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TMI Blog2025 (1) TMI 299X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or Standing Counsel for CBIC, assisted by Ms. Pravalika Goud WRIT PETITION NOS. 1154, 2123 2851, 3624, 4680, 5238, 5485, 5567, 5617, 5911, 5917, 6692, 6856, 7140, 7208, 7596, 8015, 8022, 8133, 8196, 8273, 8530, 8569, 8768, 9177, 9435, 9490, 9790, 9947, 9979, 10322, 10331, 10565, 10591, 10725, 10733, 10766, 10790, 13212, 13291, 13737, 13746, 13756, 13767, 13777, 13779, 13786, 13795, 13799, 13804, 13818, 13819, 13821, 13822, 13823, 13841, 13842, 13853, 13859, 13917, 13934, 13940, 14100, 14179, 14182, 14268, 14281, 14289, 14437, 14476, 14496, 14729, 14843, 14896, 14947, 15013, 15150, 15201, 15332, 15381, 15439, 15452, 15479, 15483, 15492, 15510, 15569, 15648, 15855, 15863, 16038, 16118, 16281, 16350, 16374, 16656, 16875, 16920, 17012, 17015, 17224, 17294, 17682, 17684, 17766, 17916, 17967, 17990, 18097, 18115, 18117, 18126, 18172, 18176, 18198, 18310, 18425, 18438, 18486, 18613, 18618, 18684, 18894, 19008, 19205, 19594, 19757, 19992, 20150, 20164, 20232, 20233, 20234, 20235, 20355, 20371, 20429, 20671, 20676, 20680, 22410, 22472, 22524, 22535, 22552, 22588, 23087, 23282, 23538, 23962, 25177, 25272, 25742, 26603, 26606, 26621, 26646, 27082, 27228, 27725, 28511, 28653, 28657, 28757, 28 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... scribed under Section 73 (10) of the GST Act. Under the garb of extension of limitation as per impugned notifications, said OIO came to be passed. Criticizing the impugned notification Nos. 9 and 56 of 2023, it is contended that on the date of issuance of these notifications, no force majeure conditions were in existence. Section 168A of the GST Act, in no uncertain terms makes it clear that limitation can be extended on availability of 'special circumstances'. In absence of force majeure circumstance on the date of issuance of notifications, these notifications cannot be said to be passed based on enabling provision. 3. To buttress aforesaid contention, the letter written by Secretary, Home Department to Chief Secretaries of all the States, dated 22.03.2023 was highlighted to establish that there was no need to invoke provisions of the Disaster Management Act, 2005. Thus, COVID-19 period, admittedly, came to an end before impugned notifications were issued. Paragraph Nos. 6(1), (6), (7) and (8) of said letter were relied upon. 4. The next limb of argument is that COVID-19 relaxations/extensions are not available to the Government. Notification Nos. 35/2020, dated 03.04.2020 and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eferred to show that necessary ingredients to attract force majeure clause were absent in the instant case. 9. It was common ground taken by learned counsel for the parties that Section 168A of the GST Act provides that extension notification can be issued on the recommendation of the GST Council. So far as notification No. 56/2023 is concerned, there was no prior notification of GST Council. The counter of the Department filed in these cases shows that the notification No. 56/2023 was issued on the basis of decision taken by GST Implementation Committee/Law Committee. Thus decision of Implementation/Law Committee was ratified by GST Council after six months from the date of issuance of notification No. 56/2023. The meaning of words 'recommendation' and 'ratification' were highlighted to show the difference between the two. The 'recommendation' is always prior in time which forms basis for taking a decision, whereas, 'ratification' is a subsequent exercise for a decision which has already been taken. In view of statutory mandate ingrained in Section 168A of the GST Act, subsequent 'ratification' cannot satisfy the requirement of statute i.e., 'on the recommendation of the GST Coun ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t (para No. 33) filed in W.P. No. 21851 of 2024 was pointed out where State itself treated the power of issuing impugned notifications as 'legislative power'. The judgment of Allahabad High Court in Graziano Transmissions (supra) was also referred to support the same point. Since impugned notifications are issued in exercise of legislative power therefore, 'ratification' aspect dealt with in certain judgments of Supreme Court while exercising executive/administrative power cannot be pressed into service. Putting it differently, it is urged that subordinate legislative and administrative actions cannot be judged on the same parameters. Since statute envisages the requirement of recommendation of council before taking decision of extension of limitation, no other method can be adopted. 14. The meaning of words 'approval' and 'recommendation' as used in Black's Law dictionary and considered by Gauhati High Court in M/s. Barkataki Print and Media Services, Dhrubajyoti Barkotoku (supra) was also referred. 