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Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity of section 143(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 2. Legislative competence of Parliament to tax loss. 3. Reasonableness and arbitrariness of retrospective amendments. 4. Nature of additional income-tax as penalty or tax. Summary: 1. Constitutional Validity of Section 143(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961: The petitioners challenged the constitutional vires of section 143(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as substituted by the Finance Act, 1993, arguing it was ultra vires, illegal, unconstitutional, and void. They contended that the provision imposed additional tax even when the resultant figure after adjustments was a loss, which was beyond the legislative competence of the Union Parliament. 2. Legislative Competence of Parliament to Tax Loss: The petitioners argued that the word "income" in entry 82, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution could not include loss, and thus Parliament could not tax loss. They cited Supreme Court rulings to support their claim that loss is not income and cannot be taxed. The respondent, however, argued that "income" could include deemed or notional income, and thus Parliament had the authority to legislate on such matters. 3. Reasonableness and Arbitrariness of Retrospective Amendments: The petitioners contended that the retrospective amendment was unreasonable and violative of article 14 of the Constitution. They argued that the amendment imposed additional income-tax even in cases where no tax was payable, and without providing an opportunity for a hearing, making it arbitrary and confiscatory. The court found that the retrospective operation of the amendment was unreasonable and arbitrary, thus ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution. 4. Nature of Additional Income-Tax as Penalty or Tax: The court concluded that the levy under section 143(1A) was not a tax on income but a penalty for not declaring income or loss correctly in the return. The provision was intended to ensure accurate declarations in returns and imposed additional income-tax by way of punishment for incorrect declarations. The court held that such a penalty was within the legislative competence of Parliament under entry 82, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Conclusion: The court held that sub-section (1A)(a) of section 143 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as substituted by the Finance Act, 1993, was constitutionally valid, but its retrospective operation was ultra vires the Constitution. The impugned orders imposing additional income-tax on the petitioners were quashed, and the writ petitions were allowed to the extent indicated. Each party was to bear its own costs.
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