2008 (7) TMI 973 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether the order passed by the prescribed authority as affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Kanpur Nagar (Appellate Authority) allowing the release application of Smt. Lajwanti Kathuria respondent-landlady valid?

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Bona fide need of the landlady for additional accommodation.
2. Comparative hardship between the landlady and the tenant.
3. Legality and validity of the second release application.
4. Allegations of sub-letting and alternate accommodations available to the tenant.
5. Concurrent findings of the lower courts and their affirmation by the High Court.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Bona Fide Need of the Landlady for Additional Accommodation:
The landlady, Smt. Lajwanti Kathuria, filed a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent, and Eviction) Act, 1972, citing the need to accommodate her large family, including her sons, daughters-in-law, and grandchildren. She claimed that her family faced "tremendous inconvenience and hardships" due to the shortage of accommodation. The prescribed authority and the Appellate Authority found her need to be bona fide and genuine, stating that the landlady required additional rooms for her family members, including separate rooms for her sons, their wives, and children, as well as rooms for her married daughter and her family who frequently visited her.

2. Comparative Hardship Between the Landlady and the Tenant:
The prescribed authority and the Appellate Authority conducted a comparative hardship analysis and concluded that the hardship faced by the landlady was greater than that of the tenant. The tenant's claim that he would suffer irreparable injury and hardship if evicted was not substantiated by evidence. The authorities noted that the tenant and his family had other accommodations available in Kanpur, whereas the landlady's need for additional space was pressing and genuine.

3. Legality and Validity of the Second Release Application:
The tenant contended that the second release application was an abuse of process since a previous application for the same relief had already been allowed by the Appellate Authority in 1983. However, the court found that the circumstances had changed since the first application, and the landlady's need for additional accommodation had become more pressing. The prescribed authority and the Appellate Authority found no legal impediment in entertaining the second release application, and the High Court affirmed this view.

4. Allegations of Sub-Letting and Alternate Accommodations Available to the Tenant:
The landlady alleged that the tenant had sub-let the premises to one R.N. Singh and had other accommodations available in Kanpur. The tenant denied these allegations but failed to provide convincing evidence. The prescribed authority found that the tenant's son, Ajay Juneja, owned a house in Kanpur, and other family members also had separate accommodations. The court concluded that the tenant had not made any effort to secure alternate accommodation during the eviction proceedings and that the landlady's allegations were substantiated by evidence.

5. Concurrent Findings of the Lower Courts and Their Affirmation by the High Court:
The High Court dismissed the tenant's writ petition, affirming the concurrent findings of the prescribed authority and the Appellate Authority. The High Court held that the findings of bona fide need and comparative hardship in favor of the landlady did not warrant interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the entire material on record, found no merit in the tenant's appeal and upheld the High Court's judgment, stating that no illegality, infirmity, or error of jurisdiction was shown.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the tenant's appeal, affirming the lower courts' findings of bona fide need and comparative hardship in favor of the landlady. The court granted the tenant time until 31.06.2009 to vacate the premises, subject to filing an affidavit of undertaking to deliver vacant possession by the stipulated date. There was no order as to costs.