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TMI Blog1985 (7) TMI 140X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mum of Rs. 45,000..." 3. The commission payable to the deceased on the date of death was as follows: Rs. Commission for the calendar year 1980 (1-1-1980 to 31-12-1980) 45,000 Commission for the period from 1-1-1981 to 12-2-1981 (date of death) 7,500 --------------- Total 52,500 --------------- 4. The accountable person had included Rs. 45,000 in the return but had not included Rs. 7,500. According to her, the said amount was not due to the deceased on the date of death (19-2-1981) and that the said amount had become due on 31-12-1981, at the end of the accounting year and, as such, said amount did not represent property pass ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing on death. 6. The two decisions on which the learned representative for the assessee has relied are not of assistance. The first decision is CIT v. Birla Gwalior (P.) Ltd. [1973] 89 ITR 266 (SC). The ratio of that decision is that the commission receivable if given up prior to making up of accounts was not liable to be included in the income when no date had been fixed by agreement for payment of such commission. The second decision is CIT v. Mehar Singh Sampuran Singh Chawla [1973] 90 ITR 219 (Delhi). In that case it was held that the salary, commission and bonus which had been foregone before the end of the relevant accounting year did not constitute income of that year. The ratio of these two decisions is not applicable in the present case. The concept of accrual of income is different from the concept of beneficial interest in the property passing on death. The right to receive commission constitutes property in praesenti although the commission is to be quantified and to be actually received on a future date and this property would certainly pass on the death of the deceased and the value thereof would be liable to be included for calculating the estate duty. We, therefor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the son and son's son of the deceased. In such a partition, the son's wife would be entitled to the share equal to that of her son and that share of the son's wife was not liable to be taken into account for the purposes of aggregation under section 34(1)(c). The principle laid down in this decision would not be applicable in the present case. It is well settled that a wife cannot herself demand a partition but if a partition takes place between her husband and his son, she is entitled (except in South India) to receive a share equal to that of a son and to hold and enjoy that share separately even from her husband. In that decision, there was a son's son of the deceased and as such, it was held that the wife of the son would be entitled to a share and that share was not liable to be included under section 34(1)(c). In the present case, the deceased had no son and as such, there was no question of his wife getting any share. The principle laid down in that decision would not be applicable in the present case where the deceased was sole surviving coparcener. This ground is, therefore, rejected. 9. The fourth ground is that the Controller (Appeals) had erred in holding that no de ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e principal value of the equity shares of Hico Products Ltd., no cognizance be taken of the fact that stock exchange quotations do not always furnish an infallible guide in the matter of valuation of shares and, besides, do not take into account the erosion of the value of the shares induced by the death of the deceased. It was submitted that the deceased had a towering personality as far as the business of Hico Products Ltd. (of which he was managing director) was concerned. The tremendous progress made by the said company was entirely due to herculean efforts made by the deceased. The said company had acquired a particular status because of the reputation of the deceased. On the death of the deceased a sudden void was created and this resulted in serious erosion of the intrinsic worth of the shares of the said company. The value of the shares depreciated considerably by reason of the death of the deceased. Consequently, according to the learned representative for the assessee, the stock exchange quotation on the date of death of the deceased should not be taken as fair market value of the shares of the said company. The stock exchange quotation on that date, according to him, did ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the deceased is not material. It is laid down in the proviso that where the value of the property has been depreciated by reason of the death of the deceased, the depreciation shall be taken into account in fixing the price. It is obvious that the depreciation would not take place at the very moment of the death of the deceased. It would take place after lapse of a reasonable period after the death of the deceased. Consequently, when the death of the deceased is the cause of depreciation in the value of the property, it is the depreciated price which shall be the principal value of the property and not the market price at the time of the deceased's death. When the deceased is doing a small business and if depreciation takes place by reason of his death, depreciation will be discernible within a short period. However, when the deceased is the managing director of a big company, and if depreciation takes place by reason of his death, that depreciation in value would be visible only after a lapse of a bit longer time. A period of about two to four months would be considered as a reasonable period in which the effect of death of the deceased on the value of the property would be vis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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