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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the complaints against the petitioner were barred by limitation. 2. Whether the offences under sections 159 and 220 of the Companies Act, 1956 are continuing offences. 3. Whether the petitioner could be convicted of the offences under sections 159 and 220 after her resignation as a director. Detailed Analysis: 1. Limitation of Complaints: The petitioner contended that the complaints were barred by limitation as she had resigned as a director on 12-12-1990, while the complaints were filed on 11-6-1992. It was argued that the offences under sections 159 and 220, being punishable with fine, should be subject to the six-month limitation period provided in section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. However, this contention was challenged by the respondent, who argued that the offences were continuing in nature, thus making section 468 inapplicable. 2. Continuing Offences: The court examined whether the offences under sections 159 and 220 are continuing offences. Section 159 mandates that every company with a share capital must file an annual return within 60 days of the annual general meeting. Section 220 requires the company to file three copies of the balance sheet and profit and loss account within 30 days of the AGM. Section 162 stipulates penalties for non-compliance, which may extend to Rs. 50 for every day of default. The court referred to the precedent set in Kuldip Singh v. State, where it was held that non-filing of annual returns and balance sheets are continuing offences. The court also considered Supreme Court decisions in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, Bagirath Kanoria v. State of Madhya Pradesh, and Maya Rani Punj v. CIT, which distinguished between ordinary offences and continuing offences based on the language of the statute and the nature of the offence. The court concluded that sections 162 and 220(3) indicate that the Legislature intended these defaults to be continuing offences, thereby making section 468 inapplicable. 3. Conviction Post-Resignation: The petitioner argued that after her resignation on 12-12-1990, she could not be held liable as an "officer in default" under sections 5, 159, and 220. The court interpreted section 5 to mean that even after resignation, the petitioner would still be considered an officer in default. This interpretation prevents directors from evading liability by simply resigning. The court noted that the petitioner did not argue before the trial court or the first appellate court that she lacked access to company records necessary for filing returns. Consequently, this point could not be raised at this stage. Conclusion: The court dismissed the revisions, holding that the offences under sections 159 and 220 read with section 162 are continuing offences, and the complaints were not barred by limitation. Furthermore, the petitioner remained liable as an officer in default even after her resignation, given the absence of any argument regarding the unavailability of company records. The court upheld the fines imposed by the lower courts, reinforcing the legislative intent to ensure compliance with statutory requirements.
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