1988 (9) TMI 48 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether a Commission of Inquiry constituted under section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 is court for purposes of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973? Held that - The least that is required of a court is the capacity to deliver a definitive judgment , and merely because the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has power to administer an oath, will not impart to it the status of a court. That being so, it must be held that a Commission of Inquiry appointed by the appropriate Government under section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act is not a court for the purposes of section 195 of the Code. In conclusion, we wish to clarify that this judgment of ours will not prevent the State Government from launching a prosecution against the appellant for commission of the alleged offences under sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, if otherwise permissible in law. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the High Court are set aside and the proceedings pending in the court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Esplanade, Bombay, in Criminal Case against the appellant for having committed alleged offences punishable under sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, on a complaint filed by the Secretary to the Commission, are quashed.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether a Commission of Inquiry constituted under section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, is a "court" for the purposes of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. The impact of sub-section (3) of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on the status of a Commission of Inquiry as a court.
3. Analysis of whether the legal fiction created by sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, deems the Commission to be a court for all purposes.
4. The effect of the legal precedents and legislative amendments on the interpretation of the term "court" in the context of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether a Commission of Inquiry constituted under section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, is a "court" for the purposes of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

The primary issue revolves around the interpretation of whether a Commission of Inquiry can be considered a "court" under section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The court examined the statutory provisions and the nature of the Commission's functions. It was noted that a Commission of Inquiry is a fact-finding body appointed by the government for its own information and is not required to adjudicate upon the rights of parties. The court concluded that a Commission of Inquiry does not possess the attributes of a court as it does not have the power to deliver definitive judgments or adjudicate disputes.

2. The impact of sub-section (3) of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on the status of a Commission of Inquiry as a court:

Sub-section (3) of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was introduced to clarify the definition of "court" and to resolve the conflicts in interpretation. The court noted that the legislative history and the recommendations of the Law Commission indicated a need for clarity in the definition of "court." The introduction of sub-section (3) was intended to ensure that only those tribunals declared by their constituting Acts to be courts for the purposes of section 195 would be considered as such. The court held that this change in law meant that a Commission of Inquiry could not be deemed a court for the purposes of section 195 unless explicitly declared by the Act.

3. Analysis of whether the legal fiction created by sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, deems the Commission to be a court for all purposes:

The court analyzed the legal fictions created by sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. It was observed that the legal fiction in sub-section (4) that deems a Commission to be a civil court is limited to specific purposes, such as forwarding cases to a Magistrate when certain offences are committed in its presence. Similarly, sub-section (5) deems proceedings before the Commission to be judicial proceedings only for the purposes of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. The court held that these legal fictions do not extend to deeming the Commission a court for all purposes, including section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

4. The effect of the legal precedents and legislative amendments on the interpretation of the term "court" in the context of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

The court reviewed various legal precedents and legislative practices. It was noted that prior to the enactment of sub-section (3) of section 195, there was a conflict of opinion among different High Courts regarding the interpretation of "court." The court referred to the decision in Lalji Haridas v. State of Maharashtra [1964] 52 ITR 423 (SC), where it was held that proceedings before an Income-tax Officer were judicial proceedings and must be treated as proceedings in any court for the purposes of section 195(1)(b). However, the court observed that this decision was rendered before the introduction of sub-section (3) of section 195 and that the legislative amendments had since clarified the definition of "court." The court concluded that the decision in Lalji Haridas' case was now only of academic interest and that the current legal framework required an express declaration for a tribunal to be deemed a court for the purposes of section 195.

Conclusion:

The court held that a Commission of Inquiry constituted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, is not a "court" for the purposes of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The appeal was allowed, and the proceedings against the appellant in the court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate were quashed. The judgment clarified that the State Government could still prosecute the appellant for the alleged offences under sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, if permissible by law.

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