TMI Blog2025 (4) TMI 1184X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Excise Act, 1944. 2. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise Division vide Order-in-Original dated 22.10.2013 disallowed the Canvat Credit of Rs.1,40,113/- to the appellant alongwith interest and penalty. The appellant had reversed the Canvat Credit of Rs.1,40,113/- on 28.11.2012 and the same was also appropriated in the said Order-in-Original; thereafter, against the said Order-in-Original, the appellant filed appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) who vide Order-in-Appeal dated 23.02.2018 rejected their appeal; thereafter, against the Order-in-Appeal dated 23.02.2018, the appellant filed appeal before this Tribunal and the Tribunal vide its Final Order No. A/63416/2018 dated 01.11.2018 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... indgarh. 4.2 The learned Counsel further submits that the appellant filed the refund claim on 16.12.2019 based on the copy of the Final Order available with their Counsel. As the refund claim had to be filed alongwith the certified copy of the Final Order, therefore, the appellant requested the CESTAT Registry for providing certified copy of the said Final Order. He also submits that the letter dated 28.02.2020 by the Assistant Registrar, CESTAT, Chandigarh to the Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise Division, Mandi Gobindgarh clearly states that the certified copy of the said Final Order was supplied to the appellant on 18.12.2019 and therefore, the appellant is well within time limit as per Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Act, 1944. 5.2 The learned AR further submits that the said Final Order was pronounced on the date of hearing itself in the presence of the appellant‟s counsel, which clearly proves that the said order was very much in the knowledge of the appellant. 5.3 The learned AR further takes me through the „clause [(ec)]‟ of Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 regarding the "relevant date" for filing the refund arising out of duty being refundable as a consequence of judgment/order/direction of the Court, which is as under: "Section 11B (5) ------ (B) "relevant date" means - [(ec) - in case where the duty becomes refundable as a consequence of judgment, decree, order or direction of appellate authority, Appellat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... consequence of judgment, decree, order or direction of appellate authority, Appellate Tribunal or any court, the date of such judgment, decree, order or direction will be the "relevant date" and the limitation period of one year will start from that date. 8. Further, I find that this issue of "relevant date" has been considered by the Tribunal in the case of Prontos Steerings Ltd Vs CCE, Chandigarh-I (supra). The relevant findings are reproduced herein below: "4. The limitation period prescribed under Section 11B for filing the refund claim is one year from the relevant date. The term "relevant date" in the case where the duty becomes refundable as the consequences of judgment, decree, order or direction of the Appellate Authority, Appe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... judgment, observed as under :- "13. So far as the party who is affected by the order or decision for seeking his remedies against the same, he should be made aware of passing of such order. Therefore Courts have uniformly laid down as a rule of law that for seeking the remedy, the limitation starts from the date on which the order was communicated to him or the date on which it was pronounced or published under such circumstances that the parties affected by it have a reasonable opportunity of knowing of passing of the order and what it contains. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive is thus an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be said to have been concluded a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the order was communicated to the assessee or the date on which it was pronounced. 9. Further, the statutory provision also prescribed that the period of one year would start from the date of the judgment on which the same is pronounced in the open court. Therefore, in the present case, the date of communication of the Tribunal's order is 01.11.2018, on which the order was pronounced in the open court in the presence of the appellant's counsel, but the refund application was filed on 16.12.2019; hence, I find that the refund claim filed by the appellant on 16.12.2019 is beyond the prescribed period of one year, accordingly, is clearly time barred. 10. In view of my discussion above, I am of the considered view that there is no infirmity i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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