2015 (10) TMI 2630 - SC - Indian Laws

Peaceful functioning of fair price shop in Gram Sabha Ardauna, Tehsil Sadar, District Mau - Held that - In the instant case, shop no.2 had become vacant. The appellant was allotted the shop, may be in the handicapped quota but such allotment is the resultant factor of the said shop falling vacant. The original allottee, that is the respondent, assailed his cancellation and ultimately succeeded in appeal. We are not concerned with the fact that the appellant herein was allowed to put her stand in the appeal. She was neither a necessary nor a proper party. The appellate authority permitted her to participate but that neither changes the situation nor does it confer any legal status on her. She would have continued to hold the shop had the original allottee lost the appeal. She cannot assail the said order in a writ petition because she is not a necessary party. It is the State or its functionaries, who could have challenged the same in appeal. They have maintained sphinx like silence in that regard. Be that as it may, that would not confer any locus on the subsequent allottee to challenge the order passed in favour of the former allottee. She is a third party to the lis in this context. The land of which possession is given and the landless persons who have received the Pattas and have remained in possession, they have a right to retain their possession. It will be an anarchical situation, if they are not impleaded as parties, whereas in a case which relates to a post or position or a vacancy, if he or she who holds the post because of the vacancy having arisen is allowed to be treated as a necessary party or allowed to assail the order, whereby the earlier post holder or allottee succeeds, it will only usher in the reverse situation an anarchy in law. The question to be posed is whether there is curtailment or extinction of a legal right of the appellant. The writ petitioner before the High Court was trying to establish her right in an independent manner, that is, she has an independent legal right. It is extremely difficult to hold that she has an independent legal right. It was the first allottee who could have continued in law, if his licence would not have been cancelled. He was entitled in law to prosecute his cause of action and restore his legal right. Restoration of the legal right is pivotal and the prime mover. The eclipse being over, he has to come back to the same position. His right gets revived and that revival of the right cannot be dented by the third party. In view of the aforesaid premises, we do not perceive any merit in this appeal and, accordingly, the same stands dismissed

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
2. Procedural lapses in the cancellation of the original allottee's licence.
3. Rights of the subsequent allottee vis-`a-vis the original allottee.
4. Concept of necessary and proper parties in legal proceedings.
5. Applicability of principles of natural justice.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution:
The appellant invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 2.3.2012 passed by the Commissioner, Azamgarh Division, and a writ of mandamus against the respondents to not interfere with the peaceful functioning of the fair price shop.

2. Procedural Lapses in the Cancellation of the Original Allottee's Licence:
The original allottee's licence was suspended based on complaints of non-distribution of essential commodities. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate ordered an enquiry, and after obtaining the report, suspended the licence and called for an explanation. The final enquiry report indicated improper distribution of essential commodities, leading to the cancellation of the allotment. The appellate authority found serious procedural lapses, including reliance on oral statements without proper enquiry, non-provision of the investigation report to the allottee, and a faulty investigation by the Block Development Officer.

3. Rights of the Subsequent Allottee vis-`a-vis the Original Allottee:
The appellant, who was a subsequent allottee, argued that her rights were independent and she had a right to challenge the appellate order. The High Court dismissed her writ petition, stating she had no right to continue the litigation as a subsequent allottee. The Supreme Court upheld this view, stating that the appellant was not a necessary party to the litigation and could not challenge the order passed in favor of the original allottee. The original allottee's cancellation was overturned, and his allotment and licence were restored, rendering the appellant's allotment void.

4. Concept of Necessary and Proper Parties in Legal Proceedings:
The Supreme Court discussed the concept of necessary and proper parties, emphasizing that a necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively, while a proper party is one whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision. The appellant was not considered a necessary party as she did not have an independent legal right to contest the original allottee's cancellation. The Court referred to various precedents to illustrate this principle, including Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, and others.

5. Applicability of Principles of Natural Justice:
The principles of natural justice, particularly the right to be heard, were discussed. The appellate authority found that the original allottee was deprived of an opportunity to submit his clarification due to procedural lapses. The Supreme Court reiterated that principles of natural justice must be applied contextually, and in this case, the original allottee's right to a fair hearing was violated. The subsequent allottee's claim was dismissed as she was not directly affected by the procedural lapses that led to the original allottee's cancellation.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, emphasizing that the appellant, as a subsequent allottee, had no independent right to challenge the appellate order favoring the original allottee. The procedural lapses in the cancellation of the original allottee's licence were significant, and the principles of natural justice were not adhered to, leading to the restoration of the original allottee's licence. The concept of necessary and proper parties was crucial in determining the appellant's lack of standing in the case.

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