1994 (12) TMI 331 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the writ petition.
2. Applicability of the statutory time-limit for deemed permission.
3. Validity of the Metropolitan Authority's order under Section 13(3) of the BMRDA Act.

Summary:

Jurisdiction of the High Court to Entertain the Writ Petition:
The appellant contended that the writ petition should not have been entertained by the High Court as the writ petitioner had an adequate alternative statutory remedy, which was already availed by filing an appeal before the statutory authority. The Supreme Court agreed, stating, "This is a case, where there is not only the existence of an alternative remedy but the writ petitioner actually had availed of that remedy. The writ petitioner's appeal before the statutory authority was pending. In that view of the matter this writ petition should not have been entertained."

Applicability of the Statutory Time-Limit for Deemed Permission:
The respondent-Company argued that permission must be deemed to have been granted as the Metropolitan Authority did not refuse permission within 60 days as required by Section 13(3) of the Act. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, clarifying that the statutory fiction of deemed permission arises only if there is a failure on the part of the Metropolitan Authority to pass an order within 60 days of the receipt of the application. The Court stated, "No question of this time-limit arises when the Appellate Authority quashes the order and directs a fresh order to be passed." The Court further noted, "The application received by the Metropolitan Authority on 15-7-1977 was disposed of by an order dated 8-9-1977 within the requisite period of 60 days. Therefore, there is no question of the deeming provision coming into operation in this case at all."

Validity of the Metropolitan Authority's Order under Section 13(3) of the BMRDA Act:
The respondent-Company contended that the Metropolitan Authority had no jurisdiction to pass any order dealing with the application under any provision except Section 13(3). The Supreme Court agreed, stating, "The consequential order passed by the Metropolitan Authority after it was quashed by the High Court must be treated as an order under Section 13(3) of the Act for the purpose of appeal and the limitation must be counted from the date of the fresh order." However, the Court clarified that the time-limit for passing an order under Section 13(3) does not apply to the fresh order that has to be passed after the appellate order or the High Court's direction.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment under appeal dated 15-6-1994, and stated, "The appellant will be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs." The related Civil Appeals Nos. 9153-54 of 1994 were also allowed in view of the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 9152 of 1994.