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Issues Involved: Jurisdiction of the Special Court, Limitation under Articles 12 and 134 of the Limitation Act, Defect of Parties, Admissibility of Partition Documents, Plaintiff's Title to Mortgaged Properties.
Jurisdiction of the Special Court: The appellants contended that the suit was outside the jurisdiction of the Special Court created under the Sangli State Agriculturists Protection Act I of 1936. They argued that the Act authorized the Special Court to take accounts and reopen closed transactions only up to the year 1915, and since the transactions in question were from the years 1898, 1900, and 1901, the Special Court was not competent to grant any relief. The Court held that the Sangli Act had chosen the year 1915 as the dateline for reopening closed transactions but did not limit the court's jurisdiction to grant other reliefs for transactions prior to 1915. Therefore, the Special Court was competent to entertain the suit for redemption. Limitation under Article 12 of the Limitation Act: The appellants argued that the suit was barred by a one-year limitation under Article 12 of the Limitation Act due to an auction sale in 1907. The Court found that neither the plaintiff nor her father was a party to the sale, and thus the sale did not bind the plaintiff. The Privy Council's decision in Malkarjun Bin Shidramappa Pasare v. Narhari Bin Shivappa was distinguished as it involved a judicial determination of the legal representative, which was not the case here. Therefore, the suit was not barred by Article 12. Limitation under Article 134 of the Limitation Act: The appellants contended that the suit was barred under Article 134, which requires suing to recover possession within 12 years from the date the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff. The Court noted that the sale-deeds relied upon by the appellants were not on record, and thus the exact terms of the sale-deeds were unknown. Without proof that the mortgagee transferred a larger interest than justified by the mortgage, Article 134 was not applicable. Therefore, Article 148, which provides a 60-year limitation period, applied, making the suit timely. Defect of Parties: The appellants argued that the suit was bad for defect of parties as the heirs of defendant No. 2 were not brought on record after his death. The Court found that defendant No. 2 had no subsisting interest in the mortgaged property, and any determination in the suit would not bind his heirs. Similarly, the issue of non-service of some legal representatives of defendant No. 8 was addressed, and it was concluded that the suit or appeal was competent in their absence. Therefore, the preliminary objections regarding defect of parties were overruled. Admissibility of Partition Documents: The appellants contended that the documents from 1892, which evidenced separation in estate among the three brothers, were inadmissible for want of registration. The Court held that these documents were admissible for the limited purpose of showing separation in estate, as they did not purport to create or extinguish any right, title, or interest in immovable property. Hence, they were not compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act. Plaintiff's Title to Mortgaged Properties: The Court examined the three mortgage deeds and the plaintiff's claim that the properties were ancestral and had been mortgaged by her father Gundi, with his brothers as sureties. The Court found that the documents from 1892 evidenced a separation in estate among the brothers. On the death of one brother, Rama, and their mother, the properties vested equally in the surviving brothers, Gundi and Sadashiv. Since Sadashiv's share had been sold to Fulchand, the plaintiff could only claim her father's share. Therefore, the appeal was allowed to the extent of Sadashiv's half share, and the decree for possession after redemption was confined to the other half belonging to the plaintiff's father. Conclusion: The appeal was allowed in part, with each party bearing its own costs throughout. The decree for possession after redemption was confined to the plaintiff's father's half share of the mortgaged property.
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