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TMI Blog2025 (1) TMI 992X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ef facts of the case The Appeals have been filed by the four appellants out of which one is a financial institution namely, Standard Chartered Bank and other is IFCI Limited. The other appeals are by Shri Sanjay Singhal and Atmaram House Investment Pvt. Ltd.. The matters largely pertain to affairs of M/s Bhushan Power & Steel Limited (hereinafter for short "M/s BPSL") and other entities apart from the individuals. The appellant, Mr. Sanjay Singhal was Director of M/s BPSL along with the others. The credit facility from 33 different Banks / Financial Institutions was availed by the Company between 2007 to till 2014. The outstanding amount as on 30.01.2018 was found to be Rs.47,204 crores. M/s BPSL availed the loan facility under the leadership of Punjab National Bank for different purposes and thereupon defaulted in making repayment of loan to the banks /financial institutions. The lead - Punjab National Bank declared the account of M/s BPSL as Non-Performing Assets (NPA) on 13.12.2015 followed by similar action by other banks / financial institutions. In search conducted by the Income-tax authorities in the premises of M/s BPSL at Chandigarh, the documents were found to show ill ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... issued on 16.01.2020 is subject matter of this appeal. The Ld. Counsel for the appellant raised legal issue to press the appeal for challenge to the impugned order i.e. PAO dated 16.01.2020 and its confirmation order dated 12.07.2021. It was submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Adjudicating Authority after expiry of 180 days from the date of the PAO which in fact lapsed on 180th day from 16.01.2020 i.e. the date of PAO. A reference to Section 5(3) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (in short "the Act of 2002") was given to press the first ground of challenge. It was submitted that Adjudicating Authority was not having jurisdiction to give life to the lapsed PAO. Thus on the aforesaid ground itself the impugned order deserves to be set-aside. The other argument was that respondent failed to consider that no amount was given to the appellant by the financial institutions / banks which is said to have been laundered by it. In fact, M/s BPSL had given Rs. 136 crores to the various entities which may include the Appellant's company largely controlled by Mr. Sanjay Singhal. The respondent failed to produce any document to show loan or advance of money to the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... offence under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act was pending against the appellant and therefore their properties could not have been attached. A reference of Section 8(3)(a) of the Act of 2002 was given to substantiate the arguments. The Ld. Counsel for the appellant made reference to the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mahender Khandelwal vs. ED WP(C) No. 10993 of 2023 to support the arguments referred above. It has been held that property of a person against whom criminal proceedings are not pending before the Special Court, its properties cannot be attached. In the instant case, the appellant's company has not been named as an accused and therefore no proceedings were pending against it on the date of passing of the Provisional Attachment Order. A further reference of the judgement of this Tribunal in Ramji Natarajan v. ED FPA-PMLA-2409/DLI/2018 was given where in the absence of a prosecution complaint against the person whose property was attached, an appropriate order was passed. The reference of other judgments was also given where it was held that the prosecution complaint has to be filed within 365 days from the date of the order passed by the Adjudic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e considered the submissions and find that the period intervening was largely effected by Covid-19 started after issuance of PAO on 16.01.2020. The period of Covid-19 from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 and has been eliminated by the Apex Court in Suo Motto Petition No. 03/2020 decided by the order dated 10.01.2022 for termination of the proceedings under any statute. In the light of the exclusion of the period of Covid-19 for termination of the proceedings, the impugned order would not lapse. The issue aforesaid has been dealt with by this Tribunal in many cases where the judgment of the Apex Court not only in the Suo Motto Petition No. 03/20 decided by the order dated 10.01.2022 but also in the judgment in the case of Prakash Corporates vs. Dee Vee Projects Limited reported in 2022 INSC 180 has been considered. An elaborate judgment was given by Telangana High Court which has been referred by this Tribunal in its order in the case FPA-PMLA4363/BBS/2021 Bhuneshwar Prasad Verma vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bhubaneswar dated 24.09.2024. The relevant paras of the order of this Tribunal in the case of Bhuneshwar Prasad (supra) are quoted hereunder: "16. It is no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se notice under Section 8(1) of the PMLA was issued by the Adjudicating Authority on 03.03.2021. A hearing under Section 8(2) of the PMLA was conducted on 05.07.2021 and 06.07.2021. However, no confirmation order was passed till date. The Petitioner contends that as 180 days have lapsed since the passing of the provisional attachment order, the Adjudicating Authority cannot pass an order confirming the provisional attachment. iii) On the other hand, the ED in both W.P. Nos. 34238 of 2022 and 34627 of 2022 contends that due to Covid-19 pandemic the provisional attachment of properties could not have been confirmed within 180 days. However, in In re: Limitation (supra) the Apex Court extended the period limitation from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022. ED contends that the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded from the date of provisional attachment till the date of passing of confirmation order to compute the period of 180 days. iv) It is relevant to note that the Apex Court in In re: Limitation (supra) took suo moto cognizance of the Covid-19 pandemic situation and extended the period of limitation from 15.03.2020 for the purpose of filing petitions/applications/suit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. 