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1965 (4) TMI 107 - SC - Indian LawsWhether the High Court was justified in interfering with the decision of the District Court that the decree in question extinguished the respondents right to redeem the mortgage? Held that - On the facts of this case the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conclusion of the District Court that the decree in question had extinguished the respondents equity of redemption. Appeal allowed.
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the mortgage was extinguished and the respondents were entitled to claim adjustment of the debt. 2. Whether the respondents' application for adjustment of the debt was barred by time. 3. Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by interfering with the District Court's decision. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the mortgage was extinguished and the respondents were entitled to claim adjustment of the debt. The respondents moved the B.A.D.R. Court at Karad for adjustment of the debt alleged to be due from them to the appellants, stating that the debt was under a mortgage deed executed in 1881. They claimed that the relationship between the parties continued to be that of mortgagors and mortgagees, and thus, they were entitled to claim adjustment of the debt. The appellants argued that the mortgage was extinguished, and the respondents were not entitled to claim adjustment. The trial Judge rejected the appellants' argument and held that the equity of redemption still vested in the respondents. However, the appellate Court and the District Court held that the decree in Suit No. 102 of 1932-33 amounted to a final decree, which debarred the right of the respondents to redeem the property as they failed to pay the decretal amount within the prescribed time. 2. Whether the respondents' application for adjustment of the debt was barred by time. The trial Judge found that the respondents' application for adjustment of the debt was barred by time, resulting in the dismissal of their application. The appellate Court agreed with this view. However, the High Court took a different stance, stating that the question of whether the application was within sixty years from the expiry of the period prescribed in the mortgage deed for repayment was irrelevant, as the application was substantially for the adjustment of debt under the decree passed in Suit No. 102 of 1932-33. 3. Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by interfering with the District Court's decision. The High Court, exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code, remanded the proceedings to the trial Court to determine whether the Code of Civil Procedure applied to the State of Oundh at the relevant time. The trial Court found that the Code had been applicable since 1909-10. The High Court also directed that the issue of possession of the property at the relevant time be tried, and the trial Court found that the appellants were in possession as owners from March 2, 1937. The High Court ultimately differed from the District Court, concluding that the decree did not determine the respondents' right to redeem the mortgage. However, the Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 115, as the construction of the decree was a point of law that did not justify the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court emphasized that errors of law not related to the jurisdiction of the court cannot be corrected under Section 115. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by interfering with the District Court's decision that the decree in question extinguished the respondents' equity of redemption. Consequently, the respondents' application for adjustment of the debt was dismissed as barred by time. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.
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