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Issues Involved:
1. Status of the family as an undivided Hindu family. 2. Claim for partition and entitlement to half share in family properties. 3. Alleged prior partition in 1929. 4. Doctrine of blending concerning properties at Jonnagiri. 5. Entitlement to properties acquired under Ex. B-32. 6. Specific claim to items 4 to 61 in Schedule A. 7. Claim to properties in Schedule C. 8. Claim to items 63, 64, and 65 in Schedule A. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Status of the Family as an Undivided Hindu Family: The appellants claimed that their family was an undivided Hindu family with respondent 1 as its manager. The trial court and the High Court both found that the alleged partition in 1929 was not proved. The trial court observed that respondent 1 had manipulated records and coerced the appellants' mother, Neelamma, to execute documents under false pretenses. The High Court confirmed these findings, concluding that the family remained undivided until the suit's institution. 2. Claim for Partition and Entitlement to Half Share in Family Properties: The appellants sought partition, claiming half share in the family properties. The trial court declared the appellants entitled to half share in the properties described in Schedule A (excluding certain items), Schedule B, and Schedule C. The High Court upheld this decision except for items 4 to 61 in Schedule A and properties acquired under Ex. B-32. 3. Alleged Prior Partition in 1929: Respondent 1 argued that a partition had occurred in 1929, rendering the appellants' claim untenable. Both the trial court and the High Court rejected this plea, finding no evidence of such a partition. The courts criticized respondent 1's conduct and manipulation of records to support his claim. 4. Doctrine of Blending Concerning Properties at Jonnagiri: The appellants claimed that properties at Jonnagiri, originally belonging to Channamma, were thrown into the common stock, making them joint family properties. The High Court rejected this claim, stating that the doctrine of blending could not apply to a Hindu female's limited estate. The court emphasized that blending requires clear and unequivocal conduct by a coparcener, which was not evident in this case. 5. Entitlement to Properties Acquired under Ex. B-32: The High Court upheld the trial court's decision that the appellants were not entitled to properties acquired under Ex. B-32. The court found no evidence that these properties had been blended into the joint family estate. 6. Specific Claim to Items 4 to 61 in Schedule A: The appellants' claim to items 4 to 61 in Schedule A was based on the principle of blending. The High Court rejected this claim, finding no evidence of deliberate conduct by Channamma to convert her separate property into joint family property. The court noted that Channamma's surrender deed in 1938 contradicted the appellants' claim. 7. Claim to Properties in Schedule C: The trial court had decreed the appellants' claim to properties in Schedule C, but the High Court reversed this decision. The Supreme Court found that the suit filed by respondents 1 and 2 was intended to benefit the undivided family, with Neelamma's consent. The court held that the decree in the suit enured for the benefit of the whole family, not just respondent 1. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision and restored the trial court's decree regarding Schedule C properties. 8. Claim to Items 63, 64, and 65 in Schedule A: These items were part of the Jonnagiri property, which the appellants could not claim. The trial court and the High Court found that these items were sold to Channappa in 1898 and later surrendered to respondent 1 in 1938. The courts accepted the surrender deed as genuine and valid, rejecting the appellants' claim to these items. Conclusion: The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal, granting the appellants their half share in the properties described in Schedule C while confirming the rest of the High Court's decree. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs.
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