5.2. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 3-10-2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 1-3- 2022. 5.3. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 1-3-2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 1-3- 2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. 5.4. It is further clarified that the period from 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23(4) and 29-A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nizance of the scheduled offence, as the case may be, or a similar report complaint has been made or filed under the corresponding law of any other country: Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in first proviso, any property of any person may be attached under this section if the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by him for the purposes of this section has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that if such property involved in money laundering is not attached immediately under this Chapter, the non-attachment of the property is likely to frustrate any proceeding under this Act. Provided also that for the purposes of computing the period of one hundred and eighty days, the period during which the proceedings under this section is stayed by the High Court, shall be excluded and a further period not exceeding thirty days from the date of order of vacation of such stay order shall be counted. (2) The Director, or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director, shall, immediately after attachment under subsection (1), forwar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f crime. It is only upon recording satisfaction regarding the twin requirements referred to in sub-section (1), the authorised officer can proceed to issue order of provisional attachment of such proceeds of crime. Before issuing a formal order, the authorised officer has to form his opinion and delineate the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing, which indeed is not on the basis of assumption, but on the basis of material in his possession. The order of provisional attachment is, thus, the outcome of such satisfaction already recorded by the authorised officer. Notably, the provisional order of attachment operates for a fixed duration not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of the order. This is yet another safeguard provisioned in the 2002 Act itself. x) It is true that the period of 180 days within which the provisional attachment order under Section 5(1) of the PMLA has to be confirmed is mandatory. However, in appropriate cases the High Court can exclude certain period while computing the period of 180 days. For instance, this Court in Karvy Realty (India) Ltd. v. The Adjudicating Authority MANU/TL/2356/2022 noting that the Petitioner therein did ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r 'CrPC') could be denied on the ground that investigation was not completed and charge sheet was not filed due to Covid-19. The Court therein held that Section 167(2) of the CrPC envisages an indefeasible right to obtain statutory bail, if investigation is not completed within the prescribed time. The Court held that the decision in In re: Limitation (supra) is not applicable to Section 167(2) of the CrPC as personal liberty of an individual cannot be curtailed. The Court noted the decisions of other High Courts and held that the decision in In re: Limitation (supra) is not applicable to police investigations. In other words, time periods prescribed to complete police investigations and where individual liberty of the accused is in question, the benefit of extension of limitation in In re: Limitation (supra) cannot be taken. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: 20. If the interpretation by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment [S. Kasi v. State, MANU/TN/7730/2020] is taken to its logical end, due to difficulties and due to present Pandemic, police may also not produce an accused within 24 hours before the Magistrate's Court as contemplated by Sec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ourt dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0505/2020 : (2020) 19 SCC 10] . 34. The Rajasthan High Court had occasion to consider Section 167 as well as the order of this Court dated 23-3- 2020 passed in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0505/2020 : (2020) 19 SCC 10] and the Rajasthan High Court has also come to the same conclusion that the order of this Court dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, MANU/SC/0505/2020 : (2020) 19 SCC 10] has no consequence on the right, which accrues to an accused on non-filing of charge-sheet within time as prescribed under Section 167CrPC. The Rajasthan High Court in Pankaj v. State [Pankaj v. State, MANU/RH/0309/2020] decided on 22-5-2020 has also followed the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Settu v. State [Settu v. State, MANU/TN/3790/2020] and has held that the accused was entitled for grant of the default bail. The Uttarakhand High Court in Vivek Sharma v. State of Uttarakhand [Vivek Sharma v. State of Uttarakhand First Bail Application No. 511 of 2020, order dated 12-5-2020 (Utt)] in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on 8(3) of the Act, the Provisional Attachment Order ceases to have effect and therefore, there is no order before the Adjudicating Authority to confirm under Section 8(3) of the Act. The Adjudicating Authority therefore, becomes functus officio. 