2004 (5) TMI 591 - SC - Indian Laws

Jurisdiction of the Tribunal - Whether a dispute is said to be pending before an industrial Tribunal for the purpose of proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 ( the Act ) during the period when operation of the order of reference of dispute itself remained stayed - HELD THAT - In the present case as on date of dismissal of workmen from service the interim order staying the operation of the order of reference was operative. Hence the question of dispute being pending on that day did not arise. As already stated in order to make an application under proviso to Section 33(2) (b) of the Act pendency of the proceeding was essential. In this view the appellant companies did not contravene the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. No doubt the object of Section 33 of the Act is to protect the workman concerned during pendency of the proceedings in a dispute against victimization by the employer for having raised industrial dispute or his continuing the pending proceedings. Further it is to ensure that the proceedings in connection with the industrial disputes already pending should be concluded in a peaceful atmosphere and to say that no employer should during pendency of the proceedings take action of any kind mentioned in the said Section giving rise to fresh disputes leading to straining the relations between the employer and the workman. But then the requirements of the said Section are to be satisfied in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the said provision. For the purpose of the present case pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal was pre-requisite condition for making an application under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. Since the proceedings were not pending at the relevant time i.e. on the date of dismissal of the workmen by virtue of the interim order granted by the High Court the preliminary objection raised by the appellant Companies as to the very maintainability of complaint u/s 33A is valid and sustainable. The question set out above in the beginning of this judgment is answered in the negative. Thus viewed from any angle in our considered opinion the impugned order cannot be sustained. The preliminary objection raised by the appellant companies is upheld and consequently the complaint made by the respondent-workmen is dismissed as not maintainable. We must however make it clear that this order does not prejudice or preclude the respondent workmen from questioning the validity and correctness of the order of their dismissal from service by raising appropriate dispute in accordance with law. The appeals are accordingly allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether a dispute is said to be pending before an industrial Tribunal for the purpose of proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, during the period when the operation of the order of reference of dispute itself remained stayed.

Summary:

Issue 1: Whether a dispute is pending before an industrial Tribunal during the stay of the order of reference:
The core issue was whether a dispute is considered pending before an industrial Tribunal for the purpose of proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, when the operation of the order of reference of the dispute itself was stayed. The appellants argued that the stay of the order of reference meant that no proceedings were pending before the Tribunal, thus no violation of Section 33(2)(b) occurred when the workmen were dismissed. The Tribunal and the High Court had previously held that the dispute was pending despite the stay, relying on the decision in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Assn.

The Supreme Court analyzed the legal position and the effect of the stay order. It distinguished between the stay of further proceedings and the stay of the order of reference itself. The Court concluded that when the operation of the order of reference is stayed, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to proceed, and thus no dispute is pending before it. The stay of the order of reference meant that no proceedings were pending before the Tribunal on the date of dismissal of the workmen, and therefore, the requirements of Section 33(2)(b) were not applicable.

The Court emphasized that the stay of the operation of the order of reference by the High Court meant that the dispute was not pending before the Tribunal. The Tribunal could not take any action, including granting approval for disciplinary actions, during the stay. The Supreme Court upheld the preliminary objection raised by the appellant companies and dismissed the complaint made by the respondent-workmen as not maintainable. The Court clarified that the respondent workmen could still challenge the validity of their dismissal through appropriate legal channels.

The appeals were allowed, and the impugned order was set aside.