1963 (5) TMI 63 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of applications under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
2. Applicability of the doctrine of res judicata.
3. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal in issuing the direction.
4. Interpretation of the award and its applicability to the respondents.
5. The merits of the respondents' claims.
6. The impact of delay and laches on the claims.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Maintainability of Applications under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act:
The appellant contended that the applications made by the respondents were not maintainable under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court referred to its previous decision in The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan, which established that applications under Section 33C(2) are competent and that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to compute the benefit in terms of money. Therefore, the applications were deemed maintainable.

2. Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Judicata:
The appellant argued that the applications were barred by res judicata due to previous awards in other proceedings between the same parties. The Labour Court rejected this contention, and the Supreme Court upheld this decision, finding no merit in the res judicata argument.

3. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal in Issuing the Direction:
The appellant claimed that the direction in the award was issued without jurisdiction, particularly due to the inclusion of the words "and others." The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's direction pertained to demand No. 11(a), which referred to all workers, not just the four categories specified in demand No. 11(b). The Court found that the inclusion of "and others" was appropriate and justified, and thus, the direction was within the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

4. Interpretation of the Award and Its Applicability to the Respondents:
The appellant contended that the direction did not cover the respondents' cases and that the conditions precedent prescribed by the direction had not been satisfied. The Supreme Court interpreted the award and concluded that the direction applied to all workers who were required to work on Sundays till 1948 and were given a weekly day off without corresponding wage increases. The Court found that the respondents met these criteria and were entitled to the benefits.

5. The Merits of the Respondents' Claims:
The appellant argued that the respondents were not entitled to the claims as they were not required to work on all Sundays in the relevant years. The Supreme Court clarified that the test was whether the workers could have been required to work on Sundays, not whether they actually worked every Sunday. The Labour Court's finding that the respondents were required to work on Sundays before 1948, supported by evidence, was upheld.

6. The Impact of Delay and Laches on the Claims:
The appellant argued that the claims should be barred due to the respondents' delay in making the applications, citing the Payment of Wages Act, which prescribes a limitation period for wage claims. The Supreme Court noted that Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act does not prescribe any limitation period. The Court held that in the absence of legislative provision for limitation, it would not be appropriate for the courts to introduce such limitations. The Labour Court's decision to reject the appellant's contention on the grounds of delay was upheld.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the Labour Court's decisions on all issues. The applications under Section 33C(2) were maintainable, the direction in the award was within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, the respondents were entitled to the benefits, and the claims were not barred by delay or laches. The appeals were dismissed with costs.