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Issues:
1. Application to recall an order granting permission to proceed with a suit against a company in liquidation. 2. Entitlement of defendants to be heard before granting permission under section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956. 3. Maintainability of the suit against guarantors. 4. Suit dismissal and restoration application. 5. Barred by time - application under section 446(1) of the Act. Analysis: 1. The judgment pertains to an application seeking to recall an order allowing a bank to proceed with a suit against a company in liquidation. The court had granted permission for the bank to continue Suit No. 272 of 1987 against the company and its guarantors. The official liquidator opposed the application, arguing that the assets were already sold, and the bank's claim was filed. The court dismissed the application to recall the order, emphasizing the maintainability of the suit against the guarantors despite the company's liquidation status. 2. The issue of whether defendants, including guarantors, are entitled to be heard before granting permission under section 446(1) of the Companies Act was raised. The applicant, a guarantor and defendant, contended that rule 117 of the Companies (Court) Rules mandates notice to parties before such applications are allowed. The court acknowledged the applicant's right to be heard but upheld the previous order permitting the bank to proceed with the suit. 3. The judgment addressed the maintainability of the suit against guarantors despite the company being in liquidation. It was held that since the suit included claims against the guarantors, it was maintainable, thereby allowing the bank to pursue legal action against them even after the company's winding-up order. 4. Regarding the suit dismissal and restoration application, the court noted that while the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution, a restoration application was pending. The bank filed an application under section 446(1) of the Act to continue the suit while the restoration application was unresolved. The court clarified that the pending restoration application did not bar the bank from seeking permission to proceed with the suit. 5. The final issue revolved around the application being barred by time. The applicant argued that the bank's application under section 446(1) was filed after the winding-up order, exceeding the permissible time limit. However, the court rejected this argument, stating that the limitation period did not apply to applications seeking leave to continue suits initiated before the winding-up order. Citing relevant case law, the court emphasized that the grant of leave does not impact vested rights, thereby dismissing the contention of the application being time-barred.
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