is not exhaustive and is intended only for purposes of the Act. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1, and that of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Puhupram's case [1968] MPLJ 629, lay down the correct law. The least that is required of a court is the capacity to deliver a definitive judgment , and merely because the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has power to administer an oath, will not impart to it the status of a court. That being so, it must be held that a Commission of Inquiry appointed by the appropriate Government under section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act is not a court for the purposes of section 195 of the Code. In conclusion, we wish to clarify that this judgment of ours will not prevent the State Government from launching a prosecution against the appellant for commission of the alleged offences under sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, if otherwise permissible in law. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the High Court are set aside and the proceedings pending in the court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Esplanade, Bombay, in Criminal Case No. 1121(W) of 1987 against the appellant for having committed alleged offences punishable under secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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