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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the refusal to renew the appellant's trading license. 2. Constitutionality of Section 3 of the Lushai Hills District (Trading by non-Tribals) Regulation, 1953 under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 3. Reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the Regulation. Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the Refusal to Renew the Appellant's Trading License: The appellant, a non-tribal trader, had been conducting business in the Mizo District since 1957 under temporary licenses issued by the Mizo District Council. His license was renewed periodically until May 31, 1960. However, the Executive Committee refused further renewal, citing that the number of non-tribal traders had reached its maximum. The appellant challenged this order under Article 226 of the Constitution, claiming it was malafide and discriminatory. The High Court struck down the order to remove his properties and the fine imposed but upheld the refusal to renew the license, stating it was a valid and non-discriminatory order. 2. Constitutionality of Section 3 of the Lushai Hills District (Trading by non-Tribals) Regulation, 1953: The appellant contended that Section 3 of the Regulation, which empowered the District Council to refuse trading licenses to non-tribals, was unconstitutional as it violated his fundamental rights under Articles 14 (equality before the law) and 19(1)(g) (right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business). The High Court rejected this argument, stating that the Regulation was enacted under Paragraph 10 of the Sixth Schedule, which specifically empowered the District Council to regulate and control trading by non-tribals to protect the interests of the tribals. 3. Reasonableness of the Restrictions Imposed by the Regulation: The Supreme Court examined whether the restrictions imposed by Section 3 of the Regulation were reasonable under Article 19(6), which allows for reasonable restrictions on the right to trade in the interest of the general public. The Court noted that while the Regulation aimed to protect tribals from exploitation, it lacked clear principles or standards for granting or refusing licenses. The power to refuse a license was entirely at the discretion of the Executive Committee, with no provision for appeal or judicial review, making the restriction arbitrary and unreasonable. The Court cited several precedents, including the State of Madras v. V.G. Row and R.M. Seshadri v. The District Magistrate, Tanjore, to illustrate that an unbridled discretionary power is not a reasonable restriction. Conclusion: The majority judgment, delivered by Shelat, J., concluded that Section 3 of the Regulation was an unreasonable restriction on the appellant's fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) and was therefore void. Consequently, the order dated July 11, 1960, refusing to renew the appellant's license was set aside, and the appeal was allowed with costs. Dissenting Opinion: Bachawat, J., dissented, arguing that Paragraph 10 of the Sixth Schedule provided a clear policy for the protection of tribals, and Section 3 of the Regulation was in strict conformity with this policy. He contended that the Regulation was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and did not violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(g). He upheld the refusal to renew the appellant's license, stating that the decision was made in the interest of the tribals and was not discriminatory. Order: In accordance with the majority opinion, the appeal was allowed with costs.
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