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Issues Involved:
1. Whether a Magistrate is debarred from sending a complaint disclosing an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session to the police for investigation u/s 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Summary: 1. Issue: Whether a Magistrate is debarred from sending a complaint disclosing an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session to the police for investigation u/s 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court examined whether Clause (a) of the First Proviso to s. 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 prohibits a Magistrate from sending a complaint, which discloses an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session, to the police for investigation u/s 156(3). The case arose from a complaint filed by Respondent 1 alleging that the appellants formed an unlawful assembly and committed various offences including those u/s 307 and 395 IPC, which are exclusively triable by the Court of Session. The Magistrate forwarded the complaint to the police for investigation u/s 156(3). The appellants contended that the Magistrate was bound to proceed with the complaint himself and could not direct the police to investigate, citing the prohibition in the First Proviso to s. 202 of the new Code. The respondents argued that the powers conferred u/s 156(3) are independent of those u/s 202 and that the Magistrate had not taken cognizance of the case when he sent it for investigation. The Court noted that the power to order police investigation u/s 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation u/s 202(1). The former is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, while the latter is at the post-cognizance stage. The Court held that the Magistrate had not taken cognizance of the offence but had only ordered an investigation u/s 156(3). Therefore, the First Proviso to s. 202(1) was not applicable. The Court concluded that the Magistrate was not debarred from sending the complaint to the police for investigation u/s 156(3) and dismissed the appeal. The judgment clarified that the stage at which s. 202 could become operative was never reached in this case.
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