28. In view of the above dicta, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that as the delay in proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority cannot be blamed on the respondents, the respondents must not be penalized and the time period should be extended, cannot be accepted. It is not a question of penalization of the respondents for the delay, but of application of the mandate of law from which there is no escape. Equally, the principle of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit can also have no application. 30. Clearly, the above order extended the period of limitation. In the present case, Section 5(1) and 5(3) do not provide the period of limitation, but the period of validity of the Provisional Attachment Order. The same would not stand extended due to the above order of the Supreme Court. This becomes more evident from the order dated 06.05.2020 passed by the Supreme Court in I.A. 48411/2020, whereby it was pleased to exte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r Section 8(3) of the Act being passed by the Adjudicating Authority, it is held that the Adjudicating Authority has been rendered functus officio and cannot proceed with the Original Complaint, being O.C. No. 1228/2019 pending before it. The Notice/Summons dated 26.05.2020 is accordingly set aside. 38. In the present case I have intentionally refrained myself from making any comment on whether the period of total lockdown declared by the Central Government, that is from 24.03.2020 to 20.04.2020, can be excluded for computation of the 180 days, as it is not disputed that even on exclusion of this period, the 180 days would have expired on 16.06.2020, the returnable date of the notice issued by the Adjudicating Authority. xvi) Similarly, the Calcutta High Court in Gobindo Das (supra) held that Adjudicating Authority cannot be termed as a litigant for whose benefit In re: Limitation (supra) was passed. Therefore, In re: Limitation (supra) cannot be used to extend the 180 day period to pass orders confirming provisional attachment of properties. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: 13. Considering the records available, submission of the parties and judgments/order reli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nsion/confirmation of the said order by virtue of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suo moto Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020 (supra) by claiming itself as a litigant or advocate or quasi-judicial authority when it was not required to approach physically any quasi-judicial or judicial authority to initiate any proceeding or to file any application/suit/appeal for the purpose of extension or confirmation of the order under Section 5 (1) of The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. xvii) Similarly, the Calcutta High Court in Hiren Panchal (supra) held that vide orders in In re: Limitation (supra), the Apex Court extended the period of limitation to safeguard the right of litigants to institute proceedings. The Court held that computation of 180 days to confirm provisional attachment of properties under Section 8(3) of the PMLA cannot be equated to initiation/institution of proceedings. The Court also held that prescription of 180 days is in the form of a protection against deprivation of right to property. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: 15. It is further relevant to state that the orders passed by the Supreme Court in the Suo Motu writ petition m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aid section, the ED has made itself vulnerable to Section 5(3) of the PMLA. The petitioner in turn has been given the breather of exhaustion of the 180 days window from 1st April, 2022 and the ED cannot now revive the proceedings after more than 80 days have passed from the end point of the 180 days period. 21. In Gobindo Das, the Appeal Court disagreed with the view of the Adjudicating Authority being a "non-litigant". The Division Bench was also disturbed by the fact that the bank accounts of the writ petitioners have been debited leaving the balance at zero despite the order of attachment. Prakash Corporates dealt with the prescribed statutory time period for filing of the written statement under Order VIII Rule 1 of The Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by the Commercial Courts Act. Prakash Corporates also recognised the fact that the decision in S. Kasi was concerned with filing of the charge sheet under Section 167(2) of The Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) and hence would not apply to filing of written statements beyond the prescribed time-limit. 22. The reasoning in S. Kasi would apply to the present case. The Supreme Court recognised that the 23rd March, 2020 o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... same is confiscated. Even in cases of confirmation of provisional attachment, a person can still enjoy such property till the same is confiscated. xx) In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), the Apex Court held that provisionally attached properties which are confirmed can still be enjoyed by a party till a confiscation order is passed. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: 304. The other grievance of the petitioners is in reference to the stipulation in sub-section (4) of Section 8 providing for taking possession of the property. This provision ought to be invoked only in exceptional situation keeping in mind the peculiar facts of the case. In that, merely because the provisional attachment order passed under Section 5(1) is confirmed, it does not follow that the property stands confiscated; and until an order of confiscation is formally passed, there is no reason to hasten the process of taking possession of such property. The principle set out in Section 5(4) of the 2002 Act needs to be extended even after confirmation of provisional attachment order until a formal confiscation order is passed. Section 5(4) clearly states that nothing in Section 5 including the order ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... In re: Limitation (supra), a fortiori when the property can still be enjoyed. xxii) It is relevant to note that the Supreme Court in Prakash Corporates v. Dee Vee Projects Ltd. MANU/SC/0180/2022 : (2022) 5 SCC 112 dealt with the application of In re: Limitation (supra) in relation to filing of a written statement. The Court therein held that the scope of In re: Limitation (supra) cannot be unnecessarily narrowed and in relation to S. Kasi (supra) held that the same stands on different footing as it dealt with Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: 27.7. We are not elaborating on other directions issued by this Court but, when read as a whole, it is but clear that the anxiety of this Court had been to obviate the hardships likely to be suffered by the litigants during the onslaughts of this pandemic. Hence, the legal effect and coverage of the orders passed by this Court in SMWP No. 3 of 2020 cannot be unnecessarily narrowed and rather, having regard to their purpose and object, full effect is required to be given to such orders and directions. [ To complete the scenario, we may indicate in the passing that even after we had hear ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ra). The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: 12. Insofar as the judgment of the Calcutta High Court that was brought to our notice, we find that the Calcutta High Court had mainly relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in S. Kasi case. With utmost respect to the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, we are not in agreement with the reasoning in the above judgment. The issue that was dealt with by the Apex Court in S. Kasi case pertains to the scope of Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. which is directly referable to Article 21 of the Constitution of India viz., personal liberty of a person. The same cannot be equated while dealing with a property right under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and the judgment of the Apex Court in S. Kasi case cannot be applied to a case involving property right of an individual or a corporate. 14. Our reasoning supra is also supported by the judgment of the Apex Court in Prakash Corporates v. Dee Vee Projects Limited [MANU/SC/0180/2022 : (2022) 5 SCC 112]. The Apex Court has explained the scope of the order passed in S. Kasi case and has categorically held that the same cannot be applied in a matter involving proceedings be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t confirmed within a period of 180 days. Therefore, while calculating/computing the 180 day period, the period from 15.03.2022 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded. xxviii) To answer Issue No. 3, this Court holds that the decision in In re: Limitation (supra) and subsequent extensions vide In re: Limitation 2022 (supra) are applicable to PMLA proceedings to compute the period of 180 days. While computing such period, the period from15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall be excluded The para quoted above deals with the issue and is applicable to the facts of this case. Since the period of Covid19 from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 has been excluded by the Apex Court for termination of proceedings, the Telangana High Court took notice to it and held that if period of 180 days was falling during the period eliminated by the Apex Court for termination of proceeding, then the provisional attachment would not lapse." The judgment in the case (supra) deals with the issue with elaborate finding and in the light of the aforesaid, we are unable to accept first ground raised by the appellant for challenge to the impugned order. The period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 is eliminated for termination o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he check-period when huge funds borrowed by the M/s BPSL was diverted to its entities and individuals who in turn purchased the immovable properties. We may give reference of the properties attached by the respondent, which are as under: S. No. Details of property Details of entity in whose name registered Proportion of property attached Value of property attached (Rs.) 1. 53, Jor Bagh, New Delhi Atma Ram House Investment Private Limited 100% 74,35,00,000 2. 5, Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi Atma Ram House Investment Private Limited 100% 11,20,11,326 3. Apartment A.03.2, One Hyde Park, 100 Knightsbridge, London Avantika Global Private Limited 61.09% (to the extent of Rs.99,17,86,772/- out of total Rs.162,34,26,192/- 99,17,86,772 4 FDR Account No. 1010857229, 1020008457 and 1010990887 with Standard Chartered Bank, Jersey kept as security for the loan advanced to M/s Avantika Global Private Limited Avantika Global Private Limited 100% 19,57,68,660 (based upon the principal amount of GBP 24,36,448.79 in November 2011) + interest thereupon All the properties were acquired during the check period. The property at item no. 1 was purchased in the year 2012. In the light ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion against the person whose property has been attached or even the criminal proceedings against such