2001 (8) TMI 1369 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside a concurrent finding of fact within the limits prescribed by Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. Whether the appellant was entitled to specific performance of the agreement.
3. Determination of the sale consideration payable by the appellant for the execution of the re-conveyance deed.
4. Whether the appellant had come to the Court with clean hands.
5. The relevance of the rise in property prices in denying specific performance.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Justification of High Court's Decision under Section 100 CPC:
The core issue was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The High Court reversed the decree for specific performance granted to the appellant, construing the agreement as a privilege or concession, thus requiring strict performance. The Supreme Court found this interpretation unsustainable, noting that the High Court erred in treating the agreement as an option to repurchase rather than an ordinary agreement for sale. The Supreme Court emphasized that an agreement for sale and purchase is a reciprocal arrangement and not a unilateral option, thus governed by the laws of contract relating to reciprocal promises.

2. Entitlement to Specific Performance:
The appellant's readiness and willingness to perform the agreement were reiterated in the plaint and supported by evidence. The appellant had sent a legal notice offering to pay the entire amount of Rs. 19,990/- within the period specified in the agreement and filed the suit before the deadline. The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to specific performance, as both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court had rightly determined based on the evidence.

3. Sale Consideration Payable:
The Trial Court decreed specific performance upon the appellant's deposit of Rs. 23,448.75, accounting for additional sums claimed by the respondent. The First Appellate Court modified this, directing the appellant to deposit Rs. 19,990/-, rejecting the respondent's claims for additional amounts. The Supreme Court upheld the First Appellate Court's decision, noting that the respondent had not made any counterclaim or set-off in the suit nor paid any Court fees for such claims.

4. Clean Hands Doctrine:
The High Court denied specific performance under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, alleging that the appellant had falsely claimed not receiving any amount under the first deed of sale. The Supreme Court found that this issue was not raised by the respondent at any stage nor argued before the lower courts. The First Appellate Court had expressly refused to delve into the question of payment under the original sale deed, focusing solely on the specific performance of the second agreement.

5. Rise in Property Prices:
The respondent argued that specific performance should be denied due to the significant rise in property prices. The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, stating that the rise in property prices might be relevant when considering specific performance for the first time, but not when the decree has already been passed by the lower courts and affirmed on appeal. The principle from K.S. Vidyanadam and Others V. Vairavan (1997) would not apply in this context.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and upholding the decision of the First Appellate Court. The appellant was entitled to specific performance of the agreement, and the High Court had erred in its interpretation and application of legal principles. There was no order as to costs.