15. The alternative submission of learned Senior Counsel is that by the time notification No. 56/2023 was issued, the original period of limitation for F.Y. 2018-2019 which was upto ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (2021) 1 SCC 539 and V.M. Kurian v. State of Kerala (2001) 4 SCC 215 were relied upon to show difference between the words 'consultation' and 'recommendation'. 20. Banarsi Debi v. Income-Tax Officer AIR 1964 SC 1742 was referred to submit that in view of the principle laid down therein, a conjoint reading of Sections 73 (10) and 168A of the GST Act shows that the provisions are substantive in nature. Such provisions deserve strict interpretation. Section 168A talks about extension of time limit 'specified', 'prescribed' or 'notified' in the GST Act. This power can be once exercised and the law does not permit extension by issuing subsequent notification whereby the time limit originally specified under Section 73 (10) can be extended. 21. Section 73 (2) of the GST Act envisages issuances of notice and for this, time limit is specified. This time limit is regarding initiation of proceedings, whereas Section 75 (10) prescribes expiry date by putting a deeming clause. 22. The bone of contention of the learned Senior Counsel is that Section 168A of the GST Act permits extension of limitation prescribed as per Section 73 (10). This original limitation prescribed in Section 73 (10) c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... High Court in Rungta Mines Limited v. State of Jharkhand 2023 SCC OnLine Jhar 1188 to show that aforesaid circular of CBIC dated 20.07.2021 was considered by the High Court in relation to Value Added Tax and it was made clear that COVID-19 relaxation is not applicable for extending limitation in such matters. 28. Sri V. Sridharan, learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment of Privy Council, which was followed in T. Kaliamurthi v. Five Gori Thaikkal Wakf (2008) 9 SCC 306 to submit that such limitation cannot be extended with retrospective effect. The exercise of extension of limitation is an exercise of substitutive nature. The judgment of P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries (1990) 2 SCC 378 was relied upon to submit that such extension of limitation is impermissible. Although, the judgment of P.K. Unni (supra) was overruled by the Constitution Bench in Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu (2001) 7 SCC 71, it is not overruled on the point in question (paragraph No. 15 of the judgment of P.K. Unni). 29. Lastly, learned Senior Counsel submits that GST Implementation Committee was established as in-house mechanism to take care of 'urgent procedural' matters. It was decided that the sa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... also cited as reasons which cannot form part of force majeure clause. The ratification of notification No. 56/23 took place only on 22.06.2024. Such ratification is unknown to GST Act. 34. Sri P. Govind Reddy, learned counsel appearing in W.P.No.2851 of 2024, relied upon Section 168A of the GST Act and urged that the purpose of insertion of this provision is for empowering and enabling the primary legislation. Such provisions must be strictly construed. The power under Section 168A can be used for the purpose of cases 'not complied' or 'completed'. It cannot be used for the purpose of initiation of proceedings. A judgment of United States of America distinguishing between 'cause of action' and 'action' is also relied upon. Why the benefit of extension of limitation was extended only in favour of department and not for tax payers is another limb of argument. The force majeure period at best covers five months that is equal to the duration of COVID-19 pandemic period. 35. Sri M. Ramachandra Murthy, learned counsel for petitioners in W.P.No. 14729 of 2024 and other matters, submits that the Apex Court in Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (2024 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the impugned Notification Nos. 9/2023 and 56/2023. If COVID-19 was a global Pandemic, the Revenue was not the only sufferer. Tax payers were also sufferers. Thus, extending limitation only for Department by Notification Nos. 9/2023 and 56/2023 hits Article 14 of the Constitution. However, on a specific query from the Bench, learned counsel for the petitioner, fairly, admitted that there is no pleading regarding discrimination in the body of the writ affidavit. It is strenuously contended by Sri Karthik Ramana Puttam Reddy, learned counsel, that the period for which limitation could have been extended is only between 05.07.2022 to 31.07.2023. While issuing Notification No. 13/2022, dated 05.07.2022, it is presumed that the Revenue was aware of the hardship, which took place in interregnum period and therefore, there was no occasion to extend it any further in subsequent meeting. The hardship period can be between May 2021 and 05.07.2022 only. The minutes of the 49th Meeting of GST Council and Clause 5.7 shows that there was no force majeure ingredient available with them. 39. Dr. Avinash Poddar, learned counsel for the petitioner(s) in W.P. No. 10591 of 2024 and other matters, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1957 SCC OnLine SC 27 was relied upon. It is further supported by para No. 24 of the judgment in Gomantak Mazdoor Sangh v. State of Goa 2022 SCC OnLine SC 587. 