1979 (9) TMI 200 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the order of termination was passed by way of punishment, thereby violating Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
2. Whether the termination order was violative of Article 16 of the Constitution due to discriminatory treatment.
3. Whether the termination order was passed with mala fide intent.
4. Whether the respondent had become a permanent employee under Rule 4(2)(iv) of the Bombay Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1956.
5. Whether the termination order violated the provisions of Article 235 of the Constitution.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Violation of Article 311(2) - Termination as Punishment:
The High Court held that the respondent should be deemed confirmed in his post as his work was satisfactory and a vacancy was available, thus making the termination order a violation of Article 311(2). However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the rule does not imply automatic confirmation after the probationary period. The court emphasized that the respondent continued in an officiating capacity without an express order of confirmation. The termination was thus not by way of punishment but a simple notice of termination, permissible under the terms of employment. The Supreme Court referenced previous judgments, including *State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh* and *Kedar Nath Bahl v. State of Punjab*, to support the necessity of an express order for confirmation.

2. Violation of Article 16 - Discriminatory Treatment:
The respondent argued that he was purposefully picked for discharge while his juniors were retained, violating Article 16. The Supreme Court found no substance in this argument, noting that no other officers from the same batch had been confirmed by 1971, and the respondent's service record was not satisfactory. The court emphasized that the order was not arbitrary or discriminatory.

3. Mala Fide Intent:
The High Court did not hear arguments on mala fides, and the Supreme Court also found no substantial argument on this point. The respondent's allegations of ill-feeling and ill-will by superior officers were not supported by specific allegations or evidence. The court reiterated that adverse remarks in the respondent's service record justified the termination, and no hostile discrimination was alleged against the High Court or Government officials involved in the decision.

4. Permanent Employee Status under Rule 4(2)(iv):
The High Court held that the respondent should be deemed confirmed under Rule 4(2)(iv) of the Bombay Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1956. The Supreme Court disagreed, clarifying that the rule does not provide for automatic confirmation after the probationary period. The court emphasized that the respondent continued in an officiating capacity, and no express order of confirmation was made. The Supreme Court referenced *State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh* and *Kedar Nath Bahl v. State of Punjab* to support this interpretation.

5. Violation of Article 235:
The High Court decided this point against the respondent. The Supreme Court did not find it necessary to delve into this issue further, given the conclusions on the other points.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed the respondent's Writ Petition. The court held that the termination was not by way of punishment, was not discriminatory, and did not violate Articles 311(2) or 16 of the Constitution. The respondent was not deemed confirmed in his post, and the termination was permissible under the terms of his temporary appointment. The Supreme Court also addressed the procedural aspects of examining official records, emphasizing that such scrutiny is warranted only when a prima facie case is made by the government servant.

Separate Judgment:
Justice Pathak concurred with the judgment but expressed reservations about the observations related to the entitlement of a government servant to information from official records. He emphasized that the court should scrutinize records when a prima facie case is made, but declined to do so in this case due to the lack of substantial allegations by the respondent.