1968 (7) TMI 78 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether ss. 3 and 4 are in conflict with cl. 12 of the Schedule of the Electricity Act ? Held that - We see no conflict between cl. 12 of the Schedule in the Electricity Act and ss. 3 and 4 of the Bombay Act. Clause 12 prescribes a procedure for settling the price of electricity supplied by the licensee for street lighting. It merely lays down the machinery for settling the price if there is dispute between the contracting parties. That clause does not fix the price to be paid or even the maximum price payable. We fail to see how that clause takes away the power from the State legislature to impose additional burden on the consumer. All that clause means is that the licensec cannot dictate his terms to the authority responsible for street lighting. We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that in incorporating cl. 12 of the Schedule the central legislature intended that under no circumstance the liability of the consumer can be increased beyond what is asked during the continuance of the contract. In our opinion it imposes no fetters on the powers of the provincial legislatures in the matter of hanging the price of the electricity supplied by the licensec for street lighting. unable to agree with the High Court that either the suit is bad because of want of a valid notice under s. 233 of the Ajmer Merwar Municipalities Regulation or that the notification imposing surcharge is invalid for any reason.Appeal allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of notice under Section 233 of the Ajmer Merwar Municipalities Regulation, 1925.
2. Validity of the notification issued by the Chief Commissioner of Ajmer on March 29, 1949, imposing surcharge.
3. Application of surcharge on electricity used for pumping water.
4. Quantum of surcharge payable by the defendant.
5. Retrospective operation of the notification.
6. Surcharge on charges for maintaining street lighting equipment.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of Notice under Section 233 of the Ajmer Merwar Municipalities Regulation, 1925:
The High Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit partly because no notice as required by Section 233 of the Ajmer Merwar Municipalities Regulation, 1925, was given. The Supreme Court analyzed whether such a notice was necessary. Section 233 prescribes that no suit shall be instituted against a Committee or its members without a one-month prior notice stating the cause of action and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff's case did not involve any act or illegal omission by the defendant that required such notice. The Court emphasized that the failure to pay a debt does not constitute an illegal omission. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that no notice under Section 233 was necessary.

2. Validity of the Notification Issued by the Chief Commissioner of Ajmer on March 29, 1949:
The High Court had held that the notification imposing the surcharge was beyond the scope of the Bombay Electricity Surcharge Act, 1946, as extended to Ajmer. The Supreme Court examined Sections 3 and 4 of the Bombay Act and concluded that these sections empowered the Chief Commissioner to levy a surcharge on the bills for the supply of electricity for street lighting. The Court found no reason to exclude Municipal Councils from the operation of these sections. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was wrong in concluding that the notification was without the authority of law.

3. Application of Surcharge on Electricity Used for Pumping Water:
The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the plaintiff was not entitled to any additional sum for the electricity used for pumping water. The Court noted that the agreement between the plaintiff and the Municipal Committee was for pumping water for a fixed consideration, and this did not amount to supplying electricity. Therefore, the surcharge did not apply to the electricity used for pumping water.

4. Quantum of Surcharge Payable by the Defendant:
The High Court did not examine the defendant's contention that the plaintiff failed to prove the quantum of surcharge payable. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the High Court to examine this issue.

5. Retrospective Operation of the Notification:
The High Court did not address the defendant's contention that the notification could not have retrospective operation. The Supreme Court remanded this issue back to the High Court for examination.

6. Surcharge on Charges for Maintaining Street Lighting Equipment:
The High Court did not decide on the issue of whether the notification allowed for a surcharge on charges for maintaining street lighting equipment. The Supreme Court remanded this issue back to the High Court for examination.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and remanded the case back to the High Court for deciding the issues that remained undecided. The costs of the appeal were to be costs in the cause.