1973 (9) TMI 104 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues:
1. Validity of the prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
2. Compliance with the provisions of section 10(7) of the Act.
3. Validity of the written consent for prosecution under section 20 of the Act.

Analysis:

1. Validity of the Prosecution: The appellant was convicted under section 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The prosecution's case was based on the Food Inspector finding adulterated groundnut oil being used for frying potato chops at the appellant's stall. The appellant's defense that the oil was not for sale or food preparation was rejected by the trial court, the Additional Sessions Judge, and the High Court. The key issue raised was regarding the validity of the prosecution under the Act.

2. Compliance with Section 10(7) of the Act: The appellant argued non-compliance with section 10(7) of the Act as the Food Inspector did not have witnesses present during the purchase of the oil. However, this argument was not raised before the High Court, and thus, was not considered by the Supreme Court as it involved questions of fact.

3. Validity of Written Consent for Prosecution: The main contention before the Supreme Court was the validity of the written consent for prosecution under section 20 of the Act. The appellant argued that the consent given by the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, was not valid as it was a general authority and did not specify individual offenses. The Act was amended in 1964, and the relevant section now allowed for general authorizations. The Court held that even before the amendment, a general authority for consent was permissible. The Court referred to various High Court judgments supporting this interpretation and upheld the validity of the prosecution.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, stating that there was no ground to interfere with the sentence. The Court upheld the validity of the prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and clarified that general authorization for consent to prosecute was permissible even before the Act's amendment. The judgment provided a detailed analysis of the legal provisions and interpretations regarding the prosecution and consent under the Act, setting a precedent based on previous High Court decisions.