1963 (11) TMI 87 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the suspension order dated July 18, 1959.
2. Applicability and interpretation of Article 314 of the Constitution.
3. Validity of Rules 3, 7, and 10 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955.
4. Authority competent to suspend a member of the Indian Civil Service/Indian Administrative Service.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Suspension Order Dated July 18, 1959:
The appellant, a member of the Indian Civil Service, was suspended by the Governor of Punjab on July 18, 1959, due to a pending criminal case. The appellant contended that the suspension violated Article 314 of the Constitution, which guaranteed the same rights as respects disciplinary matters as those enjoyed before the Constitution's commencement. The appellant argued that under Rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (Appeal Rules), suspension was only permissible as a penalty, and there was no provision for suspension pending a criminal case. The Supreme Court held that the power to suspend as an interim measure pending a departmental enquiry or criminal proceedings existed under general principles of master and servant law. However, the Court found that the power to suspend a member of the former Secretary of State's Services as an interim measure was vested only in the appointing authority, which, in the changed circumstances, was the Government of India. Consequently, the suspension order by the Governor of Punjab was invalid.

2. Applicability and Interpretation of Article 314 of the Constitution:
Article 314 guaranteed that members of the former Secretary of State's Services would retain the same conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave, pension, and disciplinary matters. The Court interpreted "rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances may permit" to mean rights similar to those existing before the Constitution, considering only the constitutional changes post-1947. The Court rejected the respondent's argument that suspension pending a departmental enquiry or criminal proceedings was not a disciplinary matter. It held that such suspension was indeed related to disciplinary matters and thus protected under Article 314.

3. Validity of Rules 3, 7, and 10 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955:
The appellant challenged the validity of Rules 3, 7, and 10 of the Discipline Rules as violative of Article 314. Rule 3 omitted suspension as a penalty, and Rule 10 provided for appeals only against penalties mentioned in Rule 3. The Court did not find it necessary to decide on the vires of Rules 3 and 10, as the suspension order was not made under Rule 3 but under Rule 7. The Court focused on Rule 7, which allowed suspension pending departmental enquiry or criminal proceedings. It held that Rule 7 was ultra vires Article 314 to the extent it allowed any authority other than the Government of India to suspend members of the Indian Administrative Service who were former members of the Indian Civil Service.

4. Authority Competent to Suspend a Member of the Indian Civil Service/Indian Administrative Service:
The Court examined the historical context and legal provisions governing the suspension of members of the Secretary of State's Services. It concluded that, before the Constitution, such suspension could only be ordered by the appointing authority, which was the Secretary of State or the Government of India post-1947. The Court rejected the argument that the Governor of a Province could suspend such members as an interim measure. It held that the appointing authority in the changed circumstances was the Government of India, and only it could suspend such members pending departmental enquiry or criminal proceedings. Consequently, Rule 7 of the Discipline Rules, which allowed suspension by authorities other than the Government of India, was declared ultra vires Article 314.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, declaring Rule 7 of the Discipline Rules ultra vires Article 314 to the extent it permitted suspension by authorities other than the Government of India. The suspension order dated July 18, 1959, was set aside. The appellant was not entitled to further relief regarding emoluments, as the Governor's order of September 11, 1963, had already granted full emoluments for the suspension period. The State of Punjab was ordered to pay the appellant's costs in the Supreme Court and the High Court.