1960 (6) TMI 19 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Summary

Issues:
Interpretation of the expression "passing of an order" under section 21 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941; Starting point of limitation for filing an application under section 21(1) of the Act.

Analysis:
The judgment dealt with the interpretation of the term "passing of an order" under section 21 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. The case involved the petitioner, who filed an application for revision before the Board of Revenue against an order made by the Commercial Tax Officer. The Board of Revenue dismissed the application, and the order was communicated to the petitioner on a specific date. The petitioner filed an application for a certified copy of the order and later filed an application requiring the Board to refer certain questions of law to the High Court. The key issue was determining the starting point of limitation for filing the application under section 21(1) of the Act. The petitioner argued that the limitation period runs from the date of communication of the order and sought to deduct the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order. However, the judgment clarified that the time taken to obtain a certified copy cannot be excluded as it does not fall under the categories mentioned in the Indian Limitation Act. The judgment referenced a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court to support this interpretation.

Regarding the starting point of limitation, the judgment held that in cases where the order was not pronounced in open court, the date of passing of the order is when it is communicated to the parties. This view was supported by previous decisions and was deemed applicable in the present case. The judgment emphasized that the passing of an order includes its communication or publication to the parties. It further discussed a decision by the Nagpur High Court, stating that limitation starts when the party affected has a reasonable opportunity to know the order's contents. In this case, the notice served by the Board of Revenue was considered equivalent to pronouncement in open court, providing the petitioner with an opportunity to inspect the order. Therefore, the starting point of limitation was determined to be the date of communication of the order to the petitioner, not the date of receiving a certified copy.

In conclusion, the judgment discharged the Rule, stating that the application under section 21(2)(b) of the Act presupposes a valid application under section 21(1), which was found to be barred by limitation in this case. The judgment agreed with the interpretation of the starting point of limitation and the exclusion of time taken for obtaining a certified copy, ultimately leading to the dismissal of the petitioner's application.

The judgment was delivered by LAHIRI C.J. and BACHAWAT R.S., JJ. with BACHAWAT, J. concurring.