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Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal under amended Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 2. Right to file an appeal as a substantive right versus procedural right. 3. Interpretation and application of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Detailed Analysis: 1. Maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal under amended Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: The primary issue in this case is whether a Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against the order of a learned Single Judge, given the amendments to Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The appellants filed an application under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956, which was initially decided in their favor by the Company Law Board. The respondent appealed under Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956, and the learned Single Judge allowed this appeal on 14th February 2003. The amended Section 100A, which came into force on 1st July 2002, states: "No further appeal in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge." 2. Right to file an appeal as a substantive right versus procedural right: The appellants argued that the right to file an appeal is a substantive right that vests on the date when the original proceedings are instituted. They cited the Supreme Court's decision in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, which established that the right of appeal is substantive and not merely procedural. This right is preserved from the date of the institution of the suit and is governed by the law prevailing at that time. However, the court noted that a vested right of appeal can be taken away by a subsequent enactment if it explicitly or implicitly intends to do so. 3. Interpretation and application of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: The court discussed the legislative intent behind Section 100A, which was initially introduced in 1976 to minimize delays in adjudication by limiting the number of appeals. The amended Section 100A, effective from 1st July 2002, aimed to further reduce litigation delays by preventing further appeals from decisions of a Single Judge in appellate jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the use of the word "is" in Section 100A indicates that no further appeal is maintainable for judgments rendered by a Single Judge after 1st July 2002, regardless of when the original suit was filed. This interpretation is supported by Full Bench decisions from the Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat High Courts, which held that the amended Section 100A applies to judgments rendered after the amendment's effective date, even if the original suit was filed earlier. The court further clarified that the Companies Act, 1956, does not expressly confer a right of further appeal to a Division Bench against the decision of a Single Judge. Therefore, an appeal to the Division Bench is not maintainable against the decision of the Single Judge rendered after 1st July 2002. The appellants' argument that the expression "no further appeal shall lie" should be interpreted to mean a further appeal at the behest of the party that filed the first appeal was rejected. The court held that Section 100A's plain language bars any further appeal, regardless of which party filed the initial appeal. In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was not maintainable under the amended provisions of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
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