2014 (1) TMI 1710 - SC - Indian Laws

Rejection of claim of the writ petitioner Podhu Dikshitars to administer the Temple - Held that - Explanation to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the CPC ) provides that if the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based, is reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, it shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Thus, even an erroneous decision cannot be a ground for the court to undertake review, as the first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and in absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed In view of the fact that the rights of the respondent no. 6 to administer the Temple had already been finally determined by the High Court in 1951 and attained finality as State of Madras (as it then was) had withdrawn the notification in the appeal before this Court, we are of the considered opinion that the State authorities under the Act 1959 could not pass any order denying those rights. Admittedly, the Act 1959 had been enacted after pronouncement of the said judgment but there is nothing in the Act taking away the rights of the respondent no. 6, declared by the court, in the Temple or in the administration thereof. Even if the management of a temple is taken over to remedy the evil, the management must be handed over to the person concerned immediately after the evil stands remedied. Continuation thereafter would tantamount to usurpation of their proprietary rights or violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution in favour of the persons deprived. Therefore, taking over of the management in such circumstances must be for a limited period. Thus, such expropriatory order requires to be considered strictly as it infringes fundamental rights of the citizens and would amount to divesting them of their legitimate rights to manage and administer the temple for an indefinite period. We are of the view that the impugned order is liable to be set aside for failure to prescribe the duration for which it will be in force. The word regulate is difficult to define as having any precise meaning. It is a word of broad import, having a broad meaning and may be very comprehensive in scope. Thus, it may mean to control or to subject to governing principles. Regulate has different set of meaning and must take its colour from the context in which it is used having regard to the purpose and object of the legislation. The word regulate is elastic enough to include issuance of directions etc. The power under the Act 1959 for appointment of an Executive Officer could not have been exercised in the absence of any prescription of circumstances/ conditions in which such an appointment may be made. More so, the order of appointment of the Executive Officer does not disclose as for what reasons and under what circumstances his appointment was necessitated. Even otherwise, the order in which no period of its operation is prescribed, is not sustainable being ex facie arbitrary, illegal and unjust.Thus, the appeals are allowed.

Issues Involved:
1. Violation of constitutional rights under Article 26.
2. Right of Podhu Dikshitars to administer the temple.
3. Applicability of doctrine of res judicata.
4. Validity of the appointment of an Executive Officer under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Violation of Constitutional Rights under Article 26:
The appellants contended that Article 26 of the Constitution confers certain fundamental rights on religious denominations, which include the right to manage their own affairs in matters of religion and to administer their properties. The Podhu Dikshitars, being declared a religious denomination, claimed that their right to administer the temple's properties was protected under Article 26. The court reiterated that the rights conferred under Article 26 are subject to public order, morality, and health, and not to any other provision of Part III of the Constitution. The court emphasized that the State could regulate the secular activities of the temple but could not divest the Dikshitars of their right to manage and administer the temple and its properties.

2. Right of Podhu Dikshitars to Administer the Temple:
The court examined whether the Podhu Dikshitars constituted a religious denomination and whether they had the right to participate in the administration of the temple. It was noted that the High Court of Madras in an earlier judgment had recognized the Podhu Dikshitars as a religious denomination with the right to administer the temple, which had been established for over several centuries. The court held that the earlier judgment, which attained finality as the State withdrew the notification, recognized the Dikshitars' exclusive privilege to administer the temple. Therefore, the State authorities could not pass any order denying those rights.

3. Applicability of Doctrine of Res Judicata:
The court discussed the doctrine of res judicata, which prevents the same parties from litigating the same issue that has already been finally determined by a competent court. The court emphasized that even an erroneous decision on a question of law attracts the doctrine of res judicata. The court held that the earlier judgment of the High Court recognizing the Dikshitars as a religious denomination and their right to administer the temple operated as res judicata, and the High Court erred in holding otherwise.

4. Validity of the Appointment of an Executive Officer:
The court examined the validity of the appointment of an Executive Officer under Section 45 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959. It was noted that the appointment of an Executive Officer must be subject to conditions prescribed by rules. The court held that in the absence of any rules prescribing the conditions for such an appointment, the appointment of the Executive Officer was not valid. Additionally, the court emphasized that the management of the temple must be handed over to the concerned persons immediately after the evil (maladministration) is remedied, and any continuation thereafter would amount to usurpation of their proprietary rights or violation of their fundamental rights. The court concluded that the impugned order appointing the Executive Officer was liable to be set aside for failure to prescribe the duration for which it would be in force.

Conclusion:
The appeals were allowed, and the judgments/orders impugned were set aside. The court held that the Podhu Dikshitars, being a religious denomination, had the right to administer the temple and its properties, and the earlier judgment recognizing these rights operated as res judicata. The appointment of the Executive Officer was invalid due to the absence of prescribed conditions and the failure to specify the duration of the appointment.

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