9911796707
TMI Blog2025 (1) TMI 992X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ings, the impugned order would not lapse. The issue aforesaid has been dealt with by this Tribunal in many cases where the judgment of the Apex Court not only in the Suo Motto Petition No. 03/20 decided by the order dated 10.01.2022 but also in the judgment in the case of Prakash Corporates vs. Dee Vee Projects Limited [2022 (2) TMI 1268 - SUPREME COURT] has been considered. An elaborate judgment was given by Telangana High Court which has been referred by this Tribunal in its order in Bhuneshwar Prasad Verma vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bhubaneswar [2024 (10) TMI 227 - APPELLATE TRIBUNAL UNDER SAFEMA AT NEW DELHI]. >It was held in the case that 'Since the period of Covid19 from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 has been excluded by the Apex Court for termination of proceedings, the Telangana High Court took notice to it and held that if period of 180 days was falling during the period eliminated by the Apex Court for termination of proceeding, then the provisional attachment would not lapse.' >It is not necessary that attachment of the property can be only of the person who is accused in the FIR or ECIR. It can be even of a person who is not an accus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y can be if any person is in possession of the property as given under Section 5(1)(a) and as per Section 8(3)(a), the continuation of the attachment during the period of investigation for a period of 365 days or pendency of the proceedings relating to any offence under the Act.
>The attachment orders were upheld - Appeal dismissed. X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itutions and government exchequer. >In the light of facts given above, an FIR was registered followed by ECIR on 05.04.2019 for the offence under Sections 120-B read with 420, 468, 471 & 477A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. >The investigation was thereupon conducted by the respondent, apart from the Income-tax Department where it was found that a huge sum was borrowed from the banks / financial institutions which was diverted / siphoned off to Shell companies and thereupon used to acquire the immovable properties. The Provisional Attachment Order (for short "PAO") was therefore issued to attach the properties to secure the proceeds of crime. >The Ld. Counsel for the appellant submitted that a PAO to attach the properties of M/s BPSL to the extent of Rs. 4025.23 crores was issued on 10.10.2019. The said PAO is now pending for consideration before the Apex Court in the pending SLP. >The PAO issued on 16.01.2020 is subject matter of this appeal. The Ld. Counsel for the appellant raised legal issue to press the appeal for challenge to the impugned order i.e. PAO dated 16.01.2020 and its confi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... been attached earlier by the respondent under PAO No. 11/2019 vide order dated 16.01.2020 which was for greater amount than amount of alleged proceeds of crime of Rs.2348 crores. Thus for the aforesaid reason also, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. >The further argument is that during the period starting from 12.08.2011 to 31.03.2013, the account of the BPSL was regular and therefore the purchase of property for a sum of Rs. 74,35,00,000/- on 09.11.2012 could not have been treated to be out of "proceeds of crime" from the loan obtained by BPSL from the bank(s). The account was reported to be NPA in the year 2015. The Ld. Counsel for the appellant referred the status of BPSL from the year 2007 to 2014 showing it to be cash profit company and therefore there was no reason to treat the purchase of properties during the aforesaid period to be the "proceeds of crime". >The Counsel for the appellant, further, submitted that as on date of passing of the impugned orders, no proceedings for the offence under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act was pending against the appellant and therefore their properties could not have been attached. A reference of Section 8(3)(a) of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ts of the case has been given in the beginning to show how the money was laundered by the Companies and individuals. The FIR was registered followed by ECIR. The respondent thereupon issued the PAO and for that first attachment order was passed on 08.11.2019 and said to be pending for consideration before the Apex Court. Another PAO dated 16.01.2020 has been confirmed by the impugned order. The appellant has not contested the allegations levelled against the accused and others rather argued the appeal on the grounds referred earlier. >The first ground raised by the appellant for challenge to the impugned order was in reference to Section 5(1) and 5(3) of the Act of 2002 which provides that the provisional attachment order would have life of 180 days unless it is confirmed within the period aforesaid. The Ld. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the PAO is dated 16.01.2020 while its confirmation is on 12.07.2021 i.e. subsequent to the period of 180 days. A prayer for lapse of provisional order has been sought. >We have considered the submissions and find that the period intervening was largely effected by Covid-19 started after issuance of PAO on 16.01.2020. The period of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... detailed Judgement on the issue and the relevant paras of the Judgement are quoted hereunder: - >15.Issue No. 3: Whether the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 which was excluded by the Apex Court in computation of limitation vide In re: Limitation (supra) is applicable to orders confirming provisional attachment within 180 days? >i) The Petitioner in W.P. No. 34238 of 2022 contends that the provisional attachment order i.e., PAO No. 04 of 2022 dated 03.02.2022 could not have been confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 