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TMI Blog2025 (1) TMI 944X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... isions is that an appeal has to be filed within sixty days [the initial period], and if not done so, then, on sufficient cause being shown, the High Court can condone the delay up to a further period of sixty days. The question that arises in the present case, is whether by virtue of the said proviso, the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is excluded. This Court, in the case of MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI VERSUS ANUSAYA SITARAM DEVRUKHKAR ORS. [ 2025 (1) TMI 783 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] , after reviewing the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Company [ 2001 (10) TMI 1044 - SUPREME COURT ], Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others [ 2010 (4) TMI 1031 - SUPREME COURT ], Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Gujrat Energy Transmission Corporation Ltd. and others [ 2017 (3) TMI 1628 - SUPREME COURT ] and Bengal Chemist and Druggists Association Vs. Kalyan Chowdhary [ 2018 (2) TMI 487 - SUPREME COURT ], came to the conclusion that beyond the stipulated period of 120 days, this Court would have no power to condone the delay. The decision rendered by this Court i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s working as the Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Surat, Sub-Zonal Office, Surat. The Joint Director of the Directorate of Enforcement, Ahmedabad Zonal office, Ahmedabad, had filed Original Complaint No. 805 of 2017 [under Section 5 (5) of the PMLA, 2002] in respect of Provisional Attachment Order No.4 of 2017 dated 17th July 2017. This provisional attachment was also levied under Section 5 (1) of the PMLA, 2002. 5. It is the case of the Appellant that after going through all the documents and evidence, the Adjudication Authority confirmed the Provisional Attachment Order [dated 17th July 2017] vide its order dated 28th December 2017. This confirmation was done under Section 8 of the PMLA, 2002. 6. Being aggrieved by the order of the Adjudicating Authority dated 28th December 2017, the Respondent-Bank, on 15th February 2018, preferred an Appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26 of the PMLA, 2002. This Appeal filed by the Respondent-Bank was heard on 4th April 2018 and the Judgment was pronounced by the Appellate Tribunal on 4th July 2018. The Appellate Tribunal allowed the Appeal filed by the Respondent-Bank and inter-alia set aside the order of the Adju ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the learned Counsel submitted that the provisions of Section 42 do not preclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In this regard the learned Counsel submitted that Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 clearly stipulates that where any special or local law prescribes inter-alia for any appeal, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule of the said Act, for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for such appeal by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 [inclusive] shall apply only insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. He submitted that if one reads the language of Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002 there is no express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and therefore, we would have the power to condone the delay even beyond the period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 42 of the said Act. The learned Counsel also took us through certain other provisions of the PMLA, 2002, namely, the definition of the words proceeds of crime under Section 2 (1) (u) as well as Section 47. The learned Counsel sub ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re there are more than one respondent, any of the respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. (emphasis supplied) 12. As can be seen from the aforesaid provision, any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal on any question of law or fact arising out of such order. The proviso to Section 42, and which is important for our purposes, stipulates that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the initial period of sixty days, may allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. What can be discerned from these provisions is that an appeal has to be filed within sixty days [the initial period], and if not done so, then, on sufficient cause being shown, the High Court can condone the delay up to a further period of sixty days. The question that arises in the present case, is whether by virtue of the said proviso, the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is excluded. As ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special law or local law. After perusing the provisions of Section 42, we are clearly of the view that when the said Section is read as a whole, the inescapable conclusion is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked for condoning the delay beyond the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 42 read with its proviso. If the legislature had in fact intended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to an appeal to be filed under Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002, the legislature would not have inserted the proviso to Section 42 which [after the initial period of sixty days to file an appeal under Section 42 has expired], gives power to the High Court to condone the delay for a further period not exceeding sixty days. The legislature would have stopped by simply saying that any person aggrieved by the decision or an order of the Appellate Tribunal, may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of the decision or order. If that is all that was said by the legislature, the applicability of Section 5 of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the initial period of sixty days, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. For the sake of convenience, Section 74 (1) the 2013 Act and its proviso are reproduced hereunder:- 74. Appeal to High Court. ( 1) The Requiring Body or any person aggrieved by the Award passed by an Authority under section 69 may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of Award: Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. 16. As can be seen from this provision, it is almost identical to the provisions of Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002. This Court, in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (supra), after reviewing the law laid down by the Supreme Court in ( i) Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Company [(2001) 1 SCC 470]; (ii) Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others [(2010) 5 SCC 2023]; (iii) Oil and Natural Gas Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inety days. (emphasis supplied) 18. Whilst construing this provision, the Division Bench of this Court held that the word shall appearing in the proviso to Section 21 (5) should be read as may and hence would be directory in nature. We fail to understand how this decision can be of any assistance to the Appellant. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Faizal Hasamali Mirza alias Kasib Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (supra), came to this finding taking into consideration that an appeal filed by the accused under Section 21 of the NIA Act would be a part of the right to life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is in these facts that the Division Bench in the case of Faizal Hasamali Mirza alias Kasib Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (supra) came to the conclusion that the word shall in the proviso to Section 21 (5) has to be read as may and hence directory in nature. What is important to note is that in this decision, the Division Bench has not come to the conclusion that although the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are excluded by the language of Section 21 of the NIA Act, yet the Court has th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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