1989 (1) TMI 126 - SC - Central Excise

Whether the appellant, which manufactures cotton fabrics on power looms which is otherwise exempt from duties of excise and the additional duties of excise respectively under Notification No. 230/77 and 231/77 dated 15.7.1977, looses the benefit of exemption by process of 'calendering' on a calendering plant situated in the appellant's premises? Held that - In the present case the expressions 'bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie processing' which precede the expression 'or any other process' contemplate processes which impart a change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric or otherwise. 'Any other process' in the section must, share one or the other of these incidents. The expression any other process is used in the context of what constitutes manufacture in its extended meaning and the expression unprocessed in the exempting notification draws its meaning from that context. The principle of construction considered appropriate by the Tribunal in this case appears to us to be unsupportable in the context in which the expression or any other process has to be understood. This appeal is allowed, the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal is remitted to it for a fresh disposal in accordance with law.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the process of calendering cotton fabric removes its status as "unprocessed" under Notification No. 230/77 and 231/77.
2. Interpretation of "any other process" in Section 2(f)(v) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
3. Application of the principle of ejusdem generis to the term "any other process."
4. Determination of whether calendering imparts a lasting change to the fabric.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Whether the process of calendering cotton fabric removes its status as "unprocessed" under Notification No. 230/77 and 231/77.
The appellant, a manufacturer of cotton fabrics on power looms, claimed exemption from excise duties under Notifications No. 230/77 and 231/77, which exempt "unprocessed" cotton fabrics. The Central Excise authorities and the Tribunal held that the appellant's calendering process disqualified the fabric from being "unprocessed," thereby subjecting it to excise duties. The Tribunal upheld the levy of duty and dismissed the appellant's appeal.

Issue 2: Interpretation of "any other process" in Section 2(f)(v) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
Section 2(f)(v) includes processes like bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie processing, or "any other process." The Tribunal interpreted "any other process" broadly, concluding that calendering falls within this scope. The appellant argued that "any other process" should be interpreted ejusdem generis, meaning it should share the same characteristics as the listed processes.

Issue 3: Application of the principle of ejusdem generis to the term "any other process."
The principle of ejusdem generis suggests that general words following specific ones should be limited to the same class. The Tribunal, however, did not find this principle applicable, stating that the listed processes were disparate and did not form a class. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the processes listed in Section 2(f)(v) impart lasting changes to the fabric, either chemically or otherwise, and "any other process" should share this characteristic.

Issue 4: Determination of whether calendering imparts a lasting change to the fabric.
The appellant contended that calendering merely involves pressing the fabric between rollers to improve its appearance temporarily and does not impart a lasting change. The Supreme Court recognized the need to investigate whether calendering imparts a lasting change to the fabric, as this would determine if it falls within the scope of "any other process" under Section 2(f)(v). The case was remitted to the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh examination of this aspect.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's order, and remitted the case for fresh disposal. The Tribunal was directed to reconsider the appeal in light of the proper rule of construction for "any other process" and to determine whether the calendering process employed by the appellant imparts a lasting change to the fabric. No order as to costs was made.

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