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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the offences punishable under sections 162(1) and 220(3) of the Companies Act are "continuing offences" within the meaning of section 472, Criminal Procedure Code. 2. The applicability of the limitation period under section 468, Criminal Procedure Code to these offences. Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the offences punishable under sections 162(1) and 220(3) of the Companies Act are "continuing offences" within the meaning of section 472, Criminal Procedure Code: The primary contention raised by the petitioners was that the prosecutions were barred by limitation as per section 468, Criminal Procedure Code, unless the offences could be classified as "continuing offences" under section 472. The court examined the nature of "continuing offences," noting that the term does not have a fixed concept and varies from statute to statute. The Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria v. State, AIR 1984 SC 1688, emphasized that the expression is difficult to define with a static formula. The court differentiated between an offence and its effect, stating that the continuation of the effect does not make the original offence a continuing one. However, offences like "wrongful restraint" or "wrongful confinement" are considered continuing as long as the restraint or confinement persists. The court referred to the Supreme Court decision in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, AIR 1973 SC 908, which held that failure to submit returns within a prescribed period is not a continuing offence unless the law specifies continued penal liability for the default. The court concluded that sections 162(1) and 220(3) of the Companies Act, by providing for daily fines until the default is rectified, make the offences continuing ones. The court emphasized that the penal liability for the default continues until the omission or default is rectified, thus making it a continuing offence. 2. The applicability of the limitation period under section 468, Criminal Procedure Code to these offences: The court examined the limitation period under section 468, Criminal Procedure Code, which bars prosecution if not initiated within the prescribed period unless the offence is a continuing one. The court noted that section 162(1) of the Companies Act imposes a daily fine for each day the default continues, thereby extending the penal liability until compliance. This provision aligns with the principle that continued non-compliance constitutes a fresh offence each day, as elucidated in Bhagirath Kanoria, where the Supreme Court held that each day of non-compliance with the obligation to pay contributions constituted a fresh offence. The court also addressed contrary views from previous Division Bench decisions, such as National Cotton Mills v. Assistant Registrar of Companies [1984] 56 Comp Cas 222 (Cal), which held that offences under section 162(1) are not continuing offences. However, the court noted that this decision relied on earlier judgments that were overturned by the Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria. The court also highlighted that the decision in Eastern Paper Mills [1988] Cal Crl LR (HC) 176, which held that offences under sections 162(1) and 220(3) are not continuing offences, did not adequately consider the implications of the Supreme Court's rulings in Deokaran Nenshi and Bhagirath Kanoria. Ultimately, the court held that the offences under sections 162(1) and 220(3) of the Companies Act are continuing offences, thus not barred by the limitation period under section 468, Criminal Procedure Code. The court dismissed the revisional applications and directed the lower court to proceed with the cases expeditiously. Conclusion: The judgment concluded that the offences under sections 162(1) and 220(3) of the Companies Act are continuing offences, thereby not subject to the limitation period under section 468, Criminal Procedure Code. The court emphasized the necessity of interpreting statutory provisions to ensure compliance and proper enforcement of the law, aligning with the principles established by the Supreme Court in relevant cases.
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