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TMI Blog1961 (2) TMI 61X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eerabhadrappa (died 1927). Gurushantappa married Parvathamma; the two appellants are the sons of Bandappa, their mother being Neelamma. They were born in 1926 and 1929 respectively. Their case was that respondent 1 who has been the manager of the family for many years has been trying to deprive them of their legitimate share in the property and refused their request for partition, and so they had to file the present suit. According to them, in the property of the family they and respondent 1 were entitled to half share each. To the plaint were attached the schedules describing the several items of property. Schedule A consisted of items 1 to 163 which included houses and lands at Jonnagiri. Schedule B described the movables while Schedule C included items 1 to 35 all of which had been acquired by the family under a document Ex. B-32. It is in respect of all these properties that the appellants claimed their half share and asked for a partition in that behalf. This claim was resisted by respondent 1 principally on the ground that in 1929 Ramappa, the father of respondent 1 and the grandfather of the appellants had effected a partition of the joint family properties between respon ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the opinion of the trial court respondent 1 through his agents whom he examined as witnesses in the suit (D. Ws. 2 and 14) managed the family lands, arranged to pay cist for them and manipulated entries in the revenue record purporting to show that Neelamma had paid the said cist as pattadar. Neelamma was an illiterate and Gosha woman and it appeared that a certain amount of coercion had been practised on her as well as deception in persuading her to execute the original of Ex. B-10 which contained the recital that the house there described had fallen to the share of Neelamma's husband at a prior partition. The trial court was satisfied that the said recital had been fraudulently made and the 'document had not been read to Neelamma at all. The demeanour of respondent 1 in the witness box was also criticised by the trial judge when he observed that he did not impress the trial judge as a truthful witness, and in his opinion he was a powerful and influential man in the village who was able to do a number of things as he wished and so it was not surprising that he was able to get a number of witnesses to speak to separate enjoyment of a few items of land by the appellants' ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erties has been rejected by the High Court. Before considering the appellants' case in regard to ,/these properties it is necessary to enquire whether the doctrine of blending can be invoked in such a case. Is this doctrine based on any Sanskrit Text of Hindu Law? According to the decision of the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Rani Prayag Kumari Debi ((1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 331.) this doctrine is based on the text of Yagnavalkya and the commentary of Mitakshara; the text of Yagnavalkya reads thus: In cases where the common stock undergoes an increase, an equal division is obtained (Ch. 1, sect. 4, 30.). In his commentary on this text Vijnyaneshwara has observed as follows: Among unseparated brothers, if the common stock be improved or augmented by any one of them through agriculture, commerce or similar means, an equal distribution nevertheless takes place; and a double share is not allotted to the acquirer (Mitakshara, ch. 1. sect. 4, Pl. 31.). Sir Dinshah Mulla, who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Shiba Prasad Singh ((1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 331.) has observed that the words of Yagnavalkya mean that if a member of a joint family augment ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n stock itself. Therefore, in our opinion, the said text cannot be treated as the basis for the doctrine of blending as it has been judicially evolved. It is, we think, unnecessary to investigate whether any other text can be treated as the foundation of the said doctrine since the said doctrine has been recognised in several decisions and has now become a part of Hindu law. In Rajani Kanta Pal v. Jaga Mohan Pal ((1923) L.R. 50 I.A. 173.) the Privy Council held that Where a member of a joint Hindu family blends his self-acquired property with property of the joint family, either by bringing his self-acquired property into a joint family account, or by bringing joint family property into his separate account, the effect is that all the property so blended becomes a joint family property. The question which falls for our decision is: Does this principle apply in regard to a property held by a Hindu female as a limited owner? In our opinion, it, is difficult to answer this question in favour of the; appellants. The rule of blending postulates that a;, coparcener who is interested in the coparcenary property and who owns separate property of his own may, by deliberate and inte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he basic notion of blending and the basic character of a limited owners' title to the property held, by her. This aspect of the matter has apparently not been argued before the courts below and has not been considered by them. Thus, if the doctrine of blending cannot be invoked in regard to the property held by Channamma, the appellants' claim in respect of the said property can and must be rejected on this preliminary ground alone. However, we will briefly indicate the nature of the evidence on which the plea of blending was sought to be supported. It appears that in 1921 a deed of maintenance was executed in favour of Gurushantappa's widow Parvathamma by the three surviving brothers of Gurushantappa. This deed was attested by their father Kari Ramappa. It is clear that this deed includes some of the lands which Channamma had acquired by succession to her father (Ex. A-10). Subsequently, on July 5, 1923, some additional properties belonging to Channamma were charged to the said maintenance (Ex. A-11). It also appears that pattas in respect of the same lands belonging to Channamma were obtained in the names of the members of the family; and consequently, the said pat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... estate after the lifetime of his widows and daughter. A further declaration was also claimed that alienations and gifts specified in the plaint were invalid beyond the lifetime of the widows and the daughter of Virupakshapna. This suit ended in a compromise decree, and it is common ground that the properties in Schedule C came to the share of respondent 1 by this compromise decree. The question which has been argued before us in respect of these properties is whether or not the appellants are entitled to a share in these properties. The appellants contend that respondent 1 had joined respondent 2 in the said suit as representing their undivided family and the properties acquired by him under the compromise decree passed in the said suit has been allotted to him as representing the whole of the family. On the other hand, respondent 1 contends that he joined respondent 2 in his individual character and the decree must inure for his individual benefit. It is clear that at the time when the said suit was filed respondent 2 was a presumptive reversioner and not respondent 1 ; but it appears that respondent 2 wanted the help of respondent 1 to fight the litigation, and both of them j ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y to bear in mind that respondent 1 has not shown by any reliable evidence that the expenses for the said litigation were borne by him out of his pocket. It is true that both the courts have found that respondent 1 purchased certain properties for ₹ 600/- in 1925 (Ex. B 4). We do not know what the income of the said properties was; obviously it could not be of any significant order; but, in our opinion, there is no doubt that where a manager claims that any immovable property has been acquired by him with his own separate funds and not with the help of the joint family funds of which he was in possession and charge, it is for him to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence his plea that the purchase money proceeded from his separate fund. The onus of proof must in such a case be placed on the manager and not on his coparceners. But,, apart from the question of onus, the evidence given by respondent 1 in this case has been disbelieved, and in the absence of any satisfactory material to show that respondent 1 had any means of his own it would be idle to contend that the expenses incurred for the litigation in question were not borne by the joint family income. Therefore, apart ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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