person, rather what has been provided is for continuance of the attachment till completion of investigation within 365 days or during the pendency of the proceedings for the offence under the Act of 2002. The pendency of the proceedings again does not postulate against the person whose property has been attached. The reason for it seems to be that after commission of the predicate offence and the offence of money laundering, accused may park "proceeds of crime‟ with third person having no connection with the crime. The person in possession of the "proceeds of crime‟ can be subjected to attachment and in that case since FIR is not registered against him so as the ECIR, the question of investigation against him so as the criminal proceedings would not arise. The attachment or seizure is permissible even in the hands of a person not arrayed as an accused. The reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary and Others v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2022) SCC Online 929 is relevant. Para 65 of the said judgment is quoted thus: 6 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... orts the finding. For better elucidation, we are reproducing the section 5(1)herein below: "Section 5(1). Attachment of property involved in money-laundering.- (1) Where the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by the Director for the purposes of this section, has reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that- (a) any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime; and (b) such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter, he may, by order in writing, provisionally attach such property for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of the order, in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in relation to the scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrate under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has been filed by a person authorised to investigate the offenc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... can be from a person other than an accused and if that is so where would be a question of investigation against such person not named as accused or any proceeding in the court relating to the offence under the Act. In the light of the judgment in the case supra, we find no substance in the arguments of the appellant. In fact in the case of reported Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India in 2022 SCC Online SC 929, the issue was dealt with in para 65 of the judgment and has been quoted in our order in the case of Mr. Irfan Ahmed Siddiqui (supra). In the light of the judgment of Apex Court, we are unable to accept the arguments of the appellant that attachment of property cannot continue if such a person has not been made an accused. In fact, it can be of other person holding the property and in that case no prosecution complaint can be filed against such a person. Both the issues are accordingly decided against the appellant. The fact on record shows that acquisition of property under attachment was during the check-period from 2007 to 2014 and the respondent have given complete money trail to show purchase of immovable properties out of the proceeds. It was generated after ta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o. In fact, no such issue was raised by the appellant before the Adjudicating Authority. It may be for the reason that total outstanding amount is Rs.47,204 crores as on 30.01.2018. In fact, the appellant has ignored the check-period which has been given by them itself to show cash profit of Company between 2007 to 2014 while the property was purchased on 09.11.2012. The facts, however, remain that even if the BPSL was having cash profit, they were making default in repayment of the loan amount and thus their account was declared NPA. The Ld. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the appellant's Company has not named as an accused and thereby no proceedings against them was pending for commission of offence under the Act of 2002 at time of attachment. A reference to Section 8(3)(a) of the Act of 2002 has been given to support the arguments. It is with further reference to the judgment of Delhi High Court in Mahender Khandelwal (supra), though operation of the order has been stayed by the Division Bench of the said High Court. In any case, we refer to para 65 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra)which is quoted hereunder:- 65. As aforesa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... per the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) the property of such person can also be attached even though not named as an accused. The appellant, further, contended that the "reason to believe" under section 5(1) of the Act recorded by the competent authority was not supplied to the appellant. The statement of aforesaid has been raised without raising an issue that the "reason to believe" was otherwise to be served under section 8(1) of the Act of 2002. The Counsel for the appellant has made reference to the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of J. Sekar vs. Union of India WP (C) 5320/2017, though operation of the order of the Delhi High Court in the said case has been stayed. Thus, we do not find any force in any of the arguments to cause interference in the impugned order. Standard Chartered Appeal No. FPA-PMLA-4184/ DLI/2021 In the appeal preferred by the Standard Chartered Bank, it is submitted that the attached property has already been disposed off by the Bank prior to the attachment thus it could not have been attached by the respondent. The fact narrated by the appellant makes it clear that the properties in attachment does ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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