22.08.2022 as the same was passed after the lapse of 180 days. Further, the Petitioner contends that Adjudicating Authority cannot rely on In re: Limitation (supra) in calculating the period of 180 days in light of the Apex Court's decision in S. Kasi (supra). >ii) In W.P. No. 34627 of 2022, the provisional attachment order therein i.e., PAO No. 01 of 2021 was passed on 01.02.2021. Pursuant to which an original complaint under Section 5(5) of the PMLA was filed on 19.02.2021 and show cause notice under Section 8(1) of the PMLA was issued by the Adjudicating Authority on 03.03.2021. A hearing under Section 8(2) of the PMLA was cond ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on MANU/SC/0108/2022 : (2022) 3 SCC 117 (hereinafter 'In re: Limitation, 2022') till 28.02.2022. The Apex Court vide the said order clarified that where any statute provides an outer limit of limitation period within which the proceedings are to be completed, the period between 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded in computing such period. The relevant paragraphs of In re: Limitation, 2022 (supra) are extracted below: >5.1. The order dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0505/2020 : (2020) 19 SCC 10 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 801] is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 8-3-2021 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0158/2021 : (2021) 5 SCC 452 : (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 40 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 615 : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 50] , 27-4-2021 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0358/2021 : (2021) 17 SCC 2] and 23-9-2021 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0946/2021 ] , it is directed that the period from 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi ju ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by the Director for the purposes of this section, has reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that- >(a) any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime; and >(b) such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter, he may, by order in writing, provisionally attach such property for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of the order, in such manner as may be prescribed: >Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in relation to the scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrate under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has been filed by a person authorised to investigate the offence mentioned in that Schedule, before a Magistrate or court for taking cognizance of the scheduled offence, as the case may be, or a similar report complaint has been made or filed under the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o to Section 5(1) of the PMLA states that if the proceedings initiated under the PMLA are stayed by the High Court, then such period during which the stay operates shall be excluded in computing the 180-day period. Further, Section 5(3) of the PMLA states that a provisional attachment order passed under Section 5(1) of the PMLA shall cease to have effect after the expiry of 180 days from the date of provisional attachment. >ix) A conjoint reading of Sections 5(1) & 5(3) of the PMLA indicates that the period of 180 days within which a confirmation order shall be passed is mandatory. This view is fortified in light of the decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India MANU/SC/0924/2022 wherein the Apex Court dealing with constitutionality of various provisions of the PMLA held that the period of 180 days is in the form of a procedural safeguard. The relevant paragraph is extracted below >287. Be that as it may, as aforesaid, sub-section (1) delineates sufficient safeguards to be adhered to by the authorised officer before issuing provisional attachment order in respect of proceeds of crime. It is only upon recording satisfaction regarding the twin requirements referred ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ting the 180 day period under Section 5(3) of the PMLA. It is important to note exclusion of certain period is different from extending the period. In the present case, the Apex Court exercising its inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India excluded the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 in computation of limitation. Therefore, the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded while computing the period of 180 days under Section 5(3) of the PMLA. >xiii) As stated above, the Petitioners relying on the decision in S. Kasi (supra) and other decisions of the High Courts in Vikas WSP Ltd. (supra), Gobindo Das (supra) and Hiren Panchal (supra) contend that the decision in In re: Limitation(supra) is not applicable to PMLA proceedings. This Court cannot accept the said contention of the Petitioners. >xiv) In S. Kasi (supra), the question before the Apex Court was whether the decision in In re: Limitation (supra) extended the time period `to complete investigation and file charge sheet and whether default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter 'CrPC') could be denied on the ground that investigation was not c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Lockdown announced by the Government of India is akin to the proclamation of Emergency. The view of the learned Single Judge that the restrictions, which have been imposed during the period of Lockdown by the Government of India should not give right to an accused to pray for grant of default bail even though charge-sheet has not been filed within the time prescribed under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is clearly erroneous and not in accordance with law. >29. We, thus, are of the view that neither this Court in its order dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0505/2020 : (2020) 19 SCC 10] can be