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Issues:
1. Interpretation of Section 66(3), Income Tax Act, regarding the requirement for the Commissioner of Income Tax to state a case. 2. Application of Section 48(1) for a refund of income tax in a specific scenario. 3. Analysis of Sections 50 and 50-A in relation to the time limit for claiming a refund. 4. Consideration of alternative remedies under Section 45, Specific Relief Act. Analysis: The case involves an application by an assessee, a limited company, seeking a reference to the High Court under Section 66(3), Income Tax Act, regarding the eligibility for a refund of income tax under Section 48(1). The company claimed that the Crown had levied tax on its dividends at a higher rate, diminishing the amount received. The primary argument against the application was that Section 66(3) is controlled by Section 66(2), which restricts the Commissioner from stating a question of law under Section 48. This contention alone was deemed sufficient to dismiss the application. The Government Advocate further argued that even if Section 66(3) did not apply, recourse to Section 45, Specific Relief Act, was not permissible due to the provisions of Sections 50 and 50-A. Section 48(1) of the Act allows for a refund of income tax if the rate applicable to the company's profits is higher than the rate applicable to the shareholder's total income. The company contended that the tax on its dividends was higher than warranted, leading to a claim for a refund. However, the Commissioner rejected the application as time-barred under Section 50, which mandates a claim within a specified period. The Court noted that while it may seem unfair for an assessee to apply for a refund before assessment, the legislative remedy lies in amending the law rather than judicial intervention. Regarding Sections 50 and 50-A, the Court emphasized the strict time limits for claiming refunds and highlighted the absence of provisions for extending the application period under Section 48. The Government Advocate argued that the availability of an appeal process under Section 50-A precluded the assessee from seeking relief under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act. Citing precedents, the Court concluded that the application failed to meet the criteria under Section 66(3) and that the assessee had alternative avenues for redress, leading to the dismissal of the mandamus application with costs. In a concurring opinion, Ba U., J., agreed with the analysis and decision of the Chief Justice, emphasizing the adequacy of existing legal remedies and the Court's role in interpreting rather than influencing the government's discretionary decisions on refunds. The judgment underscores the importance of adhering to statutory timelines for claiming refunds and the limitations on judicial intervention in tax matters.
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