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TMI Blog1989 (1) TMI 126X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... extended meaning and the expression unprocessed in the exempting notification draws its meaning from that context. The principle of construction considered appropriate by the Tribunal in this case appears to us to be unsupportable in the context in which the expression or any other process has to be understood. This appeal is allowed, the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal is remitted to it for a fresh disposal in accordance with law. - Civil Appeal No. 2147 of 1984 - - - Dated:- 17-1-1989 - R.S. Pathak C.J.I. and Venkatachaliah, J. Soli J. Sorabjee, Senior Advocate (M.A. Rangaswamy and Ms. Radha Rangaswamy, Advocates, with him), for the appellant. A.K. Ganguli, Senior Advocate (K. Swami and C.V. Subba Rao, Advocates, with him), for the respondents. [Judgment per : Venkatachaliah, J.]. - This appeal under Section 35-L of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, [ACT] by Messrs Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd., preferred against the appellate order dated 16.3.1984, of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, raises a short question whether the appellant, which manufactures cotton fabrics on power looms which is otherwise exempt fr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... term, would not, however, fall under "any other process" within the meaning of Section 2(f)(v) of the Act. It was contended that even after the calendering, the cotton fabric remained an "unprocessed" cotton fabric and the expression "any other process" in Section 2(f)(v) must be considered ejus-dem-generis, so as to partake of the nature and character of the processes - and belong to the same genus - as those envisaged in the preceding expressions in that clause. Section 2(f)(v) reads: "in relation to goods comprised in Item No. 19-1 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, includes bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie processing or any other process or any one or more of these processes;" The Appellate Tribunal did not accept this contention. It held : "......There is Prima facie nothing in the language employed in Section 2(f) and Item 19-1 of the CET to suggest that the words "any other process" will take within sweep only such processes as are of the same class or genus as the specifically enumerated processes. It may be that for the enumerated processes some extraneous substance may be required. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ically enumerated. Therefore, if it is to be held that the expression "any other process" in Section 2(f)(v) must be understood and construed ejus-Jem-generis, then the question whether the "process" of calendering employed in the present case belongs to the same genus as the processes envisaged in the preceding expressions in the section would have to be examined afresh. 6. The definition of "manufacture" obtaining in Section 2(f) of the Act was amended by Act 5 of 1986 giving it an extended meaning. In repelling the contention that the extended meaning was introduced as an artificial concept of "manufacture" not belonging to, but outside, Entry 84 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, this Court in Empire Industries v. Union of India 1985 (20) E.L.T. 179 (S.C.) = (1985) Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 292 held : "As has been noted, processes of the type which have been incorporated by the impugned Act were not so alien or foreign to the concept of "manufacture" that these could not come within that concept." [p. 323] If, accordingly, the processes such as bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie-processing, are not un ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... words do not exhaust the class, then adoption of the rule may be favoured because its rejection would make the specific words unnecessary." [See : Construction of Statutes by E.A. Driedger p. 95 quoted by Francis Bennion in his Statutory Construction page 829 and 830]. Francis Bennion in his Statutory Construction observed : "For the ejus-dem-generis principle to apply there must be a sufficient indication of a category that can properly be described as a class or genus, even though not specified as such in the enactment. Furthermore the genus must be narrower than the words it is said to regulate. The nature of the genus is gathered by implication from the express words which suggest it......" [p. 830] "It is necessary to be able to formulate the genus; for if it cannot be formulated it does not exist. 'Unless you can find a category", said Farwell LJ, 'there is no room for the application of the ejus-dem-generis doctrine'." [p. 831] In S.S. Magnild (Owners) v. Macintyre Bros. Co. [1920 (3) KB 321] Me Cardie J. said: "So far as I can see the only test seems to be whether the specified things which precede the general words can be placed under some common category. By ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t it was purely a temporary finish and that having regard to the nature of the process it is plainly manifest that it does not impart to the fabric either of the two ingredients necessary to bring the process into the family of processes envisaged by the preceding expressions in the section. Sri A.K. Ganguly, learned counsel for Revenue, however, submitted that this aspect requires investigation of the factual aspects and that since the Appellate Tribunal had not specially examined this aspect and recorded its finding thereon, it would be appropriate to remit the matter to the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh disposal of the appeal in the light of the pronouncement of this Court on the proper rule of construction to be applied in the understanding of the expression "any other process" in Section 2(f)(v) and to consider whether the particular process of calendering adopted by the appellant would satisfy that requirement. We think we should accept this submission of Sri Ganguly. 10. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the order under appeal is set-aside, and the appeal No. 151 of 1984 before the Appellate Tribunal is remitted to it for a fresh disposal in accordance with law. Ther ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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