held to have eclipsed the time prescribed under Section 167(2)CrPC nor the restrictions which have been imposed during the Lockdown announced by the Government shall operate as any restriction on the rights of an accused as protected by Section 167(2) regarding his indefeasible right to get a default bail on non-submission of charge-sheet within the time prescribed. The learned Single Judge committed serious error in reading such restriction in the order of this Court dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, M ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 3) of the PMLA and after the lapse of 180 days, the Adjudicating Authority becomes functus officio. Further, had the legislature or the Government thought it fit, they would have expressly extended the period within which provisional attachment of properties could have been confirmed. However, the Court left the question regarding the applicability of In re: Limitation (supra) in computation of 180 days open. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: >23. Therefore, a reading of sub-section (1) of Section 5 with Section 2(1)(d) of the Act leaves no manner of doubt that the effect of the Provisional Attachment Order is deprivation of the right to property. >25. In the present case, the Act clearly deprives the person against whom the Provisional Attachment Order is passed of his right to deal in the property against which the attachment is ordered. Such deprivation can therefore, be for a maximum of 180 days and no further, except where such order is confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority prior thereto under Section 8(3) of the Act. Once the 180 day period has lapsed without such order being passed under Section 8(3) of the Act, the Provisional Attachment Order ceases to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Government of India as it promulgated The Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation of Certain Provisions) Ordinance, 2020 on 31.03.2020, extending the time limit for completion of any proceedings or passing of any order etc. specified in the Acts specified therein. However, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is not one of the "specified Acts" under the Ordinance. Therefore, the respondents cannot take benefit of even this Ordinance. On the other hand, the Ordinance clearly shows that the reliance of the respondents on the orders of the Supreme Court is liable to be rejected. >35. The above judgment clearly highlights the reason and the limit of the order dated 23.03.2020 passed by the Supreme Court. It also highlights that the said order was never meant to curtail any provision of other statute which is enacted to protect the personal liberty of a person. In my opinion, in a similar manner, the order dated 23.03.2020 was not meant to deny any person his/her property rights. >37. In view of the above, the 180 days from the date of the Provisional Attachment Order dated 13.11.2019 having expired without any order under Section 8(3) of the Act being passed b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he validity of the same by the Respondent No. 2 and the action of Respondent No. 3 in not allowing the petitioner to operate its bank and postal accounts in question after the expiry of the period validity of 180 days from the date of the order passed under Section 5 (1) of the aforesaid Act, such action of the Respondent Enforcement authority, is arbitrary and illegal. >14. In view of the discussion made above this Writ Petition is allowed by declaring that the impugned order of provisional attachment of Bank accounts and postal accounts in question dated 11th December, 2019 passed under Section 5 (1) of The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 after expiry of 180 days on 9th June, 2021 is ceased to have any effect or force as a consequence of failure on the part of the Respondent Enforcement authority/Adjudicating authority in passing further order under Section 8 (3) of The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 extending or confirming order dated 11th December, 2020 under Section 5 (1) of the said Act on or before 9th June, 2021 after expiry of its validity under Section 5 (3) of the said Act by taking the stand of automatic deemed extension/confirmation of the said o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion is hence concerned with the procedure to be undertaken for provisional attachment of a property subject to the fulfillment of the other conditions in Section 5. A prescribed procedure after the same has been initiated cannot be equated to institution of a suit or filing of a petition/application which is a starting point of litigation for a person who seeks relief under a statute. The 180 days window in Section 5 contemplates an endpoint whereas the Supreme Court in the Suo Motu writ petition sought to protect the startingpoint, which was at the risk of being defeated by reason of the pandemic. >19. In other words, what was being protected by the orders of the Supreme Court was the right to remedy, not the right to take away a remedy under a given statute. The respondents before this Court seek to do the latter. The only step taken by the ED is the order of the provisional attachment dated 30th September, 2021. No other steps were taken by the ED before the petitioners reply on 3rd January, 2022 or before the expiry of 180 days period on 31st March, 2022. By its inaction and failure to act in terms of Section 5(1)(b) or the other conditions of the said section, the ED has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (supra) in relation to applicability of In re: Limitation (supra). >xviii) According to this Court, the decision in S. Kasi (supra) cannot be relied upon by the Petitioners to contend that In re: Limitation (supra) is not applicable in computing 180 days under Section 5(3) of the PMLA. In S. Kasi (supra), In re: Limitation (supra) was held to be inapplicable to