42. The judgment of Allahabad High Court in Graziano Transmissions (supra) is highlighted to show that High Court clearly held that the recommendation of Council is sine qua non for issuing the notification. The Gauhati High Court in M/s. Barkataki Print and Media Services (supra) rightly held that Notification No. 56 is assailable, because it is not issued pursuant to any recommendation of GST Council. The judgment of the Patna High Court in Barhonia Engicon Private Limited (supra) is sought to be distinguished on the ground that difference of 'recommendation' and 'ratification' was not considered. The Circular dated 20.07.2021 was not considered and erroneously the force majeure order of the Supreme Court was treated to be a reason justifying extension of limitation whereas even Revenue cannot raise that point in view of their own Circular. 43. The Karnataka High Court's judgment in M/s. Sahaj Construction v. Union of India 2024 (10) TMI 1166 is cited wherein the Court held that suo motu extension order of the Supreme Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... considered as to how many cases were pending during COVID-19 period which could not be decided and without undertaking aforesaid necessary exercise, as a matter of course, the limitation was extended which is bad in law. 46. Section 172 of the GST Act envisages the power of removal of difficulties. When such power is exercised, the order is required to be placed before the Parliament. Whereas, under Section 168A, there exists no such requirement to place the notification before the Parliament. Thus, there is always a possibility of abuse of power in issuing notification in purported exercise of power under Section 168A. Learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance on the minutes of the GST Council and pointed out that ratification had taken place without application of mind. The judgment in S.Srinivasan (supra) is cited to show that any such order which shows colorable exercise of power is bad in law. The judgment in General Officer Commanding-in-Chief v. Subhash Chandra Yadav (1988) 2 SCC 351 is referred to show that force majeure requirement is also not satisfied. For this purpose, the judgment in Energy Watchdog (supra) is also referred. The judgment of Calcutta High Court in G ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... from time to time. He relied on the first notification i.e., notification No. 35 of 2020, dated 03.04.2020, to highlight that there is a specific mention about force majeure reason i.e., 'COVID-19 pandemic'. The second notification i.e. notification No. 14/2021, dated 01.05.2021, also talks about pandemic. The third notification i.e., Notification No. 13/2022, dated 05.07.2022 was issued by referring both the previous notifications and it partially modified the previous notifications. Thus, only modification done is relating to limitation portion which stood substituted. Hence, contents of both the said notification Nos.35/2020 and 14/2021 must be read into notification No. 13/2022. If it is read conjointly in the said manner, there will be no doubt that the reason of 'pandemic' must be read into the subsequent notifications. 53. The above notifications show that benefits were given to tax payers also. Section 54 of the GST Act contains limitation of two years. After exemption for the purpose of this Section, the limitation became four years. 54. The fourth notification i.e., notification No. 9/2023, dated 13.03.2023, was affirmed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of M/s. G ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y Commissioner, considered the Notification Nos. 9/2023 and 13/2022 and dismissed the petition. Likewise, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in M/s. Graziano Trasmissioni (supra) considered the challenge to Notification Nos. 9/2023 and 13/2022 and did not interfere in the said notifications. 