1996 (4) TMI 484 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (STAT) to grant interim orders.
2. Interpretation of relevant provisions of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act.
3. Maintainability of the appeal before the STAT.
4. Inherent powers of the Appellate Tribunal.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (STAT) to Grant Interim Orders:
The primary issue revolves around whether the STAT has the jurisdiction to grant interim orders in an appeal filed against the order of the Joint Commissioner declining to stay the recovery of tax. The court examined the statutory framework and concluded that the STAT does not have the power to grant such interim orders. The court noted, "the STAT had no jurisdiction to pass the order, therefore the interim order suffers for want of jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed."

2. Interpretation of Relevant Provisions of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act:
The court delved into the provisions of Sections 19 and 21 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act to determine the scope of the appellate and revisional powers. Section 19 provides the remedy of appeal, while Section 21 outlines the appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. The court emphasized that "the order appealed against before the STAT, is not an order passed on appeal under section 19 of the Act. It is an order passed by the Joint Commissioner in exercise of the revisional power conferred under sub-section (2-B) of section 19 of the Act." Therefore, the appeal to the STAT was not maintainable.

3. Maintainability of the Appeal Before the STAT:
The court examined whether the appeal against the Joint Commissioner's order was maintainable before the STAT. The court concluded that the appeal was not maintainable, stating, "the appeal against the order of the Joint Commissioner vacating the stay and dismissing stay petition is not maintainable by the Tribunal." The court reasoned that the right to appeal is statutory and must be explicitly provided for within the statutory framework.

4. Inherent Powers of the Appellate Tribunal:
The respondent's counsel argued that the STAT has inherent powers to grant interim orders. However, the court rejected this argument, noting that the power to grant stay is specifically excluded by the statute. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Income-tax Officer v. Mohammed Kunhi, but distinguished it by stating, "the power conferred on the Appellate Tribunal under the APGST Act is a truncated power because the power to grant stay is specifically excluded by the statute." Therefore, the STAT could not exercise any inherent power to grant interim relief in this context.

Conclusion:
The court quashed the interim order passed by the STAT in T.M.P. No. 63 of 1996 in T.A. No. 233 of 1996 dated March 22, 1996, and allowed the writ petition. The court held that the STAT lacked jurisdiction to grant the interim order and that the appeal itself was not maintainable. The court also rejected the request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, stating, "no question of law of general importance which requires to be decided by the Supreme Court, arises in this case." The writ petition was allowed without any order as to costs.