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TMI Blog2025 (4) TMI 239X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oading and unloading goods subject to payment of licence fee which is to be revised every five years with the approval of Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP). 2.2. Allotment to the respondent for the licensees had been made in the year 2003. By notification dated 20.06.2005 licence fee was revised w.e.f. February, 2002. Thereafter, the next revision was notified on 23.07.2010 approving the revision of licence fee w.e.f. 20.02.2007 again for a period of five years. 2.3. Pursuant to the said revision, demand was raised for realising the arrears of licence fee for the period 20.02.2007 till 23.07.2010 i.e. the date of the notification. Beginning March, 2011, the Assistant Estate Manager/Estate Officer issued demand notice to all the Licensees. The Licensees challenged the notification dated 23.07.2010 before the High Court by way of writ petitions filed in the year 2011-2012 primarily on the ground that it was not permissible to revise the licence fee retrospectively. The learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 28.06.2013 dismissed the bunch of writ petitions holding that the licence fee could be revised retrospectively and upheld the notification dated 23.07.2010. 2.4. Aggrie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Manager (Gr.I) New Mangalore Port Trust, Mangalore, Sir, Subject: Writ Petition No.36972/2011, order dated 28.06.2013 of Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka Ref: i) Payment of difference licence fee on account of revision of scale of rates w.e.f. 20.02.2007, on the basis of Tamp order No. G184, dated: 23.07.2010. ii) Your Letter bearing No.3/44/2015/EBL.1/TAMP, dated 15.01.2015. With reference to the above said subject, we would like to inform you that we had challenged the TAMP order dated: 23.07.2010, before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore by filing the writ petition No.34541 & 34784/211 and the said writ petition was dismissed on 28.06.2013 by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore. We have challenged the order dated:28.06.2013 passed in the writ petition by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore before the division bench by filing the writ appeal no.4400 & 4401/2013, the said writ appeal was posted on 10.11.2014 for preliminary hearing/admission and the Hon'ble Court after hearing the matter by the council appearing for our company and by the council appearing for New Mangalore Port Trust the appeal was admitted by the H ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e was also replied on 25.02.2016 by the Licensees resisting any demand during the pendency of the writ appeal citing the same reasons as given earlier. 2.9. The Estate Officer not satisfied with the reply and noting the fact that there was no stay granted in the pending writ appeals proceeded to pass an under section 7(1) of the PP Act granting a month's time to make the payment failing which it would be recovered as land revenue. 2.10. The Licensees preferred a miscellaneous appeal under section 9 of the PP Act before the District Judge at Mangalore. The District Judge clubbed all the appeals and decided the same vide judgment dated 15.03.2017, allowing all the appeals holding that the proceedings under section 7(1) was barred by time and accordingly, set aside the demand. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the District Judge, the NMPT filed writ petitions before the High Court which have since been dismissed by the impugned judgment giving rise to the present appeals. 3. We have heard Mr. Yatindra Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and on behalf of the respondents Shri Vikas Singh and Ms. Haripriya Padmanabhan, learned senior counsels, and have perus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... igh Court, in which interim order was also passed. The said bunch of petitions was dismissed on 28.062013. Aggrieved by the same, respondent preferred intra-court appeals which were admitted and are still pending before the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka. Throughout in their correspondence to the various demands and the show cause notices, the only defence taken by the respondents was that the demand should not be pressed at this stage as it would prejudice their case pending in the appeal before the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court. The tenor of the defence is clear. Then subject to the outcome of the appeals, the demand could be raised if the respondents failed. f) It is further submitted that in view of the specific stand taken in their replies, the respondents cannot now urge that the recovery proceedings were barred by limitation. g) In view of the admitted position that the intracourt appeals are pending before the Division Bench of the High Court, this Court may consider setting aside the quashing of the recovery proceedings on the ground of limitation and may remand the proceedings before the High Court to be clubbed with the pending appeals and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bility/debt. d) The demands raised prior to 12.08.2015 were not under any statutory provision. These demands were being raised by the lessor to the lessee. The statutory authority under the PP Act for the first time, issued show cause notice on 12.08.2015, which admittedly was beyond a period of three years if the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act is not extended. Had there been a notice under Section 7(3) of the PP Act prior to 11.05.2015 to which a reply had been given by the respondents may be for deferment of the demand in view of the pending appeal before the Division Bench, it could be urged on behalf of the appellant that they were entitled to the benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. There being no such show cause notice prior to 11.05.2015, any proceedings for recovery would be barred by law. Both the notices under Section 7(3) dated 12.08.2015 and the order passed under Section 7(1) on 21.07.2016 were beyond the prescribed period of limitation and, thus, proceedings have been rightly quashed by the District Judge as confirmed by the High Court. e) It may be true that the Assistant Estate Manager also happened to be the Estate Officer under the PP Act, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... provision. However, Kalu Ram clarifies that the Limitation Act does apply to proceedings under the PP Act. On behalf of the appellants, it was briefly argued that Kalu Ram (supra) was incorrectly decided and required to be revisited by a larger Bench, but this was raised merely as a passing reference. 9. On behalf of the respondents, it has been submitted that in view of the admitted facts that no notice was issued under the PP Act by the Estate Officer prior to 11.5.2015, the impugned proceedings under section 7 of the PP Act were rightly held to be barred by law. 10. In effect, both sides agree that the Limitation Act will apply to the proceedings under the PP Act. The respondents cannot argue that only section 3 of the Limitation Act along with the limitation provided under Article 52 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act will apply and not section 18 of the same Act. Once the Limitation Act applies, all its provisions will be applicable to the proceedings under the PP Act. It is true that the plea of benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act was not raised before the High Court and therefore not considered but nevertheless, as we have already rejected the objection of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n Bench. This acknowledgement was given in response to the demand by the lessor (appellant) made well within the limitation of 3 years. The lessor as such would be entitled to the benefit of extension of limitation taking benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. 13. The respondents have vehemently argued that this point had never been raised before any of the forum below nor in the pleadings before this Court. However, the fact remains that the communication dated 04.02.2015 is not disputed by the respondents. There is no dispute on the contents either of the said communication. If that be so, under admitted position, and in view of Clause (a) of explanation to Section 18 of the Limitation Act, the acknowledgment of the liability stands established. Thus, the limitation would extend to 03.02.2018. 14. It has also been urged on behalf of the respondents that they never admitted the liability, rather they had specifically denied it. This submission is based on the ground that the revised tariff vide notification dated 23.07.2010 had been challenged before the High Court with respect to its retrospective application. This submission of the respondents is of no help to them. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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