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TMI Blog2025 (3) TMI 137X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ll grounds relates to common issue of rejection of application for final approval u/s. 80(G) (iii) as not maintainable alleging beyond limitation, so solitary issue exists in this appeal for adjudication that whether the Ld. CIT(E) rejected Form10AB dated 26.03.2024 in which approval under clause (iii) of first proviso to section 80G of the Act was sought by assessee, filed belatedly or not ? 3. Heard rival submission and carefully scanned the material available on record. 4. While reiterating the grounds of appeal, the Ld. AR submitted that Ld. CIT(E) has not considered the information/ evidence brought on record in correct prospective and denied the registration u/s.80G(5)(iii) of the Act. 5. In the course of hearing the learned AR submitted that the assessee / appellant trust was initially registered on 05.09.1980 and was granted original approval vide order dated 06.09.2007, U/s 80G(5)(vi) for the period from 01.04.2006 to 31.03.2009 which was expired on 31.03.2009. Thereafter, the appellant trust did not applied for renewal of approval and afterwards the proviso of Section 80G(5)(vi) was omitted by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2009 w.e.f. 01.10.2010 and effect of the said omissi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the provisional approval or within six months of commencement of its activities whichever is earlier." 8. The learned AR vehemently argued that the application for final approval rejected as non-maintainable on the ground that it was filed beyond the time limit prescribed in clause (iii) i.e. within six months of commencement of activities, which were already commenced on 05.09.1980, but above bar of limitation does not apply to the Trust, as it was not possible to apply for final approval of the Trust within six months of commencement of the authorities of the Trust. He also emphasized that the Trust was granted original approval vide order u/s. 80G (5)(vi) dated 06.09.2007 (placed on page No.6 of the PB) for the period from 01.04.2006 to 31.03.2009 and was granted provisional approval under clause (iv) of 1st proviso of Section 80G(5) of the Act on dated 02.10.2021 and since the Trust was allowed provisional approval on 02.10.2021 for the period from 02.10.2021 to A.Y. 2024-25, so the Trust was covered by the 1st limb of clause (iii) i.e. at least six months prior to expiry of the period of the provisional approval and accordingly the Trust had applied for final approval on 21 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f expiry of Provisional registration if they are applying under sub clause (iii) of the Proviso to Section 80G(5) of the Act. This will be the harmonious interpretation. 11. If we agree with the interpretation of the ld.CIT(E), then say a trust which was formed in the year 2000, performed charitable activities since 2000, but did not apply for registration u/s.80G, the said trust will never be able to apply for registration now. This in our opinion is not the intention of the legislation. This interpretation leads to absurd situation. 11.1 In this context, we will like to refer to observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K P Varghase(supra), where in Hon'ble SC observed as under: Quote, "It is a well-recognised rule of construction that a statutory provision must be so construed, if possible, that absurdity and mischief may be avoided. There are many situations where the construction suggested on behalf of the revenue would lead to a wholly unreasonable result which could never have been intended by the Legislature. Take, for example, a case where A agrees to sell his property to B for a certain price and before the sale is completed pursuant to the ag ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... templated where it would be absurd and unreasonable to apply section 52(2) according to its strict literal construction. We must, therefore, eschew literalness in the interpretation of section 52(2) and try to arrive at an interpretation which avoids this absurdity and mischief and makes the provision rational and sensible, unless of course, our hands are tied and we cannot find any escape from the tyranny of the literal interpretation. It is now a well-settled rule of construction that where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly absurd and unjust result which could never have been intended by the Legislature, the Court may modify the language used by the Legislature or even 'do some violence" to it, so as to achieve the obvious intention of the Legislature and produce a rational construction -" Unquote. 11.2 Thus, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that the statutory provision shall be interpreted in such a way to avoid absurdity. In this case to avoid the absurdity as discussed by us in earlier paragraph, we are of the opinion that the words, "within six months of commencement of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... conclusion that there is material substance in the submissions advanced on behalf of the assessee/ appellant that the trust was not migrating from old regime to new regime as its approval had lapsed on 31.03.2009, which was not renewed upto 31.03.2021, so it was allowed provisional approval on 02.10.2021 for the period from 02.10.2021 to AY 2024-25 and then the trust filed application for final approval on 21.09.2023 under clause (iii) of the first proviso to Section 80G(5), which was definitely within prescribed time limit as it is covered by the first limb of clause (iii) i.e. at least six months prior to expiry of the period of the provisional approval and not covered by the 2nd limb of clause (iii), as the activities already been commenced on 05.09.1980. 15. Upon hearing rival submissions, we are of the considered opinion that rule of procedure are just to handmade to administration of justice and not to penalise anybody and object of procedure only for interest of justice and same should be dealt with in just manner in order to fulfil the end's of justice. In conclusion, we are inclined to accept the plea of assessee / appellant and remitting the matter back to the file of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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