2000 (12) TMI 789 - SC - Indian Laws

ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT NATURE OF NOT EXCLUDED BECAUSE OF POWER OF HIGH COURT UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether Administrative Tribunals have the power to punish for their contempt.
2. The impact of the Supreme Court decision in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India on Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
3. The jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunals and High Courts concerning contempt proceedings.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Power to Punish for Contempt:
The primary issue was whether Administrative Tribunals, established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, possess the authority to punish for contempt. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh had ruled that post the Supreme Court's decision in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, Section 17 of the Act, which grants Tribunals contempt powers, did not survive. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the power to punish for contempt is essential for maintaining the efficacy and authority of the Tribunals. Section 17 of the Act, which provides Tribunals with the same jurisdiction, powers, and authority in respect of contempt as a High Court, remains valid and enforceable.

2. Impact of L. Chandra Kumar Decision:
The High Court had interpreted the L. Chandra Kumar decision to mean that Administrative Tribunals were equivalent to subordinate courts and thus could not exercise contempt jurisdiction. The Supreme Court clarified that while the L. Chandra Kumar judgment affirmed the High Courts' power of judicial review over Tribunal decisions, it did not strip Tribunals of their contempt powers. The decision did not declare Section 17 of the Act unconstitutional. Instead, it established that decisions of Tribunals are subject to judicial review by High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, but this does not affect the Tribunals' contempt jurisdiction.

3. Jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunals and High Courts:
The High Court had concluded that contempt proceedings should be initiated before it rather than the Tribunals. The Supreme Court refuted this, emphasizing that the power to punish for contempt vested in the Tribunals by Section 17 of the Act is constitutionally valid. The Supreme Court underscored that the jurisdiction to punish for contempt by the Tribunals is derived from Article 323-A(2)(b) of the Constitution, and this jurisdiction remains intact. The High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 does not negate the Tribunals' contempt powers. The Supreme Court directed that contempt cases pending before the High Court be transferred to the Tribunals for appropriate action.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment. It affirmed that Administrative Tribunals have the power to punish for contempt under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The High Court's interpretation of the L. Chandra Kumar decision was incorrect, and the Tribunals retain their contempt jurisdiction. The contempt proceedings pending before the High Court were directed to be transferred to the Tribunals for further action. The appeals were disposed of with no order as to costs.