2000 (10) TMI 930 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether in computing the period of limitation as provided in Section 81(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 the date of election of the returned candidate should be excluded or not? Held that - Appeal dismissed. In the instant case, the date of election of the returned candidate being 25.11.1998, the election petition filed on 12.1.1999 on exclusion of the first day from computing the period of limitation, was in time and the learned Single Judge rightly dismissed the petition filed by the appellant.

Summary

Issues:
- Interpretation of Section 81(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 regarding the exclusion of the date of election of the returned candidate in computing the period of limitation for filing an Election Petition.

Analysis:
The case involved a dispute between the appellant and the respondent regarding the filing of an Election Petition challenging the election of the appellant as a Legislative Assembly member. The main issue was whether the Election Petition filed by the respondent within 45 days from the date of election of the returned candidate was maintainable. The appellant argued that the Election Petition was filed beyond the prescribed period, while the respondent relied on the application of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to exclude the date of election in computing the limitation period.

The Supreme Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951 prescribed a limitation period of forty-five days from the date of election of the returned candidate for filing an Election Petition. The court noted that prior to Act No. 27 of 1956, the limitation period was governed by rules under the R.P. Act, and the General Clauses Act was expressly made applicable to those rules. However, after the amendment, the limitation period was incorporated into the R.P. Act itself, making it a self-contained code.

The court referred to previous judgments, including K. Venkateswara Rao case and Manohar Joshi case, which held that the provisions of the General Clauses Act, including Section 9, applied to the computation of the limitation period for filing Election Petitions under the R.P. Act, 1951. It was established that the principle of excluding the first day and including the last day in computing time was well-recognized in statutory interpretation.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that Section 9 of the General Clauses Act should not be universally applied to Election Petitions under Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951. It emphasized that the language of the provision clearly indicated the exclusion of the first day in computing the limitation period. The court held that excluding the date of election of the returned candidate was necessary to ensure parties had the full prescribed period for filing Election Petitions, especially in cases where election results were declared late.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge, ruling that the Election Petition filed by the respondent within 45 days from the date of election of the returned candidate was timely. The appeal was dismissed, emphasizing that the exclusion of the first day in computing the limitation period was in line with the legislative intent of Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951.