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Challenge to notification cancelling confirmation of bye-laws related to slaughter of bulls and bullocks under Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act - Infringement of fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Analysis: The petitioner, a slaughterhouse operator, challenged a notification cancelling the confirmation of bye-laws related to the slaughter of bulls and bullocks under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act. The Act empowered the Corporation to regulate slaughterhouses and fix places for animal slaughter. The notification directly impacted the petitioner's right to carry on his vocation, invoking constitutional freedoms under Arts. 14 and 19. The legal backdrop included previous judgments on the slaughter of bovine cattle, establishing the reasonableness of restrictions based on the age and utility of the animals. Attempts to circumvent these judgments through legislation were noted, leading to the enactment of minimum age requirements for slaughter. However, the Court had previously invalidated restrictions on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks, and she-buffaloes below a certain age as not being in the public interest. The State contended that the power to rescind bye-law confirmation was within its authority and that the issuance of slaughterhouse licenses was discretionary. The Court acknowledged the power to cancel bye-laws but emphasized that such actions must be reasonable and not infringe on fundamental rights. The burden of proving reasonableness of restrictions on fundamental rights lies with the State. The Court highlighted the need for restrictions on fundamental rights to be reasonable, especially in cases of total prohibition. The impugned notification, while technically within the State's competence, needed to demonstrate reasonable restrictions in the public interest to be upheld. The Court emphasized evaluating the impact on fundamental rights against the larger public interest and necessity of the restriction. Ultimately, the Court held that the notification infringing on the petitioner's fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(g) was not in the interest of the general public but aimed at respecting sentiments. Therefore, the notification was declared ultra vires, and the petitioner was awarded costs. The validity of other Act provisions and the equality clause was deemed unnecessary for consideration in this judgment.
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