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TMI Blog1957 (5) TMI 52X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... were dismissed by the lower appellate Court. The appellants have now filed a second appeal in this court, and the question has arisen as to the sufficiency of the court-fee paid by the appellants on their second appeal and on the cross objection which they filed in the lower Court. It is only with the latter that we are now concerned. 3. The appellants paid a court-fee of Rs. 24 on their cross objection; the Taxing Officer is of opinion that the value of the subject-matter of the cross objection was Rs. 2,400 upon which a court-fee of Rs. 275-8-0 is payable, to which must be added Rs. 18/12/- as the court-fee on that part of the cross objection which seeks to have set aside the order directing that payment of future maintenance be charged on the appellants' property. To the payment of this latter sum no objection is taken 4. Now Section 7, Clause (ii) (a), of the Court-Fees Act reads thus : "7. The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows; (ii) (a) In suits for maintenance and annuities or other sums payable periodically--According to the value of the subject-matter of the suit such value shall be deem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Court held that it was the intention of the Legislature that only females and minors suing for their persona! maintenance should be given a concession in the matter of court-fee, and that accordingly the benefit of the proviso had to be confined to such persons. The Court was further of opinion that "since the word 'suit' includes an appeal the expression 'by females and minors' must also refer to appeals filed by them". 7. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided Shankar Ojha's case (B), I think that the construction which Seth, J., gave to this proviso is to be preferred and that on further consideration the conclusion at which I arrived in Chief Inspector of stamps v. Ram Avadh Chowdhury (C), is erroneous. 8. In my opinion the phrase "by females and minors" in the first sentence of the proviso:-- "Provided that in first appeal from decrees in suits for personal maintenance by females and minoRs....." must, as a matter of grammatical construction, refer to the persons who have instituted the suits and not to those who filed the appeals. I think that these words cannot be transposed and read as though they app ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ich this Full Bench has been formed relates to court-fee. The decision turns on the interpretation that has to be put on the proviso to Section 7(ii)(a) of the Court-Fees Act, as amended by this State. 16. The facts, which have given rise to the question, are not in dispute. The respondent, a Hindu widow, filed a suit to recover arrears of maintenance. She also claimed future maintenance at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month and wanted it to be secured by a charge on some property in the hands of the appellants who are her deceased husband's brother and the two minor song of the latter. She valued the relief for future maintenance at Rs. 480/- under the proviso to Section 7, Court-Fees Act. 17. The trial Court awarded future maintenance at the rate of Rs. 20 per month only and also made the amount a charge on the appellant's property. Against that decree, the respondent preferred an appeal in which she claimed that the amount of her maintenance allowance be Increased to Rs. 40 per month as originally claimed. The appellants filed a cross objection in which they contended that the respondent was not entitled to maintenance at all. They valued the cross objection at Rs. 240, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mount claimed to be payable for one year; Provided that in suits for personal maintenance by females and minors, such value shall be deemed to be the amount claimed to be payable for one year". Section 2 of the Act provides that- ". . . . unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context:-- (i) "Appeal" includes a cross objection (iv) "Suit" includes a first or second appeal from a decree in a suit and also a Letters Patent Appeal." 23. Two contentions have been pressed before us on behalf of the appellants. They are; 1. According to the definition clause, an appeal includes. 'A cross objection' and a suit includes 'a first appeal from a decree in a suit'. If, therefore we at first substitute the term 'a first appeal from a decree in a suit' in place of the word 'suit' in the proviso to Section 7 and then substitute the word 'cross objection' for the word 'appeal', the proviso will read like this :-- "Provided that in a cross objection, against a decree in a suit for personal maintenance by females and minors, such value shall be deemed to be the amount claimed to be payable ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er, is the one raised by the first contention, viz., whether the appellants were bound to value their cross objection under Section 7 itself or whether they could get advantage of the Proviso to that clause. 26. For a correct approach to the question, it is in my opinion, necessary to bear in mind four considerations about which there cannot be much dispute, namely- 1. The general rule appears to be laid down in Section 7(ii)(A) itself according to which all suits for maintenance and annuities or other sums paid periodically have to be valued at ten times the claim for one year. 2. The proviso to the clause enacts an exception to the general rule. The proviso was added by Section 6 of U.P. Act No XIX of 1938 and the obvious intention with which it was enacted was to provide a cheaper, means to females and minors to claim their maintenance in certain cases. It in a way, provides a concession for females and minors who cannot be expected financially to be as well off as other persons. They are, therefore, allowed to value their claim at one-tenth of the figure at which it has to be valued, if it is filed by any other person. The concession is, however, subject to two conditions. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es, the subject-matter in dispute in an appeal is likely to be the same as that of the suit. The court-fee payable in an appeal is, therefore, usually the same as is payable in the suit. This rule, is however, not a universal rule without exception. It is possible that the controversy in respect of a portion of the subject-matter may conclude with the decree of the trial Court. In that case, the subject-matter of dispute in the appeal will obviously not be the same as was that of the suit. In some cases, like a suit for account, it is permissible for the plaintiff to value the suit at one figure but when the defendant files his appeal, he may value his appeal, at a different figure vide Ghalib Rasul v. Mangilal AIR1949All382 . If, however, the Legislature has provided that the valuation of a suit or appeal must be made in a particular manner, it has to be made in that manner irrespective of the range of controversy, even if such a Valuation results in an anomaly. Such an anomaly was noticed in connection with appeal in redemption suits in Abdul Haq v. Shamshuddin AIR1941All357 and Kishen Lal v. B. Preduman Kishen Singh AIR1946All303 . 27. The strongest ground urged by the learne ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r the word "suit" so that it may be substituted for that word wherever it occurs in the Act. Reading the proviso by substituting the phrase "first or second appeal or cross objection from a decree in a suit" for the word suit is not, therefore, the correct way of interpreting the proviso. Words or expressions are defined in statutes by employing the words "means", "includes", "denotes" and "is deemed to be". When "means" is employed it shows that the definition is a hard and fast definition and that no other' meaning can be assigned to the word or the expression defined than is put down in the definition. The use of the word "denotes"' shows that the Legislature did not intend to put down a cast iron definition of the word but only sought to describe what the word might mean. When a thing is "deemed to be" something, the only meaning possible is that whereas it is not in reality that something, the Act directs that it should be treated as if it were that thing. As pointed out by Sri Jagdish Swarup in his Interpretation of Indian Statutes at p. 165 "The word "include" o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... minor. Since the word "suit" includes appeal, the expression "females and minors" must also refer to "appeals instituted by them". The only effect of reading the proviso with the definition clause, therefore, is that the concession available to females and minors under the proviso is available to them not only in suits, filed by them for personal maintenance but also, if it becomes necessary for them to file appeals and cross objections against decrees passed in such suits. In my opinion, it could not have been the Intention of the Legislature to confine the concession granted by the proviso to females and minors alone in the trial Court but to make it available to persons not falling in that category also in appeals and cross objections. Had that been the intention, the proviso would have been differently worded. 31. It, therefore, appears to me, if I may say so with respect, that the learned Judges, while deciding Shankar Ojha's Case (B), rightly laid down that:-- "The benefit of the proviso must, therefore, it seems to us, be confined--to females and minors. In their case and in their case alone it seems to us, the value of the subject ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the plaintiff. The learned Judge, therefore, thought that the interpretation was not in accordance with common sense, justice and equity and that, if the phrase "first or second appeal from a decree in a suit" was to be substituted for the word "suit" in' Section 7(vi-A) it was also necessary to substitute the word "appellant" for the word "plaintiff", though there was no provision in the Act for making such a substitution. He consequently held that as no share was in dispute in the case, Section 7 did not apply at all and the court-fee paid was sufficient under Article 17 (vi) of the 1st Schedule. 32. In the case of AIR1952All175 , the wife had filed a suit for maintenance and had paid court-fee in accordance with the provision to Section 7. The suit had been decreed. The husband appealed and wanted to take advantage of the same proviso. The Chief Inspector of Stamps, however, urged that the court-fee on appeal should have been computed; in accordance with Section 7 and not in accordance with the proviso to Section 7. His contention was accepted by Mootham, J. (as he then was) who laid down that :-- "A "suit" is defi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bjection at Rs. 4,800/-. They were, in effect, praying for the reduction of the maintenance allowed to the respondent and could be required to value it under Section 7. No question of their taking advantage of the proviso to Section 7 would arise in that case. 35. In my opinion, therefore, the first contention of learned counsel for the appellant is untenable and cannot be accepted. 36. The usual rule, as I have said above, certainly is that the valuation of the suit should not vary but remain constant throughout all stages of the litigation. It is, therefore, not necessary for anyone to dispute the correctness of the general proposition laid down in the case of Rahman v. Bal Chand (H), relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants. As already observed, the rule has certain well known exceptions. In the present case, the Legislature itself appears to have provided an exception. It provided a concession to females and minors in a particular class of cases, whether suits or appeals. The concession was not available to persons not falling in that category. In this, class of cases, therefore, the valuation of the appeal or cross objection could be different from the valuation of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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