proceedings involving personal liberty of a person where the investigating officer failed to file charge sheet within the prescribed time. The decision in S. Kasi (supra) cannot be extended to PMLA proceedings dealing with confirmation of provisional attachment order within 180 days. >xix) It is true that provisional attachment of property has an effect of potentially depriving a person of his property. However, right to personal liberty and right to property stand on a different footing and cannot be equated. This is evident from the fact that the urgency in concluding proceedings dealing with a person in jail is much higher than a person whose property is provisionally attached. Further, under Section 5(4) of the PMLA, the person whose property is provisionally attached can still enjoy such property till the same ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y the Central Government in exercise of powers under Section 73 of the 2002 Act regarding the manner of taking possession of attached or frozen properties confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority in 2013, and also regarding restoration of confiscated property in 2019. Suffice it to observe that direction under Section 8(4) for taking possession of the property in question before a formal order of confiscation is passed merely on the basis of confirmation of provisional attachment order, should be an exception and not a rule. That issue will have to be considered on case-to-case basis. Upon such harmonious construction of the relevant provisions, it is not possible to countenance challenge to the validity of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the 2002 Act. >xxi) Therefore, provisions prescribing timelines and which deal with police investigation upon which a person's liberty is dependent has to be strictly construed. On the other hand, where timeline is prescribed for attachment of properties and due to unforeseen circumstances like Covid-19 such attachment was not confirmed, benefit can be granted in favour of the Adjudicating Authority by excluding the period as prescribed und ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... [Settu v. State, MANU/TN/3790/2020] that the said order dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0505/2020 : (2020) 19 SCC 10 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 801] did not cover the offences for which Section 167CrPC was applicable but, in the order [S. Kasi v. State, MANU/TN/7730/2020] impugned, the other learned Single Judge of the same High Court took a view contrary to the earlier decision of the coordinate Bench; and that was found to be entirely impermissible. In any case, the said decision, concerning the matter of personal liberty referable to Article 21 of the Constitution of India and then, relating to the proceedings to be undertaken by an investigating officer, cannot be applied to the present case relating to the matter of filing written statement by the defendant in a civil suit. >xxiii) Further, a Division Bench of Madras High Court in S. Prasanna v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India MANU/TN/8962/2022 held that the decision in S. Kasi (supra) is not applicable to compute the period of 180 days under Section 5(3) of the PMLA. The Court also disagreed with the view adopted in Vikas WSP Ltd. (supra), and Hiren Pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 39;s interests cannot be protected at the cost of another. This Court would further like to stress that the provisionally attached properties can still be enjoyed under Section 5(4) of the PMLA. >xxvi) The reasoning in Hiren Panchal (supra) that what was protected under In re: Limitation (supra) was institution of proceedings and not proceedings which were already initiated cannot be accepted in light of the decision in Prakash Corporates (supra) which held that In re: Limitation (supra) cannot be narrowly applied. >xxvii) Lastly, the decisions in S. Kasi (supra),Vikas WSP Ltd. (supra), Gobindo Das (supra) and Hiren Panchal (supra) cannot be applied for the simple reason that In re: Limitation (supra) was further clarified in In re: Limitation 2022 (supra) wherein the Court at Para 5.4 (extracted supra) held that where time period is prescribed for termination of proceedings, the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded. In the present case, Section 5(3) of the PMLA states that provisional attachment of properties will cease to have effect after a lapse of 180 days from the date of provisional attachment. That would mean that attachment proceedings shall termin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich borrowed the funds from the bank / financial institutions. In view of the above, we are unable to accept even the second ground raised by the appellant. The appellant company and Sanjay Singhal have used the borrowed money thus properties have been attached. The appellant has shown good financial condition of M/s BPSL from the year 2007 to 2014. This indicates nexus of the appellants with M/s BPSL otherwise, there was no reason to refer to the financial position of M/s BPSL. It is argued that the money received by it was not out of loan. The argument has been in ignorance of the fact that the M/s BPSL borrowed the funds from the year 2007 and diverted the funds to many entities which includes the appellant company which has failed to show its own source to acquire the properties. The appellant could have disclosed its independent source to acquire the properties which they failed. >The further case of the appellant is that out of the many properties, one property was purchased prior to commission of crime. A serious contest to it was made by the respondent. It was submitted that the check period involved in this case from the year 2007 till 2014. The properties attached by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dicating Authority which was seriously contested by the respondent and submitted that