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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the notification under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. 2. Legislative competence of Parliament to enact the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. 3. Alleged usurpation of judicial functions by the Commission. 4. Alleged violation of Article 14 (Right to Equality) of the Constitution. 5. Alleged mala fide action by the Government. 6. Defective notification for not specifying the time for the Commission's report. 7. Alleged delegation of essential legislative function. 8. Alleged violation of Article 23 of the Constitution. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the Notification under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952: The petitioners argued that the notification exceeded the scope of the Act, which only empowers inquiries into "any definite matter of public importance." The Court rejected this argument, stating that the conduct of individuals or companies could constitute a matter of public importance if it significantly affects public well-being. The Court held that the notification was within the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Act. 2. Legislative Competence of Parliament to Enact the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952: The petitioners contended that Parliament lacked the legislative competence to enact the Act, arguing that inquiries should only be for future legislation. The Court disagreed, noting that inquiries could also be for administrative purposes and that the Act was within Parliament's legislative powers under entries 94 in List I and 45 in List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 3. Alleged Usurpation of Judicial Functions by the Commission: The petitioners argued that the Commission usurped judicial functions. The Court clarified that the Commission only had the power to inquire and make recommendations without any power of adjudication. Therefore, there was no usurpation of judicial functions. However, the Court agreed with the High Court that the portion of clause (10) of the notification, which recommended actions "by way of securing redress or punishment," was beyond the scope of the Act and should be deleted. 4. Alleged Violation of Article 14 (Right to Equality) of the Constitution: The petitioners argued that they were arbitrarily singled out for discriminatory treatment. The Court held that the classification made by the notification was based on an intelligible differentia, which had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. The Court found no evidence that other similarly situated persons or companies were left out, and thus, the plea of violation of Article 14 could not be sustained. 5. Alleged Mala Fide Action by the Government: The petitioners claimed that the notification was issued with an ulterior motive and was not for any legitimate purpose. The Court found no substantial evidence to support this claim and held that the Government acted in good faith based on the information available to it. 6. Defective Notification for Not Specifying the Time for the Commission's Report: The petitioners argued that the original notification was defective as it did not specify the time for the Commission's report. The Court held that the subsequent notification, which specified the time, cured this defect. The two notifications together could be read as a fresh notification under Section 3 of the Act. 7. Alleged Delegation of Essential Legislative Function: The petitioners contended that the notification amounted to a delegation of essential legislative function. The Court held that even if there was delegation, it was not vitiated as the Act laid down its policy, and any legislation by the delegates would have to conform to this policy. 8. Alleged Violation of Article 23 of the Constitution: The petitioners raised this point but admitted that it was premature. The Court did not address this issue substantively, allowing the petitioners to reserve their right to raise it in the future. Conclusion: The appeals Nos. 455, 456, and 457 of 1957 were dismissed with costs. Appeals Nos. 656, 657, and 658 of 1957 were partly allowed to the extent that the words "by way of redress or punishment" in clause (10) of the notification were deleted. No order as to the costs of these three appeals.
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