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TMI Blog2025 (1) TMI 527X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al of the Appellant No.1 has been dismissed on merits while appeal of the Appellant No.2 has been dismissed for want of pre-deposit. For filing of these appeals before the Tribunal condition under Section 35F has been complied by both the appellants. Required pre-deposit has been made. 3.1 We have heard Shri Rajesh Chhibber learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Appellants and Shri A. K. Choudhary learned Departmental Authorized Representative appearing for the Revenue. 3.2 Learned counsel for the Appellant preliminary pointed out that in the present case the person issuing the Show Cause Notice have decided the matter in appeal against them. This in contravention of principles of natural justice as the matter could have been decided ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... facie, moreover, a duty to act in accordance with natural justice will arise in the exercise of a power to deprive a person of his livelihood or of his legal status where that status is not merely terminable at pleasure, or to deprive a person of liberty or property rights or another legitimate interest or expectation, or to impose a penalty on him; though the conferment of a wide discretionary power exercisable in the public interest may be indicative of the absence of an obligation so to act. Where a discretionary power to encroach upon individual rights is exercised, factors to be taken into account in deciding what fairness requires in the exercise of the power include the nature of the interests to be affected, the circumstances in whi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does it, his decision cannot stand; see R. v. Huggins (8), Sunderland justices (9), per Vaughan Williams, L.J. Nevertheless, there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is not enough; see R. v. Camborne Justices, ex parte Pearce (10); R. v. Nailsworth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... upy judicial office, or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator ought not be and will not be countenanced." In Manak Lal v. Prem Chand, AIR (1957) SC 425, this Court observed: "....But where pecuniary interest is not attributed but instead a bias is suggested, it often becomes necessary to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigant or the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. It would always be question of fact to be decided in each case. "The principle", says Halsbury, "nemo debt esse judex in causa propria sua precludes a justice, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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