the prosecution complaint has been filed against the accused. The Ld. Counsel for the appellant then submitted that the Company is not accused in the FIR or ECIR, thus its properties could not have been attached. We have analyzed the aforesaid issue also and find no substance in the argument in reference to the provisions of Act of 2002. It is not necessary that attachment of the property can be only of the person who is accused in the FIR or ECIR. It can be even of a person who is not an accused but holding the property out of proceeds of crime. In that case there cannot be an investigation against the person, who is not made an accused. Prosecution complaint is filed against the accused while property can be attached if someone is in possession of proceeds on its transfer, settlement or adjustment by the accused in favour of such person. In that case though the person occupying or holding the property may not be accused, the property can yet be attached and if such person is not an accused there would be no question of filing prosecution complaint against such a person. >The aforesaid issue h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The sweep of section 5(1) is not limited to the accused named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It would apply to any person (not necessarily being accused in the scheduled offence), if he is involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. Such a person besides facing the consequence of provisional attachment order, may end up in being named as accused in the complaint to be filed by the authorised officer concerning offence under section 3 of the 2002 Act." >The argument has been made in ignorance of the Judgment of the Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary (supra). Section 8(3)(a), does not mandate filing of complaint against the person whose property has been attached or seized. It does not mandate even investigation against the person whose property has been attached or seized and pendency of the proceedings against him in a Court of law rather what is required is the investigation and pendency of proceedings relating to „any offence‟ under this Act. Further, section 5(1) refers to "any person‟, which would include even those who have not been charged ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e any proceeding under this Act: >Provided also that for the purposes of computing the period of one hundred and eighty days, the period during which the proceedings under this section is stayed by the High Court, shall be excluded and a further period not exceeding thirty days from the date of order of vacation of such stay order shall be counted." >The provision quoted above has been framed with the object sought to be achieved. The attachment of the property can be if any person is in possession of the property as given under Section 5(1)(a) and as per Section 8(3)(a), the continuation of the attachment during the period of investigation for a period of 365 days or pendency of the proceedings relating to any offence under the Act. Section 8(3)(a) again does not refer to the investigation against the person whose property has been attached so as the criminal proceedings. Attachment of property from third party can be when the accused involved in predicate offence has parked it with such person or it was arranged in such a manner where proceeds of crime may not remain in the hands of the accused so as to be attached but to be kept with other person not involved in the crim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y was earlier made in excess to the proceeds of crime. Thus no reason to further make attachment of the properties. >It is a fact on record that the attachment of the property pursuant to the PAO No. 11/2019 dated 16.01.2020 is pending consideration before the Apex Court in the appeal where an interim orders said to have been passed. Looking the fact, aforesaid, couple with the facts that subsequent attachment order was passed by the respondent to attach the property which was directly or indirectly the proceeds out of criminal activity related to schedule offence. The appellant's Company purchased the property in question on 09.11.2012 for a consideration of Rs.74,35,00,000/-. It was much subsequent to the year 2007 and between the year 2014. The period of commission of crime cannot be taken from the date the account of BPSL were declared NPA or registration of FIR, rather, checkperiod involved in this case is from the year 2007 to 2014 when BPSL had taken the loan and started committing default in making the repayment. The amount was diverted to other entities / companies, therefore, even the case of moneylaundering was found. >The appellant's Company has not given independ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ndirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The sweep of section 5(1) is not limited to the accused named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It would apply to any person (not necessarily being accused in the scheduled offence), if he is involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. Such a person besides facing the consequence of provisional attachment order, may end up in being named as accused in the complaint to be filed by the authorised officer concerning offence under section 3 of the 2002 Act." >A perusal of para quoted above reveals that attachment of the property can be even of a person not named as an accused. The property can yet be attached if the proceeds of crime has travelled to said person, which is the case in hand. The arguments have been raised otherwise in ignorance of judgement of the Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). The order of this Tribunal so as the judgment of Delhi High Court cannot be applied going against the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). >It is further necessary to add that the prosecuti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