60. He further urged that the Karnataka High Court in M/s. Sahaj Construction (supra) considered the challenge to Notification No. 9/2023 and declined interference. The Patna High Court in M/s. Barhonia Engicon Private Limited (supra) considered the Division Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court and refused to interfere in the Notifications Nos. 9/2023, 56/2023 and 13/2022. The singular judgment in which Notification No. 56/2023 was interfered with, is a Single Bench Judgment of Guwahati High Court in M/s. Barkataki Print and Media Services (supra). In M/s. Barhonia Engicon Private Limited (supra), the Patna High Court did not agree with this Single Bench judgment of Gauhati High Court. By taking this Court to different orders passed by Supreme Court in suo motu proceeding relating to COVID-19 Pandemic, learned Standing Counsel submits that the first order was passed on 23.03.2020, gr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s consideration by Allahabad High Court. The Allahabad High Court made it clear that the extension of limitation cannot be treated to be a one-time exercise. Repelling the challenge to the notification, liberty was reserved to the petitioners to avail the remedy of appeal by giving them forty five (45) days' time to prefer the appeal. 64. The judgment of Karnataka High Court in M/s. Garej Constructions (supra) was highlighted to show that challenge to Notification No. 9/2023 has failed. Heavy reliance is placed on the judgment of Patna High Court in M/s. Barhonia Engicon Private Limited (supra) to buttress the submission that the general orders of Supreme Court issued in suo motu jurisdiction relating to COVID-19 Pandemic are indeed applicable to the proceedings under the GST Act. The Patna High Court is in agreement with the Allahabad High Court. The Circular of the Department dated 20.07.2021, on which heavy reliance is placed by the petitioners, was considered by Allahabad High Court and the judgment of Allahabad High Court was considered in extenso by Patna High Court. Therefore, Circular of the Department, dated 20.07.2024 is deemed to have been considered by Patna High Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fect to and there is no question to search for the intention of the law makers. Equitable considerations are out of question while interpreting taxing statute. Reliance is placed on Satish Ukey v. Devendra Gangadharrao Fadnavis (2019) 9 SCC 1 and Checkmate Services (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2023) 6 SCC 451. Stand of Union Government:- 68. Sri B. Narsimha Sharma, learned Additional Solicitor General, while borrowing the argument of Sri Dominic Fernandes, learned Standing Counsel for CBIC, urged that the jurisprudence relating to limitation shows that no one has any vested right in relation to the limitation. Before insertion of Section 168A in the GST Act, Section 172 was the only enabling provision to remove the difficulty. This provision also could be invoked only on the recommendation of the Council. Section 168A was introduced during COVID-19 Pandemic to take care of 'special circumstances'. Thus, language of this provision and each word used must be given full meaning. It is urged that first principle of interpretation of statute is that each word must be considered in its context and if language is plain and unambiguous, it has to be implemented irrespective of consequences. The wor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... force majeure is not spelled out separately. 71. It is submitted that the Law Committee requested for providing larger period of limitation, but GST Council provided lesser period. It shows that Council has applied its independent mind. Clause 2.8.1 of GST Implementation Committee minute was read out to show the march of events. It was done to highlight the circumstances in which the ratification exercise had been undertaken. Bajaj Hindustan Limited (supra) was relied upon to show that the word 'approval' can be at a later stage and once 'approval' or 'ratification' takes place it will date back to the date of original decision. 72. Learned Additional Solicitor General further submitted that in view of various circumstances prevailing, in the fitness of things, it was thought proper to extend the limitation and accordingly, impugned notifications have been issued. The inconvenience in holding the meeting of GST Council is evident by reading clause 2.8.1 mentioned above. All the States are the members of Council and it was not easy to bring them on one platform during Pandemic. Thus, compelling circumstance became reason to 'ratify' the decision of 'Law Committee' at a later point ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... anxious consideration on rival contentions and perused the record. FINDINGS:- 80. Taxation fundamentally operates as a legal principle, structured by a comprehensive set of laws, regulations, and statutory provisions that establish the processes for calculating, levying, and allocating taxes. These legal instruments, enacted by legislative bodies, aim to ensure fairness, equity and the effective financing of public services. They are crafted to prevent tax evasion, stimulate economic progress, and equitably distribute the tax obligation. However, the application of tax law is not a mere application of set rules. The determination of taxes involves a deep dive into the factual background. 