9911796707
|
Home
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. 2. Validity of the notification exempting government buildings under Section 3 of the Act. 3. Status of the appellant as a permanent tenant. 4. Compensation for improvements made by the appellant. 5. Interpretation of "construction" in the context of the notification exempting buildings constructed in specific years from the Act's provisions. 6. Effect of the expiry of the exemption period on the decree for ejectment. Detailed Analysis: 1. Constitutionality of Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act: The primary contention was that Section 3 of the Act, which allows the State Government to exempt certain buildings from the Act, constitutes excessive delegation of legislative power and is thus ultra vires the Constitution. The Court held that the power conferred by Section 3 is conditional legislation, not delegated legislation. The Court referenced several Supreme Court decisions to support this view, emphasizing that the legislature can delegate the power to determine the circumstances under which a law shall apply. It was concluded that Section 3 does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation and is a valid piece of legislation. 2. Validity of the Notification Exempting Government Buildings: The appellant argued that the notification exempting government buildings from the Act's provisions was outside the scope of Section 3. The Court upheld the validity of the notification, stating that it was within the powers conferred by Section 3. The notification was found to be a legitimate exercise of the power to exempt certain buildings from the Act. 3. Status of the Appellant as a Permanent Tenant: The appellant claimed to be a permanent tenant of the disputed property. The Court noted that the property in question was nazool property, and according to the District Board Rules, no lease for nazool property could exceed one year without government sanction. Both lower courts had found that the appellant was not a permanent tenant, and the High Court affirmed this finding, stating that a permanent lease could not be created without the government's involvement. 4. Compensation for Improvements Made by the Appellant: The appellant sought compensation for improvements made to the property. The Court rejected this claim, noting that there was no agreement authorizing the appellant to make improvements. The Court also pointed out that the appellant had benefited from the improvements during his extended occupancy and that there was no basis for estoppel against the District Board, as there was a clear prohibition against unauthorized alterations. 5. Interpretation of "Construction" in the Notification: The Court examined whether the reconstruction of buildings in dispute amounted to "construction" within the meaning of the notification exempting buildings constructed in specific years from the Act. The Court concluded that every reconstruction involves construction, and the exemption should apply if the entire part of the building was rebuilt. However, it was a question of degree in each case whether the reconstruction amounted to construction within the notification's ambit. 6. Effect of the Expiry of the Exemption Period on the Decree for Ejectment: The appellant argued that since the exemption period had expired, no decree for ejectment should be passed. The Court held that Section 13(1) of the Act does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree for ejectment. The execution of the decree would depend on whether the Act's provisions applied at the time of execution, a matter for the executing court to determine. Conclusion: The High Court dismissed all three appeals. It upheld the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Act and the validity of the notification exempting government buildings. The appellant was not recognized as a permanent tenant, and no compensation for improvements was awarded. The interpretation of "construction" was clarified, and the Court held that the expiry of the exemption period did not preclude the passing of a decree for ejectment.
|
