2010 (1) TMI 582 - HC - Companies Law

Offences and prosecution - Offences against Act to be cognizable only on complaint by Registrar, shareholder or Government, Accounts - To be kept by company

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Registrar of Companies is a "person aggrieved" under section 469(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Whether the complaints filed by the Registrar of Companies were barred by limitation.
3. Whether the directors of the company can be prosecuted for the alleged violations.
4. Whether the company itself can be prosecuted for the alleged violations.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the Registrar of Companies is a "person aggrieved" under section 469(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

The court considered whether the Registrar of Companies (RoC) qualifies as a "person aggrieved" as per section 469(1)(b) of the Code. The petitioners argued that the RoC is not an aggrieved person, citing decisions from the Madras High Court in Sulochana v. State of Registrar of Chits and this Court in Nestle India Ltd. v. State. However, these judgments were overruled by higher courts. The Supreme Court in Registrar of Companies v. Rajshree Sugar & Chemical Ltd. clarified that the RoC is indeed a "person aggrieved" under section 469(1)(b) of the Code, as the RoC has a statutory duty to ensure compliance with the Companies Act. The court concluded that the RoC is a person aggrieved for the purposes of initiating prosecution under the Companies Act.

2. Whether the complaints filed by the Registrar of Companies were barred by limitation:

The court examined whether the complaints were filed within the prescribed limitation period. According to section 468 of the Code, the limitation period for offenses punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year is one year. Section 469 states that the limitation period starts from the date the offense comes to the knowledge of the aggrieved person. The court noted that the offenses came to the knowledge of the RoC only upon receiving the inspection report on 24-5-2006. Therefore, the complaints filed within one year from this date were within the limitation period. The court rejected the argument that the knowledge of the offense should be imputed to the RoC from the date the balance sheets were filed, as it is impractical for the RoC to scrutinize all documents immediately upon receipt.

3. Whether the directors of the company can be prosecuted for the alleged violations:

The court analyzed the responsibility of the directors under sections 212(9), 211(7), and 217(5) of the Companies Act. It was contended that only the managing director should be liable under section 209(6). However, the court clarified that besides the managing director, other directors responsible for compliance could also be prosecuted. The complaints specifically alleged that the petitioners were the officers in default and responsible for compliance. The court held that at this stage, all allegations in the complaints must be taken as correct, and it must be presumed that the petitioners were responsible for ensuring compliance with the relevant provisions of the Act.

4. Whether the company itself can be prosecuted for the alleged violations:

The court examined whether the company could be prosecuted for the contraventions. According to section 209(6) of the Act, only directors, officers, and employees are liable for the contraventions, not the company itself. The court noted that no provision in the Act subjects the company to criminal liability for such contraventions. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, which dealt with the prosecution of companies for offenses with mandatory imprisonment. However, this decision was deemed not applicable as the Companies Act does not make the company liable for the specific contraventions in question. Consequently, the court quashed the prosecution of the company but maintained the prosecution of the individual directors.

Conclusion:

The court modified the impugned order by quashing the summoning of the company but upheld the prosecution of the individual directors. The petitions were disposed of with this modification.