81. In order to gather the extension of time limit under various notifications at a glance, it is apposite to mention the same in a table, which reads thus:- Year Last date of filing Annual Returns Notf. No. 35/2020 dated 03-04-2020 Notf. No. 14/2021 dated 01-05-2021 Notf. No. 13/2022 dated 05-07-2022 Notf. No. 9/2023 dated 31-03-2023 Notf. No. 56/2023 dated 28-12-2023 2017-18 07-02-2020 N/A N/A 30-09-2023 31-12-2023 - 2018-19 31-12-2020 N/A N/A - 31-03-2024 30-04-2024 201 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the GST Act. Section 168A in no uncertain terms makes it clear that the time limit can be extended 'in respect of actions' which could not be completed or complied with, due to force majeure. The words 'in respect of' were considered by the Supreme Court in the context of Section 23 (1) (B) and it means that 'being connected with' (see Union of India and another v. Vijay Chand Jain AIR 1977 SC 1302). 85. The Allahabad High Court considered the words 'in respect of' in the case of Graziano Transmissioni (supra) and opined as under: "126. As submitted by Sri Mahajan, the words "due to force majeure" are preceded with a general expression "in respect of". Thus, besides intrinsic evidence existing in the Explanation to Section 168-A of the Act (as discussed above), there is equally convincing evidence available in the use of the words "in respect of". The legislature clearly did not intend to provide for additional limitation only to complete actions that had been already undertaken. The words "in respect of" are clearly used to enlarge the scope of exercise of the conditional legislation function. Thus, anything directly linked to the performance of action for which time-limitat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... digarh (Registered) case [Independent Schools' Assn. v. Union of India, (2022) 14 SCC 387] are also of no avail. Here, conditional legislation arose in accordance with law. Therefore, no fault is found therein. Accordingly, the decision in Lachmi Narain case [Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 953 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 213 : (1976) 37 STC 267] is also not applicable to the present facts." (Emphasis Supplied) 86. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court that the words 'in respect of actions' are very wide and brings within its ambit the previous actions of COVID-19 period, which could not be completed or complied with, due to force majeure. Thus, we are unable to persuade ourselves with the line of argument of learned counsel for the petitioners that the time limit could have been extended only in relation to the period during which COVID-19 was subsisting. In the manner statute i.e., Section 168A is worded, there is no cavil of doubt that the Law makers intended to give it a broader umbrella to bring within its shadow, such actions which could not be completed or complied with, due to force majeure. The deliberations in the GST Council Meeting ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... from a conjoint reading of Sections 44 and 73 (10) of the GST Act. By invoking Section 168A, the notification can be issued to extend the limitation provided in the aforesaid sections. In other words, the power to extend the limitation is relating to the limitation prescribed in Section 73 (10). Thus, such limitation could have been extended by issuing notification under Section 168A, whereas, respondents have issued multiple notifications including the impugned notifications, whereby they extended the time limit extended by notifications and not the time limit mentioned in Section 73 (10). This argument deserves serious consideration. No doubt, Section 73 (10) provides that the Proper Officer must issue order under Sub-Section 9 of Section 73 within three years from the due date of issuing annual return. The interesting conundrum is, whether, extension notification issued under Section 168A can be confined to this limitation only and cannot be issued to extend the limitation extended by notifications. 90. A microscopic reading of Sub-Section 1 of Section 168A of the GST Act shows that it enables the Government to issue notification on the recommendations of the Council and exten ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an very well be further extended, while exercising power "under the Act". Putting it differently, the time limit can be extended in three situations namely:- i) 'specified' in ii) 'prescribed' in or iii) 'notified' under the Act. The impugned notifications extending time limit fall within the ambit of 'notified' under the Act and such time limit can be extended by invoking power under Section 168A. It is equally important to note that the opening words of Sub-Section 1 of Section 168A. It opens with an overriding clause, which makes it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the GST Act, such notifications extending time limit can be issued. In view of this analysis, this argument must fail. 92. The next limb of argument is based on the words "on the recommendation" of the Council. As noticed, the parties have taken diametrically opposite stand on the interpretation of this provision. 