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TMI Blog1998 (11) TMI 126X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... its judicial functioning, amounts to gross contempt of court. It is a deliberate attempt on his part to question the judicial functioning of the Tribunal coming as it does from a person of his rank. It is rightly perceived by the President as well as the two concerned Members of the Tribunal as a threat to their independent functioning in the course of deciding appeals coming up before them. The first respondent has offered his apology, to us. However, looking to all the circumstances of the present case we cannot accept the apology offered. He has travelled far beyond exercising administrative control over the Tribunal. - C.P. 287 OF 1998 - - - Dated:- 17-11-1998 - Judge(s) : SUJATA V. MANOHAR., G. B. PATTANAIK JUDGMENT The judgment of the court was delivered by MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR J.---A public interest Writ Petition No. 2350 of 1996 was filed in the Bombay High Court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Bar Association through its Secretary challenging the validity of a letter dated November 5, 1996, purporting to modify the powers of the President of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal regarding posting and transfer of members of the Income-tax Appellate Tribuna ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... went on to say, "...Thus the two orders have taken a contradicting stand. The aforesaid circumstances disclose judicial impropriety of the highest degree. It is intriguing as to how two contradicting orders got dictated in the same matter by the two members, while one order is by the Judicial Member, the other is by the Accountant Member and signed by both. You may like to enquire into the matter and send a report to the Government within 10 days from the date of the receipt of this letter. You may also like to suggest the action that may be taken in the matter and the members against whom it may be taken. Further, while submitting the report, a copy of the 'file order sheet' indicating the name of the member to whom the case was allotted for writing the judgment may also please be sent to the Government." On receipt of this letter, the applicant addressed letter dated January 7, 1998, to both the members of the said Bench enclosing a copy of the letter he had received from the first respondent, and requesting them to send their comments. Both the members have separately sent their replies to the applicant pointing out that the only order which was passed in the said case is th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... unal are discharged by its Members properly and in a manner conducive to instilling confidence in the minds of the taxpayers. The irregularity pointed out in my letter relates to a Bench which is functioning at Mumbai, where you, as the head of the Tribunal, have your regular headquarters. Under the circumstances, silence on your part may invite adverse inferences in the matter. It is, therefore, requested that your report in the matter may be sent to the Government without further delay and in any case not later than February 6, 1998. In case no report is received from you by that date, it will be presumed that you have nothing to say in the matter and Government will be constrained to take such action in the matter as may be deemed fit according to law. This may please be accorded top priority. With kind regards, Yours faithfully, (Sd.) Dr. V. K. Agarwal. Shri T. V. Rajagopala Rao, President, ITAT, 101, Old DGO Bldg., M. K. Marg, Mumbai-400 020." The applicant replied to this letter by his letter of February 6, 1998, in which he pointed out that there was no impropriety in the passing of the order by the Members of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... conduct of the first respondent who was, at the material time, the Law Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice. Undoubtedly, in the application before us it was also contended that the two letters can be looked upon as interference with the interim orders of this court dated March 31, 1997, and May 9, 1997, in the pending petitions. This would then amount to civil contempt. But the basic charge is interference with the judicial functioning of the Tribunal. The prayer in this petition was amended after it was filed to make it clear that the grievance related to interference with administration of justice. The respondents at their request were given sufficient time to reply to the charge of criminal contempt. There can, therefore, be no grievance on this score. Before examining the conduct of the first respondent, we would like to deal with the technical objections which were raised before us on behalf of the first respondent. The first respondent had initially contended that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not a court, and was also not a court subordinate to the Supreme Court. Hence, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to issue a suo motu notice of contempt in res ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... st possess and exercise similar jurisdiction and power as the High Courts had prior to contempt Legislation in 1926. Inherent powers of a superior court of record have remained unaffected even after codification of contempt of law . . . Article 129 declares the Supreme Court a court of record and it further provides that the Supreme Court shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The expression used in article 129 is not restrictive, instead it is extensive in nature. If the framers of the Constitution intended that the Supreme Court shall have power to punish for contempt of itself only, there was no necessity for inserting the expression 'including the power to punish for contempt of itself'. The article confers power on the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of itself and in addition, it confers some additional power relating to contempt as would appear from the expression 'including'. The expression 'including' has been interpreted by courts to extend and widen the scope of power. The plain language of the article clearly indicates that this court as a court of record has power to punish for contempt of itself and also som ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... first respondent that although this court may have jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that jurisdiction should not be exercised in the present case. The appropriate authority to take action would be the High Court. We do not see much force in this submission. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, although it may have Benches in different parts of the country, is a national Tribunal and its functioning affects the entire country and all its Benches. Appeals also lie ultimately to this court from the decisions and references made by the Tribunal. The mere fact that by this court taking suo motu cognizance of the contempt, the first respondent would not be able to appeal to any other court, cannot be a ground for not exercising the power to punish for contempt of a national Tribunal. In the present case, the President of the Tribunal has sought directions and orders from this court and has placed all relevant information concerning the conduct of the first respondent before us, on the basis of which this court has, suo motu, issued notice. Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act which deals with cognizance of criminal contempt, also prescribes that the Supreme Court or the High Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any manner [section 2(c)(iii)]. Therefore, any act which tends to interfere with the administration of justice or tends to lower the authority of any court can be punished with contempt. In the present case, the President of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has considered the letters of December 30, 1997, and February 3, 1998, of the first respondent as interference with the judicial decision-making process of the Tribunal. The concerned members of the Tribunal from whom the President invited comments, also looked upon the letter of December 30, 1997, as gross interference in the judicial discharge of their duties ; and they were justified in so viewing the letter. The first respondent had jumped to the conclusion that the Judicial Member had issued two contradictory orders or the Tribunal had issued two contradictory orders, and had demanded action against erring members. Coming as it did from a senior officer holding the rank of Law Secretary, the applicant was justified in taking a serious view of the first respondent's conduct. Learned senior counsel for the first respondent then contended that the two ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erned is not pending, from the realm of contempt. The present case, however, deals with acts which lower the authority of a court and tend to interfere with the administration of justice. Section 3 has no application in the present case. The letters of the first respondent insinuate a dishonest conduct on the part of the two members, presumably because the view expressed by the Judicial Member in the first alleged order is changed by him in favour of the Revenue when he concurs with the order which was actually pronounced. This kind of an attack based on access to a confidential draft exchanged between the Members of the Bench is bound to affect free exchange of ideas between the two Members who have to judicially decide a case. It is a clear obstruction to proper decision-making and to proper administration of justice. In the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 2176, it has been held that the definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person which would tend to interfere with justice or which would lower the authority of a court. The public have a major stake in effective and orderly administr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dicial Member in August 1997, the other order was per pro the Accountant Member and signed by both. The letter says, "The aforesaid circumstances disclose judicial impropriety of the highest degree". On the basis of this pseudonymous complaint, and the receipt of copies of two separate orders, the first respondent claims to have written the letter of December 30, 1997. Before doing so, he did not check whether there was any person of the name K. Prasad existing at the address given in the letter and whether what had been stated in the letter had any factual basis. He did not even check whether both the orders or any of them had been pronounced by the Bench or not. He should have been aware of an office memorandum dated September 29, 1992, issued by the Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India, to All Departments, giving instructions about dealing with anonymous and pseudonymous complaints. The memorandum states that before taking cognizance of such complaints the Chief Vigilance Officer of the Department or Organisation concerned should obtain specific orders from the head of the Department. A copy of all such complaints shall first be made available to the officer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the assessee, was changed and the Judicial Member, after discussion with the Accountant Member, ultimately agreed with the view taken by the Accountant Member and decided the appeal in favour of the Revenue. Certainly, the language of the letter of December 30, 1997, is wholly unwarranted. Curiously, the statement in the letter that the aforesaid circumstances disclose judicial impropriety of the highest degree is reminiscent of the language used in the pseudonymous complaint. Instead of even waiting for an explanation, he has straightaway asked the President to enquire into the matter and send a report to the Government, and that too peremptorily within ten days. All this is wholly unbecoming of a person holding the rank of the Law Secretary. Moreover, without waiting for some time for a response from the President, immediately on the lapse of a month, he wrote a second letter of February 3, 1998, in an equally peremptory fashion pointing out that although the President was requested to reply within ten days, he had not received any report even after a month ! He admonished the President, pointing out that the President had the responsibility to ensure that the judicial functi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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