93. Before dealing further, it is apposite to remind ourselves about general principles of construction in taxing statutes. In a classic passage LORD CAIRNS stated the principle thus: 'If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is of no assistance to Revenue. We are in respectful agreement with the findings given in this regard by Allahabad High Court in Graziano Transmissioni (supra) and Patna High Court in M/s. Barhonia Engicon Private Limited (supra). 95. The plain and unambiguous language of the statute in Section 168A leaves no room for any doubt that on the recommendation of the Council alone, Government can issue the notification. Thus, the argument and judgments relating to 'ratification' and giving stamp of approval to the decision of implementation committee/law committee with retrospective effect of GST Council fades into insignificance. We find substance in the argument of learned Senior Counsel Sri S. Ravi and V. Sridharan based on the judgment of Martwada University (supra) that when the statute gives power to a particular statutory body to act in a particular way, the said decision cannot be taken by any other body. This is trite that when the statute prescribes thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in the same manner and other methods are forbidden. This was held to be cardinal principle of interpretation way back in 1875, 1 Ch.D.426 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rity'. The Implementation Committee/Law Committee is neither a constitutional nor a statutory body. It is an in-house creation of GST Council for convenience to run the administration. The decision taken by Implementation Committee/Law Committee, on which Notification No. 56/2023 is based, cannot be said to be the decision of GST Council. The ratification of such legislative action is unknown to law. The judgments cited by Revenue were related to the executive action and were not dealing with legislative action, whereas, the judgment of Maratwada University (supra) deals with such subordinate legislative action. Thus, 'ratification' done after issuance of Notification No. 56/2023 will not provide life to Notification No. 56/2023. 98. Sri R. Sushanth Reddy, learned counsel appeared for Revenue, submits that the word "may" is used in Section 168A of the GST Act, whereas, in certain other sections before the words 'on the recommendation of the Council', the Law makers used the word "shall". Thus, existence of recommendation is not a sine qua non or a precondition for issuing notification under Section 168A. 99. This is trite that as a rule of thumb, it cannot be said that the use of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ay also be necessary to find out the intent of the legislature for enacting it and the serious and general inconveniences or injustice to persons relating thereto from its application. The provision is mandatory if it is passed for the purpose of enabling the doing of something and prescribes the formalities for doing certain things. 25. The law on this issue can be summarised to the effect that in order to declare a provision mandatory, the test to be applied is as to whether non-compliance with the provision could render the entire proceedings invalid or not. Whether the provision is mandatory or directory, depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language for which the intent is clothed. The issue is to be examined having regard to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provisions in question. The Court may find out as to what would be the consequence which would flow from construing it in one way or the other and as to whether the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions and as to whether the non-compliance is visited by small penalty or serious consequence would flow therefrom and as to whether a part ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... me Court, passed time to time, in suo motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020. On 23.03.2020, as rightly pointed out by Sri Dominic Fernandes this first order was related to Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Negotiable Instruments Act. However, on 8th March, 2021, in the said suo motu jurisdiction, the following directions were passed: "2. We have considered the suggestions of the learned Attorney General for India regarding the future course of action. We deem it appropriate to issue the following directions: - 1. In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall stand excluded. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 15.03.2020, if any, shall become available with effect from 15.03.2021. 2. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 15.03.2021. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 15.03.2021, is greater than 90 d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uded. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 15.03.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 03.10.2021. II. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 02.10.2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 03.10.2021. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 03.10.2021, is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. III. The period from 15.03.2020 till 02.10.2021 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings." (Emphasis Supplied) 108. Lastly, on 10.01.2022, the Supreme Court directed as under: "III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ".......When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to punctuation...." ".....But it would appear, at any rate, with respect to modern statutes. State that if the statute in question is found to be careful punctuated, punctuation, though a minor element, may be resorted to for purposes of construction. An illustration of the aid derived from punctuation may be furnished from the case of Mohd. Shabbir v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1979 SC 564) where section 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 came up for construction. By this section whoever 'manufactures for sale, sells, stocks or exhibits for sale or distributes a drug without a licence is liable for punishment. In holding that mere stocking is not an offence within the section, the Supreme Court pointed out the presence of comma after 'manufactures for sale' and 'sells' and absence of any comma after 'stocks'. It was, therefore, held that only stocking for sale could amount to offence and not mere stocking. For another example of the use of punctuation, reference may be made to M.K. Salpekar (Dr.) Sunil Kumar Shamsunder Chaudhari (AIR ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not be appropriate for the court to direct that the circular should be given effect to and not the view expressed in a decision of this Court or the High Court. So far as the clarifications/circulars issued by the Central Government and of the State Government are concerned they represent merely their understanding of the statutory provisions. They are not binding upon the court. It is for the court to declare what the particular provision of statute says and it is not for the executive. Looked at from another angle, a circular which is contrary to the statutory provisions has really no existence in law." (Emphasis Supplied) This view is recently followed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Rohtak v. Merino Panel Product Limited (2023) 2 SCC 597. 115. We concur with the view taken by the Patna High Court. The High Court, in our respectful view, rightly opined that issuance of impugned notifications may be an exercise in abundant caution. Relevant portion reads as under: "40. We emphasize that insofar as the three-year period; relatable to the statutory limitation, there is substantial exclusion, as provided for by the Hon'ble Supreme Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e argument of Sri Karthik Ramana Puttamreddy that in the initial notification extending limitation, 'spread of COVID' was shown as a reason which cannot be a justification for issuance of impugned notifications issued after COVID-19 was over. While dealing with such an extraordinary crisis, Government's action must be viewed in a broad perspective. 118. In view of our finding that period between 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 stood excluded for limitation as per Supreme Court's order, remaining points raised by the petitioners relating to legality of impugned notifications need not be dealt with. 119. In this batch of matters, admittedly, the petitioners have a statutory efficacious alternative remedy of appeal. These matters were entertained despite availability of above remedy because the petitioners assailed the impugned notifications Nos. 13 of 2022, 9 and 56 of 2023. In view of order of Supreme Court dated 10.01.2022, since we find no reason and justification to interfere with those notifications. The petitioners may avail the statutory remedy of appeal. 120. The Allahabad High Court in Graziano Transmissions (supra), in this regard held as under: "138. Seen in that light the d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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